Opinion
HHDCV166069518S
03-13-2017
State of Connecticut et al. v. Winston Brightly
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The court held a hearing on February 22, 2017 at which evidence was presented concerning the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. After consideration, the court issues this memorandum.
I
Background
In their complaint, the plaintiffs, the State of Connecticut and Philip A. Scarpellino, a Superior Court Judge, allege that defendant Winston Brightly filed a false and unauthorized UCC financing statement notice of lien (UCC-1) with the Office of the Connecticut Secretary of State (Secretary) and subsequent false UCC-3 amendments, seeking $100,000, including an amendment naming Judge Scarpellino as a debtor. The plaintiffs allege that these false filings are intended to intimidate, harass, and interfere with the public business of the Judicial Branch and constitute a willful and false assault on Judge Scarpellino's creditworthiness and reputation in his personal capacity for engaging in his official duties. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
The plaintiffs also allege that Judge Scarpellino's only dealings with the defendant occurred in the course of Judge Scarpellino's official duties as a Judge of the Superior Court, in the context of criminal and motor vehicle court cases involving the defendant. In November 2014, defendant submitted a " Final Notice of Default and Demand for Payment" to the court as part of his file for charges of illegal discharge of a firearm, first degree reckless endangerment, and second degree breach of peace. See Judge Scarpellino's affidavit (par. 2), part of plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Judge Scarpellino also states that he has not been a party to any financial agreements of any kind with the defendant and his only involvement with the defendant was in Judge Scarpellino's capacity as the presiding judge in the defendant's criminal and motor vehicle cases. See affidavit, ¶ 4. He avers also that the UCC filings made by the defendant concerning Judge Scarpellino are false and fraudulent and potentially injurious to his reputation and creditworthiness. See affidavit, ¶ 4.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs seek declaratory relief under General Statutes § § 42a-9-625 and 52-29 (first cause of action), injunctive relief under General Statutes § 42a-9-625 and the court's equitable powers (second cause of action), and damages under General Statutes § 42a-9-625 (third cause of action).
The defendant presented no evidence.
II
Discussion
" A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law . . . A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comm'r of Correction v. Coleman, 303 Conn. 800, 810, 38 A.3d 84 (2012). " A decision to grant or deny an injunction must be compatible with the equities in the case, which should take into account the gravity and willfulness of the violation, as well as the potential harm to the defendant." Bauer v. Waste Mgmt. of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996).
Under General Statutes § 52-471(b), concerning the granting of an injunction, the facts stated in an application for an injunction must be " verified by the oath of the plaintiff or of some competent witness." " A party seeking injunctive relief may be allowed to verify its allegations at the time of trial . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Town of Sterling v. Camplin, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. WWM CV 13 6006239 (July 17, 2013, Riley, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 509, ). Here, Judge Scarpellino's affidavit, part of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, verified the facts. The defendant did not object to the admission of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. See Clougherty v. Clougherty, 131 Conn.App. 270, 274, 26 A.3d 704, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 948, 31 A.3d 383 (2011).
General Statutes § 52-29 provides, in relevant part, " (a) The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment."
It is evident that the filing of false and fraudulent UCC financing statement notices is occurring in various jurisdictions. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1135, 129 S.Ct. 1647, 173 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2009). (" [I]nmates were filing financing statements under Article 9 of the UCC, which sets forth a process for perfecting security interests in property. These liens and judgments, accessible on financing statement forms, are easy to file. Once registered, however, the fraudulent liens are very burdensome to remove. For example, in a New Jersey incident, criminal defendants registered a fraudulent $14.5 million lien with the New Jersey Department of Revenue against a federal prosecutor and a $3.5 million lien against a federal judge for using their 'copyrighted' names in court papers and hearings; it took a federal court order to remove them. In addition to the substantial effort and expense required to expunge the liens, the fraudulent filings ruined the victims' credit reports." (Footnote omitted.) As to relief under UCC § 9-625, see United States v. James, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Case No: 5:14-cv-387-0c-30PRL, (November 20, 2015) (" The record unequivocally demonstrates that the financing statements purporting to create liens against the Federal Officers are fraudulent and false and their filing was not authorized by the Federal Officers. Because the filing of these liens was not authorized by the Federal Officers, the liens were not filed in accordance with Florida Statute § 679.625 . . . Plaintiff is . . . entitled to recover $500 in statutory liquidated damages for each of the nine unauthorized financing statements recorded against the Federal Officers . . ."); United States v. Orrego, United States District Court, E.D.N.Y., No. 04 CV 0008 SJ, (June 22, 2004) (statutory damages in the amount of $500.00 in accordance with N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-625(e)(3)).
The undisputed facts in the record here concerning show that the defendant's UCC filings were false and fraudulent. The plaintiffs have met their burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law. In addition, it is clear that these false filings were intended to intimidate, harass, and interfere with the public business of the Judicial Branch and constitute a willful and false assault on Judge Scarpellino's creditworthiness and reputation in his personal capacity for engaging in his official duties. The gravity of the conduct is such that it amounts to an effort to intimidate the judiciary and those working in the Judicial Branch, which may not be condoned. The willfulness of the violation is evident. Any potential harm to the defendant from the issuance of injunctive relief is a consequence of his intentional conduct and is outweighed by the clear need for such relief. The plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief.
General Statutes § 42a-9-625(e) provides, that where a person files a record that the person is not entitled to file " [i]n addition to any damages recoverable under subsection (b), the debtor, consumer obligor, or person named as a debtor in a filed record, as applicable, may recover five hundred dollars in each case . . ." In view of the violation of the statute, the court awards $500.00 in statutory damages.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court grants the relief requested, as set forth in the accompanying Permanent Injunction Order. It is so ordered.