Opinion
No. 37337-8-II.
January 21, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 07-1-00237-9, Anne Hirsch, J., entered January 14, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Van Deren, C.J., and Hunt, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
David Chambers appeals his conviction of one count of bail jumping. He argues the trial court erred by not taking the bail jumping charge away from the jury for lack of sufficient evidence and that his counsel was ineffective for not presenting Chambers's claim that he did not knowingly fail to appear. We affirm.
FACTS
By an amended information, the State charged Chambers with three counts of possession of stolen property and one count of bail jumping. At trial, the State called Don Smith, the prosecutor who initially charged the case. Smith testified that State's exhibit 3 was an order for continuance, that it contained a warning advising Chambers that "[f]ailure to appear may result in . . . criminal prosecution for bail jumping," and that the document was signed by "the defendant." I Report of Proceedings (RP) at 37. When Chambers did not appear for his status hearing, the trial court called out his name in open court and then issued a warrant for his arrest when no one replied.
The defense called Chambers to testify about his bail jumping charge. Chambers testified that "[e]verything that I get across the table I give to my mother out there. She tells me about my court dates." RP at 45. Chambers also indicated that he had a hearing problem which may have interfered with his ability to understand the trial court's instructions. He then reiterated that his mother took care of all his court dates for him.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the bail jumping charge, but it did not reach a verdict on the three possession of stolen property counts, which the trial court dismissed. Chambers appeals.
ANALYSIS Sufficiency of Evidence
Chambers contends that insufficient evidence showed that he knowingly failed to appear for his status hearing. He argues that "[h]ere, the State produced the aforementioned order bearing Chamber's name, but it presented no evidence to show that Chambers was the person who had signed the document: no booking fingerprints, eyewitness identification or distinctive personal information" and that he never admitted to signing the document during his testimony. Appellant's Br. at 4.
Under Salinas, "[t]he test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). "When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant." Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
Drawing the inferences from the evidence most strongly in favor of the State, it is reasonable for a jury to infer that Chambers's signature on a court order written in bold, italicized, capital letters directly above his name reading, "Failure to appear may result in . . . criminal prosecution for bail jumping" indicated he knew he had an obligation to appear on September 26. State's exhibit 3. Chamber's signature on the order for trial continuance was not the only evidence establishing his identity; Smith testified as well.
Smith testified that he knew Chambers, that the order was signed by "the defendant," and that "[t]he defendant is required to appear at those hearings. I was there on [September 26, 2007]. They're scheduled at 9 in the morning. He did not appear on that date, and when they don't appear, I request a warrant from the court, and that's what happened on September 26th." I RP at 38-39. Smith's sworn statements made before the jury in open court constitute sufficient evidence of Chamber's identity. Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to reach a verdict on the charge for bail jumping.
Ineffective Assistance
Chambers also contends that his counsel's failure to present his claim that he did not knowingly fail to appear for his status hearing prejudiced Chambers. Under Strickland, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Chambers must overcome a strong presumption that his counsel's performance was not deficient. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004).
As discussed above, sufficient evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict on Chamber's bail jumping charge. Therefore, defense counsel was not deficient for failing to bring such a motion. State v. Briggins, 11 Wn. App. 687, 692, 524 P.2d 496 (1974) (holding "[t]he failure to argue a groundless matter does not constitute a denial of effective counsel"). Because counsel's performance was not deficient, we do not address the prejudice prong. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HUNT, J., DEREN, C.J., concur.