Opinion
No. 108,074.
2013-06-7
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jose Luis CASTILLO, Appellant.
Appeal from Seward District Court; Clint B. Peterson, Judge. Razmi Tahirkheli, of Tahirkheli & Farley, L.L.C., of Osawatomie, for appellant. Don L. Scott, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Seward District Court; Clint B. Peterson, Judge.
Razmi Tahirkheli, of Tahirkheli & Farley, L.L.C., of Osawatomie, for appellant. Don L. Scott, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BUSER, P.J., McANANY and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Jose Luis Castillo appeals his convictions for criminal threat, criminal damage to property, and disorderly conduct. Finding no error, we affirm the convictions.
On August 22, 2011, Castillo was charged with aggravated assault, criminal threat, domestic battery, criminal damage to property, and disorderly conduct. These crimes were alleged to have occurred on August 21, 2011. The victim, with one exception, was Castillo's wife, Anabel Castillo; the victim of the criminal damage to property charge was Anabel's mother, Manuela Garcia. The district court appointed Razmi Tahirkheli as Castillo's counsel. A preliminary hearing was held before a magistrate judge and Castillo was bound over for trial. The record indicates Castillo retained Tahirkheli after the preliminary hearing. On October 25, 2011, Castillo pled not guilty before the Honorable Clint B.Peterson.
On January 6, 2012, Judge Peterson held a pretrial conference. On that same day, Tahirkheli filed two identical motions to recuse Judge Peterson. In his motions Tahirkheli asked the trial judge to “recuse himself from this case pursuant to K.S.A. 20–311d(5).” Tahirkheli alleged the judge had “personal prejudice” against Tahirkheli. Still on January 6, 2012, but later in the day, an affidavit by Tahirkheli was filed. There was no case caption, and the affidavit does not show service.
In the affidavit, Tahirkheli alleged Judge Peterson had “shown his personal prejudice and bias towards me by not allowing my [clients] their basic constitutional protections and an opportunity for a fair and impartial trial.” Tahirkheli provided generalized examples. For example, he claimed Judge Peterson had “tried to personally demean me by his statements on and off the record,” had “refused, again and again, to allow me to present my evidence or my defense on behalf of my clients,” had “threatened me with sanctions for wrong or frivolous reasons on and off the record,” and had “made [ex parte] communications against me and my clients.” Tahirkheli also stated that he had filed “a judicial complaint against [Judge Peterson] with the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications.” The record does not contain a transcript of the pretrial conference.
After the conference, Judge Peterson filed a pretrial order which stated: “[Tahirkheli] asks the Judge to be recused. The Court denies said motion.” Tahirkheli approved the order, and it appears he prepared it as well.
Trial was held on February 27, 2012. The State dismissed the domestic battery charge at the start of trial. The State called Anabel as its first witness. She testified that she and Castillo had lived in Liberal with their son. Manuela also lived in Liberal.
According to Anabel, on August 20, 2011, she, and Castillo, and their son attended a party in Kismet. At the party, Anabel and Castillo argued after he accused her of cheating on him. Anabel said Castillo usually did not drink alcohol, but that he was drinking at the party. Castillo insisted that he would drive home. Anabel did not want to ride with Castillo, especially because their son was with them. Anabel also did not want to return home, testifying, “I didn't want to argue with him. I mean, he had been weird all night long already.” As a result, she called her mother, who arrived with Anabel's father and took Anabel and her son to the mother's house. Anabel testified, “I just wanted to stay there and me cool down, him cool down.”
Anabel testified that Castillo called at about 3 a.m. and asked her to come home. Manuela drove Anabel to the trailer house, leaving the son with Anabel's father. On the way home, according to Anabel, Castillo called again and said, “[I]f I didn't show up, that he would burn down the house.” Anabel testified she “took it more like a ... figure of speech,” saying, “I knew he wasn't going to do it.”
