Opinion
14CR0097 A156800.
03-30-2016
STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Karrie Louise BUTCHER, Defendant–Appellant.
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Opinion
PER CURIAM. In this criminal appeal, in which defendant seeks reversal of her convictions for first- and second-degree robbery, we write only to address defendant's contention that the trial court plainly erred in requiring her to pay court-appointed attorney fees of $440. The state concedes that the trial court erred, because the record is silent as to whether defendant “is or may be able” to pay those fees. See ORS 151.505(3) (“The court may not require a person to pay costs under this section unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs.”); ORS 161.665(4) (“The court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs under this section unless the defendant is or may be able to pay them.”); see also State v. Coverstone, 260 Or.App. 714, 716, 320 P.3d 670 (2014) (holding that it is plain error for a trial court to require a defendant to pay court-appointed attorney fees in the absence of legally sufficient evidence that the defendant has the ability to pay the amount imposed). We agree that the trial court plainly erred and, for the reasons set forth in State v. Ramirez–Hernandez, 264 Or.App. 346, 349, 332 P.3d 338 (2014) (exercising discretion to correct erroneous imposition of $400 in court-appointed attorney fees because the amount was “substantial” in light of defendant's circumstances), we exercise our discretion to correct the error.
Portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.