Opinion
MMXCR181761760 MMXCR181761770 MMXCR181761790 MMXCR181761800 MMXCR18214949T MMXCR18264914T MMXCR182933370
03-20-2019
STATE of Connecticut v. Monchi CASTILLO-COSME
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Keegan, J.
At issue is whether the court should grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss his outstanding arrest warrants for an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). On December 4, 2018, the defendant filed his motion to dismiss accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law. On January 18, 2019, the State filed a brief in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the defendant filed a reply brief on January 28, 2019, and the court heard oral argument on February 20, 2019. Based on a review of the parties’ arguments and relevant case law, the court hereby denies the defendant’s motion as to seven files and grants the motion on one file.
FACTS
By agreement dated February 13, 2019, the parties stipulated to the following facts. The defendant, Monchi Castillo-Cosme, was arrested and detained in the state of Rhode Island for charges in connection with crimes committed there. On December 8, 2014, he was sentenced to twelve years in prison, followed by thirteen years of probation stemming from the Rhode Island charges. Prior to his sentence, a warrant was signed on April 4, 2014, authorizing the defendant’s arrest for the crimes of robbery in the first degree, larceny in the sixth degree, and criminal mischief in the third degree, which were all allegedly committed in the town of Cromwell, Connecticut, on or about December 18, 2013. This warrant was then entered into the NCIC system and the defendant was identified as a "wanted person." On April 25, 2014, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (DOC) received a signed copy of the Cromwell Police Department’s arrest warrant for the defendant. Thereafter, on April 28, 2014, the defendant signed for and received a copy of the Cromwell arrest warrant. Throughout 2014, several arrest warrants were signed, authorizing the defendant’s arrest.
The state of Connecticut only lodged a detainer pertaining to this one warrant. No other jurisdictions in Connecticut have lodged detainers against the defendant in Rhode Island while he was serving his sentence.
Several warrants were signed authorizing the arrest of the defendant for the following crimes and on the following dates: March 3, 2014: robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, larceny in the third degree, and conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree allegedly committed in the town of Rocky Hill; July 9, 2014: robbery in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, larceny in the fifth degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit larceny in the fifth degree, allegedly committed in the town of Enfield; August 15, 2014: robbery in the second degree and larceny in the fourth degree, allegedly committed in the town of Manchester; August 19, 2014: robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, allegedly committed in the town of Windsor; August 19, 2014: robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, allegedly committed in the town of Enfield; and September 26, 2014: robbery in the first degree allegedly committed in the town of Enfield.
On January 15, 2015, the defendant met with Counselor Michael Gingras of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, who provided him with forms to request disposition of his Connecticut charges pursuant to the IAD. On the same day, the defendant completed and returned the forms to Gingras requesting disposition on his Connecticut charges. Gingras has confirmed that he forwarded the completed IAD forms to the records department of the Rhode Island DOC, however, the Rhode Island DOC has no record of ever having received the defendant’s request for disposition dated January 15, 2015 or having sent the request to the State of Connecticut by certified or registered mail, or by any other means. Moreover, the state of Connecticut has indicated that they never received a request for disposition of the charges that were executed by the defendant on January 15, 2015, either by certified or registered mail, or by any other manner from the Rhode Island DOC.
On March 12, 2015, Massachusetts authorities lodged a formal detainer with Rhode Island for charges that were then pending in that jurisdiction. On April 29, 2015, the defendant filed a formal request to dispose of the charges on which the Massachusetts detainer was based. Thereafter, on June 12, 2014, the defendant was extradited to Massachusetts in connection with charges based in Northampton and Worcester. Upon being sentenced, he was then returned to Rhode Island on November 16, 2016.
On March 20, 2018, the defendant signed IAD paperwork requesting a disposition of a Connecticut detainer for the second time. The defendant’s request was honored and he was appropriately returned to Connecticut pursuant to the request on July 24, 2018.
I.
A review of the legal principles that govern the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is necessary to provide a context for the defendant’s claims. Because the IAD is an interstate compact that ... Congress has sanctioned, we must interpret its provisions in accordance with federal law." State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78, 85, 554 A.2d 686 (2003); see also Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716-19, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985); see also State v. Braswell, 194 Conn. 297, 304, 481 A.2d 413 (1984); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). "In searching for the applicable federal law, we may, however, look to relevant decisions in both federal and state courts." State v. Herring, supra, 210 Conn. 85; see also Pinto v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn.App. 24, 30, 768 A.2d 456 (2001); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000).
The IAD "is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact [that was enacted] to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of ... charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 57 Conn.App. 478, 482, 749 A.2d 67 (2000). "The purpose of the IAD is to establish a cooperative procedure for disposition of charges against a prisoner in one state who is wanted to respond to untried criminal charges in another state." State v. Taylor, 63 Conn.App. 386, 412, 776 A.2d 1154 (2001). "The IAD is activated when the state seeking the prisoner (the receiving state) files written notice that he is wanted to answer charges in that state ... This notice, referred to as a detainer, is simply a notification filed with the institution in which the prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction." (Citation omitted.) Id., 412; see also H.R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S.Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2 (1970) (house and senate reports providing for definition of a detainer).
