Opinion
NUMBER 2016 KA 1000
12-22-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LOUIE LOUIS CHANDLER, JR.
Scott Perrilloux District Attorney Livingston, LA Greg Murphy Assistant District Attorney Livingston, LA Brad Cascio Assistant District Attorney Livingston, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee State of Louisiana Katherine M. Franks Louisiana Appellate Project Abita Springs, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Louie Louis Chandler
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On appeal from the Twenty-First Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Livingston State of Louisiana
Docket Number 32808 Division "A"
Honorable Jeffrey Johnson, Judge Presiding Scott Perrilloux
District Attorney
Livingston, LA Greg Murphy
Assistant District Attorney
Livingston, LA Brad Cascio
Assistant District Attorney
Livingston, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
State of Louisiana Katherine M. Franks
Louisiana Appellate Project
Abita Springs, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Louie Louis Chandler BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, AND MCCLENDON, JJ. GUIDRY, J.
Defendant, Louie Louis Chandler, Jr., was charged by bill of information with possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine), a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2). He initially pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress. Following the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, defendant withdrew his former plea of not guilty, and he entered a plea of nolo contendere while reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). In accordance with a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years at hard labor, to be served concurrently with any other sentence defendant is already serving. Defendant now appeals, alleging a single assignment of error relating to the motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
Because defendant pled nolo contendere, the facts of his offense were not developed at a trial. Deputy Nick LoCicero of the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office described the facts of the offense at the suppression hearing,
Deputy LoCicero testified that around 11:40 p.m. on September 9, 2015, he observed a vehicle traveling on Florida Boulevard with an inoperable license plate light. As a result, the vehicle's license plate was not clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear. See La. Admin. Code tit. 55, § 813. Deputy LoCicero followed the vehicle briefly before initiating a traffic stop. As he followed the vehicle, Deputy LoCicero illuminated it with his spotlight. With the vehicle illuminated, Deputy LoCicero observed the driver leaning downward out of his view, making what he described as "furtive" movements toward the floorboard. Once the driver stopped the vehicle, Deputy LoCicero approached and made contact with him through an open window. Deputy LoCicero identified defendant as the driver of the vehicle.
Upon contacting defendant, Deputy LoCicero advised him of the reason for the traffic stop and requested his license, registration, and insurance. After defendant provided the requested items, Deputy LoCicero noticed him display "several nervous indicators, more than what should be on a regular traffic stop." In particular, Deputy LoCicero described that defendant was breathing unusually heavy and refused to make eye contact during the course of their conversation. Deputy LoCicero also shined his flashlight into defendant's vehicle and saw a black magnetic box on the floorboard that defendant appeared to try to conceal with his right leg. At that time, Deputy LoCicero requested that defendant exit the vehicle.
Deputy LoCicero testified that defendant became "increasingly more nervous" upon stepping out of the vehicle. Deputy LoCicero placed his hand on defendant's chest and felt that his heart was beating rapidly. Deputy LoCicero asked defendant about his nervous behavior. In response, defendant placed his head in his hands and said, "Will you help me?" Deputy LoCicero asked defendant what he needed help with and asked if he had anything on him, particularly marijuana. Defendant replied, "No, dope."
On the basis of defendant's statement, Deputy LoCicero detained defendant and began to look in his vehicle for drugs. Deputy LoCicero soon located three plastic baggies of suspected crystal methamphetamine in a cup in the center console of the vehicle. The total package weight of these items was eight grams. According to Deputy LoCicero, defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and thereafter confirmed that the substance in the baggies was methamphetamine. A field test also returned a positive reaction for the presence of methamphetamine in the substance.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues that Deputy LoCicero extended what should have been a routine traffic stop into a custodial interrogation, leading to his un-Mirandized inculpatory statement. Defendant contends that this statement should be suppressed as involuntary, causing the ensuing search to become "fruit of the poisonous tree" because it was unjustifiable for any other lawful reason.
