Opinion
No. COA02-1564
Filed 1 July 2003 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 29 August 2002 by Judge Evelyn W. Hill in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 June 2003.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Belinda A. Smith, for the State. Terry W. Alford for defendant-appellant.
Wake County No. 98CRS071996.
From his convictions on the charges of forgery and uttering a forged instrument, and sentence to two consecutive terms of 8 to 10 months imprisonment, defendant, Vernon Seymore Bullock, contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. We find no error in his trial.
At trial, the State's evidence tended to show that, on 28 October 1998, defendant presented a $100 check at the Hudson Belk store in Raleigh, North Carolina. The purported owner of the account was Elsie Hawkins. Defendant represented himself to be the son of Ms. Hawkins. The department store sales Manager, Hanna Hancock, handled the transaction. When defendant could not produce any identification, Ms. Hancock took the check from defendant and called store security and Ms. Hawkins. Defendant fled the scene, along with a female companion, Paula Randolph. Mall police apprehended defendant in the mall parking lot.
When contacted by Ms. Hancock, Ms. Hawkins stated that she did not have a son and, furthermore, that her checks had been stolen. Ms. Hawkins stated that she did not know defendant, had not given defendant permission to sign her name, had not authorized defendant to write checks on her account, and did not owe defendant any money. Moreover, upon being contacted by Ms. Hancock, a Hudson Belk loss prevention specialist, Angela McCarty, took the check from Ms. Hancock, photocopied it, and compared it to the original. After satisfying herself that the copy was like the original check, Ms. McCarty turned the original over to Crabtree Valley Mall police. At the time of trial, however, the original check had been mistakenly destroyed by Crabtree Valley Mall police. Nevertheless, Ms. Hawkins identified the photocopy of her check. Ms. Hawkins testified that the signature on the check was not her signature.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. We disagree.
"In ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which is entitled to every reasonable inference which can be drawn from that evidence." State v. Dick, 126 N.C. App. 312, 317, 485 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1997). "[T]he question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged . . . and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense." State v. Brayboy, 105 N.C. App. 370, 373-74, 413 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1992). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Williams, 133 N.C. App. 326, 328, 515 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1999) (citation omitted).
To obtain a conviction for forgery, the State may prove the following: (1) defendant falsely made or altered some instrument in writing; (2) with fraudulent intent; and (3) the instrument was apparently capable of effecting a fraud. State v. Grant, 153 N.C. App. 136, 140, 568 S.E.2d 909, 911 (2002). A conviction for uttering a forged check requires that the State prove (1) the defendant offered a forged check to another, "`(2) with knowledge that the check is false, and (3) with the intent to defraud or injure another.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hill, 31 N.C. App. 248, 249, 229 S.E.2d 810, 810 (1976)).
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to submit the matter to the jury because the original check, which he attempted to negotiate, was mistakenly destroyed; however, this Court rejected a similar argument in State v. Nicholson, 78 N.C. App. 398, 337 S.E.2d 654 (1985). In Nicholson, the defendant argued that since the check (which was allegedly forged and uttered) was not introduced into evidence at trial, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of forgery and uttering. However, based upon the other evidence admitted at trial, we found this argument to be without merit holding: "There is simply no requirement in the law that the check, upon which the endorsement was allegedly forged, be in evidence." Id. at 400, 337 S.E.2d at 656.
Similarly, we conclude that the testimony of the State's witnesses in the present case is sufficient to show that the forged check was the one described in the indictment. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could find that defendant was guilty of the offenses charged, and therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
No error.
Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).