Upon arrival at the trailer house, Manuela did a U-turn, let Anabel out of the car, and waited. Anabel testified that when she went inside Castillo “started coming towards me,” but Anabel said she saw nothing in Castillo's hands and left only because she “didn't want to argue any more.” Anabel did admit at trial that she “kind of got scared” and “took off running outside,” but she attributed it to Castillo being “mad.”
Manuela testified that Anabel had called from the party at about 10 or 10:30 p.m. Manuela did not remember Anabel receiving any telephone calls during their 3 a.m. trip from her house to the trailer house. Manuela acknowledged being told her tire was flat after arrival at the trailer house, but she claimed she was unaware of the cause.
In marked contrast to Anabel's testimony, a 911 recording on the day of the incident showed that Anabel had reported that Castillo had threatened to stab her with a knife and then chased after her. Anabel related this same version to responding police officers. She also testified that Castillo had slashed the tires on her mother's car.
Officers responding to the 911 call testified that Anabel was “hyper, ... frightened, ... crying, ... upset,” and exhibiting rapid speech on that night. Anabel provided a written statement at the police station, which apparently repeated her allegations, but the statement and the other trial exhibits, including photographs of the knife allegedly used in the incident and a slashed tire on Manuela's car, were omitted from the record on appeal.
Trial testimony did establish some details Anabel had related to officers at the police station. Anabel said Castillo was in the kitchen sharpening a knife when she entered the trailer house. Anabel said “[h]ey” to get Castillo's attention, and he “stood up and said, ‘I told you stupid Bitch.’ and put the knife sharpener down on the table.” Anabel said this caused her to run, and the police later found a knife lying on a counter and a sharpener protruding from a drawer in the otherwise neat and orderly kitchen.
At trial, Anabel claimed she initially reported Castillo with a knife because “he needed ... to learn a lesson,” apparently referring to his drinking. Anabel also said she was angry because “we'd been married for close to 10 years, and we went through a lot of things together, you know. So for him to say that I was cheating on him ... he really upset me and made me really mad.” When Tahirkheli called Anabel as a defense witness, she testified to leaving the knife on the counter after preparing food for the party. Castillo did not testify.
The jury acquitted Castillo of aggravated assault, but he was convicted of the remaining charges. Castillo appeals.
Claim of Judicial Misconduct
On appeal, Castillo contends he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial and due process because of Judge Peterson's bias and prejudice. In particular, Castillo complains that the trial judge's denial of his motion for acquittal and comments about Anabel and Manuela's credibility, exhibited bias which prejudiced his constitutional rights. The prejudice alleged is that Tahirkheli was required “to limit his cross examination of the main witnesses to the bare minimum” and that when the defense presented Anabel in the defendant's case-in-chief “she was nervous on the stand because she had heard the court's opinion of her” when denying Castillo's motion for acquittal. Notably, in Castillo's brief, these indicia of prejudice are not referenced to the record.
The State responds that by presenting evidence in the defense case, Castillo has waived any claim of error regarding the denial of the motion for acquittal. Additionally, the State contends Judge Peterson had good reason to deny the motion for acquittal, he did not limit Castillo's cross-examination, and the “defendant made no showing of judicial misconduct.”
Preliminarily, Castillo does not appeal or brief Judge Peterson's denial of his pretrial motions to recuse due to bias and prejudice. As a result, Castillo has waived or abandoned any right to appeal the district judge's adverse ruling regarding the motions to recuse. See State v. Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 858, 249 P.3d 425 (2011).
Turning to our standards of review, appellate courts have unlimited review over allegations of judicial misconduct. State v.. Kemble, 291 Kan. 109, 113, 238 P.3d 251 (2010). Our Supreme Court provided further guidance regarding how appellate courts should evaluate these claims in State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012) and State v. Schaeffer, 295 Kan. 872, 286 P.3d 889 (2012). In Robinson, the Supreme Court explained:
“Thus, when a criminal defendant alleges judicial bias, we restate our test as follows: First, the defendant must show that the trial judge has a duty to recuse. Second, the defendant must show actual bias or prejudice that warrants setting aside the conviction or sentence. But bias or prejudice will be presumed when, based on objective standards, the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” 293 Kan. at 1032.