Initially, we note that these exact issues were reviewed in a writ application filed with this court. In State v. Chandler, 15-1903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/7/16), defendant sought review of the denial of his motion to suppress. In an unpublished decision, this Court denied the writ application. Although a pretrial determination does not absolutely preclude a different decision on appeal, judicial efficiency demands that this Court accord great deference to its pretrial decisions unless it is apparent, in light of a subsequent trial record, that the determination was patently erroneous and produced an unjust result. See State v. Humphrey, 412 So.2d 507, 523 (La. 1982) (on rehearing); State v. Patterson, 08-0416, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/08), 995 So.2d 38, 40. Nonetheless, we elect to discuss briefly the merits of defendant's argument.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Whether the Fourth Amendment protects an individual from a warrantless search rests on whether the individual can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy against government intrusion. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). A defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence from use at a trial on the merits on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained. La. C. Cr. P. 703(A). The state bears the burden of proving admissibility when a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence seized without a warrant. La. C. Cr. P. art. 703(D).
As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. The standard is a purely objective one that does not take into account the subjective beliefs or expectations of the detaining officer. Although they may serve, and may often appear intended to serve, as a prelude to the investigation of much more serious offenses, even relatively minor traffic violations provide an objective basis for lawfully detaining the vehicle and its occupants. State v. Waters, 00-0356, p. 4 (La. 3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1056 (per curiam). In Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held that subjective intentions of the police are irrelevant to the probable cause analysis.
Once an officer has lawfully stopped a vehicle for a routine traffic violation, he is authorized to order both the driver and passenger out of the vehicle for his own safety and that of the occupants. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); State v. Benoit, 01-2712, p. 6 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So.2d 11, 15. An officer may temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). See also La. C. Cr. P. 215.1. The suspicion required to justify such a detention need not rise to the level of probable cause although it must be based on more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other than the traffic violation for which the defendant was stopped justifies further investigation. See State v. Lopez, 00-0562, p. 3 (La. 10/30/00), 772 So.2d 90, 92 (per curiam).
A warrantless search is unreasonable unless the search can be justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). An exception to the warrant requirement exists when there is probable cause to search an automobile. The warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable if there is probable cause to justify the search, without proving additional exigency, when the automobile is readily mobile because there is an inherent risk of losing evidence. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam).
The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. The detaining officer must have knowledge of specific, articulable facts, which, if taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the stop. Public safety requires some flexibility for police officers to investigate and prevent crime. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the officer's past experience, training, and common sense may be considered in determining if his inferences from the facts at hand were reasonable. Deference should be given to the experience of the officers who were present at the time of the incident. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress the evidence is entitled to great weight because the court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Lowery, 04-0802, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/17/04), 890 So.2d 711, 718, writ denied, 05-0447 (La. 5/13/05), 902 So.2d 1018. Correspondingly, when a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887, p. 11 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.
In the instant case, Deputy LoCicero's initial stop of defendant was justified by his probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred in connection with the unilluminated license plate. As he followed and eventually stopped defendant, Deputy LoCicero saw defendant making "furtive" downward movements to the floorboard of his vehicle, and he observed behavior by defendant that appeared to be more nervous than that typically connected to a routine traffic stop. Under Sokolow and La. C. Cr. P. art. 215.1(A), Deputy LoCicero was entitled to ask defendant to explain his actions. This interaction did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation, as would trigger defendant's Miranda rights. When defendant informed Deputy LoCicero that he was in possession of drugs, the officer gained probable cause to search the vehicle, where he found the methamphetamine. See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467, 119 S.Ct. at 2014. Defendant's subsequent admission that the substance was methamphetamine came after he had been informed of his Miranda rights.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. The initial traffic stop was supported by probable cause to believe a traffic violation had taken place. Defendant subsequently admitted during a routine, non-custodial interaction that he was in possession of drugs, giving Deputy LoCicero probable cause to search the vehicle.
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).