The IAD "contains two trigger mechanisms. The provisions of the agreement itself are activated only when the receiving or charging state lodges with the sending or asylum state a detainer ... At that point the time clock can be activated by the detainee, under article III, or by the prosecuting authority in the charging state, under article IV." (Citations omitted.) Narel v. Liburdi, 185 Conn. 562, 567, 441 A.2d 177 (1981). "To initiate proceedings under article III, the detainee must give or send to his custodian ... a written request for final disposition of the [charges] lodged against him in the charging state and shall cause to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecutor’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and of his request for final disposition." Id., 568-69.
Once the provisions of the agreement are activated, two requirements must be met in order to protect a defendant’s rights: (1) officials of the custodial state must promptly forward an inmate’s disposition request; and (2) upon receiving that request, the receiving state must initiate a trial within 180 days. See 98 A.L.R.3d 160, § § 2, 10 (2012); see also General Statutes § 54-186. In regards to the first requirement, Article III(b) "places an independent requirement on custodial officials. Because officials of the custodial state act as agents of the demanding state for purposes of the IAD ... if custodial officials fail to act promptly in transmitting the prisoner’s request the charges in the demanding state must be dismissed." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braswell, 194 Conn. 297, 305, 481 A.2d 413 (1984); see also Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52-59, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); State v. Morris, 74 Wash.App. 293, 297, 873 P.2d 561 (1994); People v. Diaz, 94 Misc.2d 1010, 1014, 406 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1978) (holding custodial officials act as agents of demanding state).
In regards to the second requirement, our Supreme Court has ruled that "the demanding state must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days of the date on which the demanding state receives the prisoner’s request for final disposition." (Emphasis added.) State v. Braswell, supra, 194 Conn. 305; see State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78, 86, 554 A.2d 686 (1989); accord H.R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S.Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2 (1970) ("Any request is transmitted through the warden to the proper official ... who then has 180 days to bring the prisoner to trial"); see also Pinto v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 62 Conn.App. 33 ("[T]he IAD unquestionably requires delivery, and only after that has occurred can one entertain the possibility of counting the 180 days from the transmittal to the warden"). But see Beebe v. State, 346 A.2d 169, 171 (1975) (ruling clock begins when prisoner asks custodial officials to prepare and send IAD forms).
II.
The defendant first argues that the Connecticut charges must be dismissed because the Rhode Island custodial officials failed to promptly forward his initial disposition request executed on January 15, 2015, to Connecticut. In support, the defendant relies upon State v. Braswell, supra, 194 Conn. 305. The State contends that the defendant’s reliance on Braswell is misplaced because the court’s statement that a custodial official’s failure to act promptly in transmitting a prisoner’s disposition request necessitates dismissal is mere dicta, and is not essential to its holding.
Our Supreme Court in State v. Braswell stated: "Under Article III(b) custodial officials shall promptly forward the prisoner’s request for final disposition to the demanding state. This section places an independent requirement on custodial officials. Because officials of the custodial state act as agents of the demanding state for purpose of the IAD ... if custodial officials fail to act promptly in transmitting the prisoner’s request the charges in the demanding state must be dismissed." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braswell, supra, 194 Conn. 305 (ruling delay of 25 days in forwarding request did not violate promptness requirement of IAD). The court disagrees with the State’s argument that this language is mere dicta. In Braswell, our Supreme Court relied on the plain language of the IAD in its analysis and made a determination that the defendant’s charges could not be dismissed because the 25-day delay did not violate the promptness provision. It is this court’s position that the Supreme Court would not have addressed the defendant’s argument on the promptness requirement if that provision of the IAD was not essential to its decision, Moreover, this court’s interpretation of Article III of the IAD is consistent with other courts nationwide. See State v. Morris, supra, 74 Wash.App. 297; People v. Diaz, supra, 94 Misc.2d 1014; see generally Fex v. Michigan, supra, 507 U.S. 52-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the defendant met with Gingras on January 15, 2015, prepared IAD documents to request a disposition of his Connecticut charges, and Gingras confirmed that the paperwork was forwarded to the records department of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections. The defendant’s act in preparing his IAD documents and providing them to Gingras, a custodial official, was all that he was required to do to implicate the IAD. See State v. Morris, supra, 74 Wash.App. 299; Pinto v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 62 Conn.App. 32 (noting IAD implicated when prisoner substantially complies to the extent possible). Therefore, the court must consider whether Rhode Island fulfilled its requirement in promptly carrying out the defendant’s request.