Our Supreme Court also applied the Robinson standard in Schaeffer. The district judge in Schaeffer had excoriated the defendant at sentencing for the heinous nature of his crimes. The defendant argued on appeal that the “excessive and ill-advised comments by the district judge demonstrate that his sentences were the products of judicial bias, prejudice, or corrupt motive.” 295 Kan. at 875. Citing Robinson, our Supreme Court instructed:
“In order to succeed on such a claim, [defendant] must first show that the judge had a duty to recuse under the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct and failed to do so and, second, that actual bias or prejudice warrants setting the sentence aside. We have recently held that bias or prejudice may be presumed when, based on objective standards, the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. [Citation omitted.]” Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at 875.
Employing this test in Schaeffer, our Supreme Court first rhetorically asked whether the judge should have recused himself. 295 Kan. at 875–76. Because the judge's comments, especially “those regarding [defendant] living in the same town as certain members of the judge's family ... might cause a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality,” our Supreme Court concluded that “the judge should have recused.” 295 Kan. at 876. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not find reversible error because the defendant had “not demonstrated that actual bias or prejudice warrants setting aside his sentences” and no objective standards established a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias. See295 Kan. at 875–77.
This court, therefore, must ask whether Judge Peterson should have recused himself based upon his comments and adverse ruling in response to Castillo's motion for acquittal. It is not apparent, under objective standards, that the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable here. See Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at 875–76 (giving examples such as a pecuniary interest in the outcome). Accordingly, bias and prejudice will not be presumed, and “[r]eversal is not required unless the judge's conduct actually prejudiced [Castillo's] rights.” See 295 Kan. at 876. “The complaining party has the burden to establish that misconduct occurred and that the misconduct prejudiced the party's substantial rights.” Kemble, 291 Kan. at 113.
Castillo argues Judge Peterson “obviously denied the ... motion for acquittal not because of any legal reason but because of the court's bias against [Castillo] and against the witnesses, which the court believed were helping [Castillo] by lying.” The State responds that it “clearly established sufficient evidence to convict ... although the jury acquitted on the charge of aggravated assault.” The State also contends Castillo waived this issue by presenting evidence in his case-in-chief, but the issue here is whether the denial of the motion for acquittal was actual bias or prejudice, not the validity of the conviction itself.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, an appellate court examines the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the conviction. The applicable standard of review is well known: When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In evaluating the evidence, a court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence.” State v. Ta, 296 Kan. 230, Syl. ¶ 3, 290 P.3d 652 (2012).
Castillo argues the district judge showed bias and prejudice because there was insufficient evidence produced by the State to prove both the aggravated assault charge and the criminal threat charge. With respect to aggravated assault, the State charged Castillo with placing Anabel “in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife.” Castillo implies that because the “State tried to show that [Anabel] ... was lying under oath but she was telling the truth when being interviewed by the police and when she was not under oath,” a rational factfinder could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Castillo cites no legal authority that a jury may consider only statements made under oath or later affirmed by the declarant while under oath. He also does not contest the admissibility of Anabel's statements to the 911 dispatcher or responding police officers or her written statement which obviously incriminated Castillo.
Castillo is, therefore, asking this court to make a credibility determination, the same complaint he makes against Judge Peterson. In essence, he is arguing that Anabel's account on the night in question was not credible, but that is beyond this court's standard of review. 7b, 296 Kan. 230, Syl. ¶ 3. A rational factfinder could have concluded based on all the evidence, including the slashed tire, that Anabel's account to the responding police officers was, in fact, the honest account of what happened.
