Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0046
01-24-2019
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. KEVLIN OMAR BROWN, Appellant.
COUNSEL Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100CR201603329
The Honorable Lawrence M. Wharton, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Vásquez and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
STARING, Presiding Judge:
¶1 After a jury trial, Kevlin Brown was convicted of transportation of marijuana for sale and sentenced to a 7.5-year prison term. Counsel has filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530 (App. 1999), stating she has reviewed the record but was "unable to find any unresolved non-frivolous issue to raise on appeal." Brown has filed a supplemental brief raising several arguments.
¶2 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict, see State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2 (App. 1999), the evidence is sufficient to support its verdict here, see A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(4). During a traffic stop in December 2016, a deputy sheriff found just over 230 pounds of marijuana in Brown's vehicle, an amount consistent with sale.
¶3 In his supplemental brief, Brown first contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered in the search of his vehicle. But he makes no legal argument and, thus, has waived this argument on appeal. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (insufficient argument waives claim on appeal). And, in our review of the record, we have found no error in the court's determination the traffic stop and subsequent search were proper.
¶4 Brown next asserts the trial court erred by "failing to do the requirement of traffic complaint for an Alleged Civil Traffic Violation," citing A.R.S. § 28-1594. Under § 28-1594, a peace officer may "stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary to investigate an actual or suspected violation of this title and to serve a copy of the traffic complaint for an alleged civil or criminal violation of this title." To the extent Brown is suggesting the traffic stop was defective because he was not given a traffic complaint, the statute plainly gives the officer authority to conduct an investigatory stop irrespective of whether the officer ultimately issues a
citation. Brown has cited no authority, and we find none, suggesting that the failure to issue a citation renders a traffic stop improper.
¶5 Lastly, Brown contends the trial court erred "without Authentication Ancient Documents over 20 years" in finding his previous felony convictions. Again, however, Brown does not explain or support this argument in any meaningful way. See Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 298. We find no error in the court's reliance on the evidence provided at the evidentiary hearing on Brown's prior convictions, and that evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that Brown had three previous felony convictions and thus should be sentenced as a category-two repetitive offender. See A.R.S. §§ 13-105(22)(d), 13-703(B). The sentence imposed is within the statutory range. See §§ 13-703(B), (I), 13-3405(B)(11).
¶6 We have searched the record for reversible error and found none, and we have rejected the arguments made in Brown's supplemental brief. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.