Opinion
ID 0311009491A.
Submitted: June 13, 2007.
Decided: July 9, 2007.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.Brian J. Robertson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Michael D. Chambers, Albion, Pennsylvania, pro se.
ORDER
This 9th day of July 2007, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. A jury found Defendant guilty of Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance on September 26, 2006. Defendant then filed a motion for new trial, pro se, on November 21, 2006, which this Court denied on January 11, 2007.
2. Defendant's four grounds for relief, in their entirety, are as follows:
Ineffectiveness of assistane [sic] of counsel
Before movant represented his self [sic] pro se, movant asked public defender . . . to subpoena witnesses in order to exonerate movant, but movant was denied this right and therefor [sic] couldn't prepare for his case!
Speedy trial rights 6th Amendment
Movant asserts that the State of Delaware and Attorney General's office were aware of, that movant was detained in Chester County prison as early as 6-6-04 but didn't try movant until 9-21-06. Uniform Extradition Act applys [sic] when a capias of detainer is issued.
Due process
Movant asserts the State of Delaware caused the 2 ½ year delay in bringing movant to trial, and when delays are caused by the State due to a situation in its control, there is no abuse of judicial discretion in dismissing the charges.
6[th] Amendment claim
Movant asserts that his 6[th] Amendment right to confront his accuser was violated when public defender refused to subpoena witnesses and filed motions such as a Franks hearing be held [sic] to confront the alledge [sic] "tip" of confidential informant.
3. Before addressing the merits of a motion for postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Rule 61. If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claim. Moreover, if it "plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified." The Court "will not address Rule 61
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated."
Zimmerman v. State, 1991 WL 190298 (Del.Super.).
4. Defendant's motion claims that his counsel failed to subpoena witnesses and that the State delayed in bringing him to trial. However, these allegations are vague and conclusory. Defendant offers no factual or legal support for his claims. Therefore, his motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.