As for criminal threat, Castillo cites State v. Holt, 221 Kan. 696, 561 P.2d 435 (1977), and makes conclusory assertions about the judge's bias and prejudice. Our Supreme Court has not accepted conclusory allegations or speculations in affidavits submitted in support of recusal. See State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 606, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007); State v. Brown, 266 Kan. 563, 570, 973 P.2d 773 (1999). Here as well, Castillo's allegations are not sufficient, especially considering the jury's guilty verdict on this charge.
Under these circumstances, did Judge Peterson have a “duty to recuse under the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct”? See Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at 875. Castillo does not brief the applicable provisions of the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct which are critical to answering this question.
Disqualification or recusal is controlled by Supreme Court Rule 601B, Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 2, Rule 2.11(A) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 729), and its contents are summarized by the opening clause: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at 876. Impartiality is defined as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, any particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.” Supreme Court Rule 601B, Terminology (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 716). In short:
“Disqualification of a judge is appropriate when the circumstances and facts of the case ‘create reasonable doubt concerning the judge's impartiality, not in the mind of the judge himself, or even, necessarily, in the mind of the litigant filing the motion, but rather in the mind of a reasonable person with knowledge of all the circumstances.’ [Citations omitted.]” Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at 876.
Castillo points to the trial court's adverse ruling on his motion for acquittal as evidence of bias and prejudice. But as discussed earlier, the trial judge's ruling was supported by the evidence. Moreover, adverse rulings, even if “numerous and erroneous,” are not in themselves grounds for recusal. Smith v. Printup, 262 Kan. 587, Syl. ¶ 7, 938 P.2d 1261 (1997); see State v. Griffin, 3 Kan.App.2d 443, 445, 596 P.2d 185 (1979); Oswald v. State, 221 Kan. 625, Syl. ¶ 2, 561 P.2d 838 (1977). Because bias “refers to the judge's mental attitude toward a party to the lawsuit,” State v. Reed, 282 Kan. 272, Syl. ¶ 3, 144 P.3d 677 (2006), it is not a matter of technical legal rulings, which are “subject to review and correction on appeal.” State ex rel. Miller v. Richardson, 229 Kan. 234, 238, 623 P.2d 1317 (1981). Instead, bias and prejudice are “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will against one of the litigants or a feeling of undue friendship or favoritism towards one.” Reed, 282 Kan. 272, Syl. ¶ 3.
Castillo also complains of comments made by the trial court regarding Anabel and Manuela's testimony. After Tahirkheli argued for acquittal on the aggravated assault charge based in part on the testimony of Anabel and Manuela, Judge Peterson stated: “[L]et me begin by staying that I find the testimony of [Manuela] and [Anabel] ... to lack credibility, to say the least.” Judge Peterson explained he was basing his adverse ruling on the responding officers' testimony and State's Exhibit 1, Anabel's written statement made to the police.
While Castillo argues these comments exhibit bias and prejudice, we note a statement Judge Peterson made just before these comments: “[I]t's incumbent upon the Court to look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” This was a correct statement of the law, Ta, 296 Kan. 230, Syl. ¶ 1, and it could explain in part the judge's comments on credibility. Given the highly controverted testimony presented by the State, it is probable that the judge felt the need to discuss why, in ruling against Castillo, he believed the evidence which incriminated Castillo rather than the evidence which exonerated him. In any event (and regardless of any credibility findings), the trial judge was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State as a matter of law. Thus, the trial court's comments in explaining his ruling which correctly set forth the legal standard were not clearly inappropriate but served to explain the trial court's ruling.
Castillo also quotes the judge's comments at the very end of trial. After receipt of the verdicts and dismissal of the jury, Tahirkheli asked Judge Peterson to rescind an order requiring Castillo to have no contact with Anabel. Tahirkheli said Anabel “has been residing with her mother since the conception [ sic ] of this case” and “feels like she wants to go back and be with her husband after this.” Tahirkheli said Anabel was present and could testify in support of the request.