Our Supreme Court in Braswell, ruled that "a delay of 25 days in forwarding the request, particularly when there is evidence that the request was mishandled by the postal service, [does not constitute] a failure to act ‘promptly’ that would warrant dismissal of the charges." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braswell, supra, 194 Conn. 305. Here, unlike in Braswell, no evidence was presented to suggest that any third party mishandled the defendant’s request, resulting in a delay. Rather, what is clear is that the defendant properly submitted his disposition request and Rhode Island failed to honor it altogether. The execution of the defendant’s IAD paperwork and transmittal to Gingras on January 15, 2015 constituted a request for a disposition of the charges against him, and that request was never acted upon by Rhode Island, until the defendant was required to execute another request on March 20, 2018. This substantial delay, caused by the custodial officials in Rhode Island, who, under Article III, were acting as agents of Connecticut, resulted in the defendant’s request being ignored for a period of three years. Rhode Island’s negligence in failing to carry out the defendant’s request for three years is in direct contravention of the purpose of the IAD and is a clear violation of the defendant’s right to a prompt transmittal. The court recognizes the heavy burden that inmates face when a detainer is lodged against them; see Carchman v. Nash, supra, 473 U.S. 730 n.8; thus, when a sending state fails to promptly transmit a defendant’s IAD request to a receiving state, the sending state is in violation of the promptness requirement. Accordingly, the Connecticut charges that formed the basis for the detainer lodged against the defendant are hereby dismissed.
The court, in Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 730 n.8, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court noted the detrimental effect detainers have on a prisoner’s treatment. Specifically, the court provided that when a detainer is lodged: "[T]he inmate is (1) deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed; (2) classified as a maximum or close custody risk; (3) ineligible for initial assignments to less than maximum security prisons (i.e., honor farms or forestry camp work); (4) ineligible for trustee status; (5) not allowed to live in preferred living quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release programs or work-release programs; (7) ineligible to be transferred to preferred medium or minimum custody institutions within the correctional system, which includes the removal of any possibility of transfer to an institution more appropriate for youthful offenders; (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs which carry higher wages and entitle [him] to additional good time credits against [his] sentence; (9) inhibited by the denial of possibility of parole or any commutation of his sentence; (10) caused anxiety and thus hindered in the overall rehabilitation process since he cannot take maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities."
III.
Next, the State argues that if the defendant’s rights were violated under the IAD, the only charges that may be dismissed are those that created the basis for the detainer filed in Rhode Island. In support, the State asserts that the provisions of the IAD only apply to the charges that form the basis of the detainer. On the other hand, the defendant asserts that the language in Article III(d) of the IAD should be interpreted to encompass all charges pending in the receiving state in order to effectuate the purpose of the IAD and to avoid a piecemeal resolution of multiple charges pending in a receiving jurisdiction.
Article III(d) of the IAD provides in relevant part: "Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed." (Emphasis added.) § 54-186. Our Supreme Court has ruled that the IAD requirements "apply only to the charges specifically contemplated by the detainer." State v. Taylor, supra, 63 Conn.App. 414; see also Hicks v. State, 719 S.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Mo.App. 1986). While the plain language of this ruling is compelling and binding upon this court, the Supreme Court in Taylor made this ruling in the context of charges that arose after a detainer was lodged, and the defendant had been transferred to the receiving state. As a result, the Taylor ruling does not provide any guidance as to charges that were pending prior to a detainer being lodged by a receiving state. Nevertheless, other jurisdictions support the proposition that the IAD is not applicable to charges that do not form the basis of a detainer. See State v. Setzer, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CR-09-0091261-S (October 10, 2017, Cradle, J.) (holding IAD requirements apply only to charges specifically contemplated by detainer); Layton v. State, 150 P.3d 173, 177 (2007) (holding charges that did not form basis of detainer do not implicate application of IAD).
In the present case, Connecticut lodged one detainer in Rhode Island, which concerned the warrant signed by the Cromwell Police Department on April 4, 2014, relating to charges of: robbery in the first degree, larceny in the sixth degree, and criminal mischief in the third degree. While there were outstanding warrants that were signed to secure the arrest of the defendant, no other jurisdiction or prosecuting authority within Connecticut filed a detainer with the Rhode Island DOC to secure the defendant’s presence. Thus, a detainer was only lodged as to the April 4, 2014 charges. Accordingly, because the court has ruled that the defendant’s right to prompt transmittal was violated under the IAD, the only charges that will be dismissed are the charges pertaining to the April 4, 2014 warrant signed by Cromwell.
IV.
Finally, the defendant argues that all charges pending against him must be dismissed because all four factors of the Barker v. Wingo analysis weigh in his favor. The State argues that all four factors weigh in favor of the State. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court outlined a four-part test in determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. "The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed ... [The factors include] length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id.
Because the court has ruled that the charges that have formed the basis for the detainer lodged against the defendant are dismissed, the court need not analyze whether the defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
SO ORDERED.