Opinion
Cr.A. No: 99-06-0244R1, ID No. 9905017167.
Date Submitted: June 13, 2000.
Date Decided: September 19, 2000.
ORDER
Upon review of Movant Jody C. Childress ("Movant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court:
1) Movant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on a plea to Trafficking Cocaine 5-50 grams.
2) On October 28, 1999, Movant was sentenced to five years at Level V, suspended after three years for two years at Level m.
3) In this motion, Movant asserts that his advice to plead guilty was based upon an insufficient factual investigation by his defense counsel. Movant also claims that his counsel did not meet with him at any time prior to the guilty plea to discuss with him defense strategies and alternative options.
4) In reviewing motions for postconviction relief the Court must first determine whether a defendant's claim is barred by procedural requirements prior to addressing the merits of the underlying claims. Rule 61(d)(4) provides for summary dismissal by the Court "[I]f it plainly appears from the motion . . . and the record . . . that the movant is not entitled to relief; the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal. . . ."
Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
5) The Court finds that defendant's claim is essentially one of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant has the burden of showing that an attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards and that such conduct was prejudicial to him.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "[t]he movant must support the ineffective assistance of counsel claims with concrete allegations of actual prejudice, otherwise the movant risks summary dismissal." The Strickland test requires that the defendant must prove the defense counsel's conduct fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness," and "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial" to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
State v. Mason, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. 1N98-02-0279-Rl, Barron, J. (Apr. 11, 1996) (Mem. Op.), citing Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 556 (1990).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). See Albury v. State, Del.Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1988).
Under Strickland, Defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to substantiate the claim. In addition, a claim of ineffective assistance based solely on counsel's strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of law and facts is insufficient to prove the claim that counsel's professional performance was ineffective.
Outten v. State, Del.Supr., 720 A.2d 547 (1998); Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (1996).
Duffy v. State, Del.Supr., No. 529, 1992, Horsey, J. (Jan. 27, 1993).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 66 (1984).
6) After reviewing the record, the Court finds that there is no basis for Movant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant claims that his advice to plead guilty was based upon an insufficient factual investigation by his defense counsel. Defense counsel obtained discovery prior to the defendant's first Fast-Track hearing. The defendant told defense counsel at that hearing that he wanted to obtain private counsel. The Court granted defense counsel's application for a continuance so the defendant could obtain private counsel, John Deckers, Esquire. Mr. Deckers advised the defendant in a letter that his best option was to have his current attorney try to negotiate a better plea offer from the State, and that the defendant would not benefit significantly from retaining private counsel. Mr. Deckers extended an assessment of the legal issues and facts in the letter.
At final case review, defendant was represented by defense counsel who did exactly what Mr. Deckers advised, a better plea offer was negotiated for the defendant. After negotiating a better plea offer, Movant signed the Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form in open court after a full colloquy with the sentencing judge. Movant further does not state how a more thorough factual investigation by defense counsel would have been beneficial to him. A review of the facts of this case reveal that New Castle County Police found over five grams of cocaine in the Defendant's residence.
Movant further states that the defense counsel did meet with the defendant at the hearing to promote the plea offer of the State, but defense counsel never met with him in a "physical" sense to discuss factual and legal issues of the case. Not only does defendant concede to meeting with counsel, but he also had the opportunity to meet with additional defense counsel, Mr. Deckers to discuss his case. Mr. Decker's letter to the defendant also acknowledges the fact that the defendant received a copy of the discovery and the plea offer as well as the legal facts and issues. The fact that Movant now disagrees with his attorney's advice is not a ground of relief for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
7) Movant has failed to establish that defense counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Defense counsel negotiated a better plea offer for the Movant from the State. Since the Movant has failed to establish the first prong of the Strickland test, his Motion for Postconviction Relief is summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 61 (d)(4). For the reasons stated above, defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is: DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________ The Honorable Richard S. Gebelein
Orig: Prothonotary Cc: Jody C. Childress James W. Garvin, Jr., Esq. Joelle M. Wright, Esq., DAG