The State objected that a no contact order with the victim is “a standard condition of probation.” Judge Peterson denied the request, saying he would “yield on the side of precaution.” The judge surmised “based upon the testimony that the victim, [Anabel], would not object or would like to have contact.” He concluded:
“However, it will be up to the probation officers, as it always is, regarding whether or not the defendant have [ sic ] contact with the victim. As I indicated during your motion for summary judgment [ sic ] at the end of the State's case, I believe the victim most likely committed perjury during the trial. I didn't believe her. I didn't believe her mother. And I just think that I'm going to go ahead and leave the no contact order and defer to the probation officers, when and if the defendant is given an opportunity on probation.”
These comments, while referencing the credibility of Anabel and Manuela, were made in the context of the trial court's ruling enforcing the no contact order until the probation office had assessed the situation. The trial court, given the jury's verdicts, had reason for caution and concern regarding Anabel's well being if Castillo was allowed to contact her. Especially given the State's opposition to rescinding the no contact order and the trial judge's observance of standard court procedures in deferring to the probation office regarding the no contact order, we discern no bias and prejudice.
Next, assuming the trial judge did err in not recusing himself, we address the second component of the inquiry—whether actual bias or prejudice was shown which would mandate setting aside the convictions. See Robinson, 293 Kan. at 1032. In Schaeffer, our Supreme Court looked at the rulings of the judge and decided in essence that because he had applied the sentencing guidelines properly, the defendant did not show actual bias or prejudice. 295 Kan. at 876. Our Supreme Court took the same approach in Reed, 282 Kan. at 279, holding that where adverse rulings were “supported by the record,” they did not “reflect hostility or favoritism on the part of the judge.” Similarly here, whatever Judge Peterson's predisposition, Castillo must show an improper ruling at trial or some other instance of actual bias or prejudice.
Castillo claims Tahirkheli was prejudiced because Judge Peterson's bias caused Tahirkheli to “limit his cross examination of the main witnesses to the bare minimum.” This argument is not only conclusory, Tahirkheli failed to object or to proffer additional questions, making it impossible for this court to review the allegation. While Tahirkheli's cross-examinations were brief, based on our reading of the transcript, they were effective, clearly identifying the important points and not obscuring them with irrelevant details. We conclude Castillo has failed to designate a record in this regard showing the judge's adverse effect on Tahirkheli. See State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 999, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012) (appellant's burden to designate a record); State v. Miller, 274 Kan. 113, 127–28, 49 P.3d 458 (2002) (recognizing a trial judge can intimidate an attorney but rejecting an alleged instance not supported by the record).
Castillo also contends that Judge Peterson's comments when ruling on the motion for acquittal intimidated Anabel when she was recalled to testify on Castillo's behalf. However, the trial transcript does not affirmatively show Anabel was present during this ruling, and there was no proffer from Anabel that she was intimidated while subsequently testifying in Castillo's case-in-chief. Once again, due to an insufficient record we have no factual basis to review this claim of prejudice. McCullough, 293 Kan. at 999.
We hold that Castillo has not met his burden to prove that the trial judge had a duty to recuse in this matter. Castillo has also failed to show actual bias or prejudice that warrants setting aside the convictions.
Sufficiency of Evidence of Criminal Threat
For his final issue on appeal, Castillo argues “there was not enough legal and sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found him guilty of Criminal Threat.”
“When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation omitted]” State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 940, 287 P.3d 245 (2012).
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Rather, we leave that function to the jury. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 859, 257 P.3d 272 (2011).
Once again, the procedural posture of this issue frustrates appellate review. It is important to consider all the evidence before the jury in our assessment of the sufficiency of evidence. Anabel's written statement and the photographs of the knife and punctured tire are not in the record on appeal. The State quoted from Anabel's written statement in closing arguments, but it is unclear whether the quotation was complete, and in any event, the State's argument was not evidence. The photographs of the knife could be important as well because they showed the location where it was found. The evidence of the knife, for example, prompted rebuttal testimony from Anabel that she had used the knife to prepare food for the party. Thus, we are not convinced that Castillo has designated a record affirmatively showing error. See McCullough, 293 Kan. at 999.
