Opinion
Appellate Case No. 2011-202347 Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-141
04-02-2014
The State, Respondent, v. William Anthony Butts, Appellant.
Frank L. Eppes, of Eppes & Plumblee, PA, of Greenville, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Greenville County,
Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Frank L. Eppes, of Eppes & Plumblee, PA, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 350, 573 S.E.2d 856, 860 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."); State v. McGaha, 404 S.C. 289, 294, 744 S.E.2d 602, 604 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The trial court has discretion in deciding whether to try charges together, and its decision will be reversed only if there is no evidence to support it or it is controlled by an error of law."); State v. Cutro, 365 S.C. 366, 374, 618 S.E.2d 890, 894 (2005) ("Generally, when offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place, and character, the trial [court] has the discretion to order the indictments tried together, but only so long as the defendant's substantive rights are not prejudiced." (footnote omitted)); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 464, 334 S.E.2d 289, 290 (Ct. App. 1985) (interpreting a single chain of circumstances to mean "'in substance a single . . . course of conduct' or 'connected transactions.'" (quoting City of Greenville v. Chapman, 210 S.C. 157, 160-61, 41 S.E.2d 865, 866-67 (1947))); State v. Caldwell, 378 S.C. 268, 278, 662 S.E.2d 474, 480 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding that, although the separate offenses must be proved by the same evidence, "the fact that some additional evidence from the individual victims may be necessary to prove the individual crimes is not fatal to the joinder of the charges"); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 279, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79-80 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding no substantive rights were jeopardized by the consolidation of charges when the trial court "went to great lengths to fully instruct the jury that the [S]tate had the burden of proving each element of each crime"); Tate, 286 S.C. at 464, 334 S.E.2d at 290 (finding joinder is prejudicial if "it is likely the jury would infer criminal disposition based on evidence of one [crime] and on that basis alone find [the defendant] guilty of another [crime]" (emphasis added)). AFFIRMED.
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.