Opinion
ID No. 1209011176 ID No. 1310009200 ID No. 1103021255 ID No. 1211016583 ID No. 1204013602 ID No. 1304009788 ID No. 1203008725 ID No. 1307025699 ID No. 1211008008 ID No. 1002000575 ID No. 1205008276 ID No. 1110009338 ID No. 1211009891 ID No. 1304022461 ID No. 1204012409 ID No. 1306008038 ID No. 1012001879 ID No. 0912005873 ID No. 1204018496 ID No. 1212007009 ID No. 1212012552 ID No. 1211023034 ID No. 1304014873 ID No. 1311015254 ID No. 1307018245 ID No. 1308001215 ID No. 1010009425 ID No. 1202012547 ID No. 1205010386 ID No. 1205019774A ID No. 1306018495 ID No. 1307000703 ID No. 0912010393 ID No. 1211007648 ID No. 1110018244 ID No. 1210028521 ID No. 1103017392 ID No. 1105013476 ID No. 1305018534 ID No. 1008014466 ID No. 1311003205 ID No. 1304014924 ID No. 0909021763 ID No. 0912005273 ID No. 1310003660 ID No. 1001004518 ID No. 1106004624 ID No. 1204006263 ID No. 1304023077 ID No. 1103014276 ID No. 1007025439 ID No. 1303011652 ID No. 0810005948 ID No. 1102017234 ID No. 1303009650 ID No. 1111011434 ID No. 1111015209 ID No. 0912001839 ID No. 1208006617 ID No. 1304023378 ID No. 1103018539 ID No. 1305012566 ID No. 1109010352 ID No. 1212012158 ID No. 1303004575 ID No. 1305024514 ID No. 1309011710 ID No. 1210000641 ID No. 1306012872 ID No. 1111004748 ID No. 1004005351 ID No. 1202010211 ID No. 1306000151 ID No. 1211017948 ID No. 1208012411 ID No. 1308001321 ID No. 1303014531 ID No. 1308018748 ID No. 0905018717 ID No. 1304013720 ID No. 1306024965 ID No. 1301017432 ID No. 1309002130 ID No. 1001021083 ID No. 1003022526 ID No. 1209014758 ID No. 1205007336 ID No. 1304020013 ID No. 1307023483 ID No. 1212013114 ID No. 1302021122 ID No. 1012018727 ID No. 1206015047 ID No. 1302015909 ID No. 1205018158 ID No. 1209017661 ID No. 1309017247 ID No. 1205012091 ID No. 1111006658 ID No. 1303023438 ID No. 1302018753 ID No. 1211003582 ID No. 1202012572 ID No. 0909012957 ID No. 0912010611 ID No. 0911010977 ID No. 1207017483 ID No. 1309013276 ID No. 0911004091 ID No. 1109001897 ID No. 1310001534 ID No. 1309018552 ID No. 1308016595 ID No. 1309013336 ID No. 1302018219 ID No. 1212013498 ID No. 1312012266
04-20-2015
STATE OF DELAWARE v. GEORGE W. ANDERSON EDWARD ARMISTEAD DOMINICK BAILEY JAMAAR S. BANKS JAMIE BARKLEY MICHAEL R. BETHARD HARRY W. BLENDT HARRY W. BLENDT JOHN E. BRADLEY DONALD BRATCHER CHRISTOPHER D. BREWER a/k/a CHRISTOPHER JERNIGAN WARREN BROOKS DONALD BROWN ANTOINE L. BURGESS CARRIE A. BUTLER SHON CALDWELL LEMAR C. CAMPBELL SHAUN CARPENTER RICHARD S. CARTER MICHAEL A. CHARLES ROBERTO CHERRICKS KYLE COHEN MARK S. COLEMAN MARVIS COLONA BOSTON K. CONNOR NICOLE J. COX BRIAN CROSSMAN BRADLEY A. DAVIS BLAISE DEJESUS MYKAL DEMPSTER MICHAEL D. DIX LAMAR J. DOZIER KURT S. DUPREE ABBYDALE N. FINNEY a/k/a ABBYDALE SEABROOKS WESLEY J. FISHER CHRISTOPHER T. FOOTE CHARLES J. FRAZIER JONATHAN FUENTES-ALMO PATRICK R. FURBECK SEANNE M. GODWIN JEREMY GORDY JERRI GREEN IRVING HALL KYIEM HALL QUAHEEM HALL LUKE A. HARRIS TRAVIS O. HARRISON JUSTIN HOLDERBAUM RANDY HOLLENBAUGH DONALD L. HORSEY QUAYSHAUN JOHNSON SAVANNAH JOHNSON ANTOINE J. JONES ALAN M. JORDAN ASHTON D. JORDAN ANDREA L. KING ANDREA L. KING DAVID KING DESTINY G. LABERGE KELLY LAWLOR DASHERE LEWIS DOMINICK LITTLE CHARLES L. LIVINGSTON CRYSTAL LYSINGER EARL MANLOVE MARK MARTIN NICK MARTINEZ DWAYNE N. MATTHEWS KEVIN MAYO BRANDON A. MCCLAIN DAVID H. MCCURLEY ANTHONY J. MCNEIL MICHAEL D. MESSICK JEROME A. MILLER RODNEY L. MILLER JAMES T. MOORE JAMES MOSES JUSTIN R. OHL ELLIOTT OWENS TAQUEN OWENS KYE PABON JASON PAJULA DEMARCE PARKS COREY PATRICK EDWARD J. POTTS DEVRON POWELL STEPHONE POWELL CORY PRICE DAVID A. RANSHAW MICHAEL A. RATLEDGE KEITH RODRIGUEZ ELWOOD J. ROSS CHARLES RUNKLE EDWIN A. SANTIAGO ILIANA M. SANTIAGO ILIANA M. SANTIAGO BRIAN M. SATTERFIELD TYRONE N. SAYLES ADAM SCOTT ALPHONSO SIMMONS SAMUEL SMITH BRENDA STRATTON RAKIM STRICKLAND KINON D. TEAT CHARLES TILGHMAN KEVIN M. TINSON TERRANCE M. TROTMON ANTHONY TROWER JAQUITA P. TURNAGE TAQUION TURNER TAQUION TURNER BOBBY WARD ANDREA WILHELM ALLEN WILLIAMS WARREN WILSON ASHMERE WRIGHT DEMETRIUS M. WRIGHT