The criminal threat jury instruction generally followed the language of the charge:
“In count two, the defendant is charged with criminal threat. The defendant pleads not guilty.
“To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:
“1. That the defendant threatened to commit violence;
“2. That such threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize Anabel Castillo; and
“3. That this act occurred on or about the 21st day of August, 2011, in Seward County, Kansas.”
_________________________
“The word ‘terror’ means an extreme fear or fear that agitates the body and mind; and ‘terrorize’ means to reduce to terror by violence or threats.”
In closing argument, the State contended that Castillo had threatened to commit violence when he “threatened to burn down the house. That's not something you say in normal ordinary conversation with your spouse.” The State also argued the “threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize Anabel.”
On appeal, Castillo contends “there was no evidence his statements [were] made to terrorize [Anabel] or made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing her terror.” He also states: “The determination of whether the statements were made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror was the primary issue for the jury to decide.” Given the narrow wording of the charge, however, the State's burden of proof at trial was actually higher—that Castillo had intended to terrorize Anabel.
Did Castillo threaten to commit violence with the intent to terrorize Anabel? Generally in such cases “criminal defendants have threatened to commit violence against their victims.” State v. Stawski, 47 Kan.App.2d 172, 178, 271 P.3d 1282 (2012), rev. denied 297 Kan. –––– (April 1, 2013). In other words, criminal threat “occurs when a person threatens to commit violence against another with the intent to terrorize the other person.” State v. Sawyer, 45 Kan.App.2d 156, 157, 244 P.3d 705 (2011), rev. granted on other grounds September 21, 2011. Castillo undoubtedly threatened to commit violence. Compare State v. Rivera, 42 Kan.App.2d 914, 919, 218 P.3d 457 (2009), rev. denied 290 Kan. 1102 (2010) (“ ‘You have a bomb in the plant. Get everyone out.’ ”). Although Castillo did not directly threaten to commit personal violence against Anabel, he threatened violence against their trailer house.
There was no direct evidence Castillo believed such a threat would terrorize Anabel. The jury was instructed that “[o]rdinarily, a person intends all of the usual consequences of his voluntary acts.” This seems to be the gist of the State's argument that married people normally do not speak this way—the suggested inference being that Castillo would not have made the threat unless he expected it to terrorize Anabel.
“The word ‘terrorize’ means to reduce to terror by violence or threats, and terror means an extreme fear or fear that agitates body and mind.” State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 486, 502 P.2d 705 (1972). At trial, Anabel asserted she was not terrorized, but that claim is not controlling. The element goes to “the reaction desired by the communicator,” not to the victim's actual reaction. State v. Cope, 273 Kan. 642, 647, 44 P.3d 1224 (2002).
Of course, a conviction can be supported by purely circumstantial evidence. State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 618, 186 P.3d 755 (2008). It is, therefore, important that Anabel called Manuela around 10 or 10:30 p.m., asking her to come to Kismet to take her and her child back to Manuela's house. A few hours later, however, after the threatening phone call from Castillo, Anabel asked Manuela to drive her to the trailer house, this time leaving the child behind. When Anabel got out of Manuela's car at the trailer house, her mother waited. From these circumstances, the jury could infer that Anabel was complying with Castillo's demand that she come home only because of his threat to destroy the trailer house if she did not. The conclusion would be that Anabel believed Castillo, which, as already stated, would be some evidence of Castillo's intent. The jury could also consider Castillo's state of mind. According to Anabel, he had been drinking and was angry and agitated. Anabel described that frightening situation as causing her to initially not want to go home.
Considering the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the prosecution and the totality of the circumstances, we are convinced that a rational factfinder could have found Castillo guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal threat.
Affirmed.