ORDER
Today, the Court consolidates and resolves a number of similarly situated Postconviction Motions. All of the cases denoted in the caption ("captioned cases" or "defendants") were filed by the Public Defenders's Office ("PD") and involve drug convictions based on guilty pleas. It appears the defendants' only contention is that the problems discovered in 2014 at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner ("OCME") require the drug convictions be vacated.
The Court notes that it requested- and considered - the parties' position with respect to whether these group files should be held to a rule to show cause or summary dismissal under Criminal Procedure Rule 61(d)(4).
Specifically, the defendants essential argument is that he/she is entitled to relief because the State failed to provide Brady material, in the form of impeachment evidence, prior to entry into the plea agreements. In the alternative, the defendants contend that, even if the State was not required to disclose general impeachment evidence prior to entry into the plea agreements, the State's failure to disclose evidence of government misconduct makes the pleas involuntary.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Upon consideration of the facts, arguments and legal authorities set forth in the captioned cases' individual Postconviction Motions, Supplements to Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief, Supplements in response to the December 3, 2014 decision in State v. Absher, et. al., Supplements of Factual Record (Dollard), including an Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief on December 17, 2014 in selected cases, the State's Response in opposition thereto, Supplement to Factual Record and Reply to the State's March 3, 2015 Response, Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, and applicable law, it appears to the Court that:
2014 WL 7010788, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 3, 2014).
1. On January 14, 2014, Tyrone Walker was on trial in this Court for drug dealing charges. During trial, an evidence envelope was presented to an officer to confirm that the substance in the envelope was the substance found on the Defendant at the time of arrest. When the officer opened the envelope, the relevant drugs were missing. This sparked an investigation into the practices of the OCME resulting in a finding of multiple cases of pilfering drugs by employees for their own personal use. Due to the revelation and subsequent investigation, "[t]he State has brought charges against persons in the chain of custody in many of the pending cases. The Court ruled that there was evidence of pilfering or stealing of drugs by a person or persons for their own use." However, as the Supreme Court of Delaware recently confirmed:
State v. Brinkley, 2015 WL 867097, at *1 (Del. Super. Feb. 6, 2015).
Id.
Id.
State v. West, 2014 WL 7466714, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 16, 2014) (citing State v. Irwin, 2014 WL 6734821 (Del. Super. Nov. 17, 2014).
The situation at the OCME is, to be sure, disturbing and regrettable. But to date, the investigation has yielded no indication that the OCME scandal involved the planting of false evidence to wrongly convict criminal defendants. Rather, it has mostly consisted of instances where employees stole evidence that they knew to be illegal narcotics for resale and personal use. That is, that misconduct occurred because the drugs tested by the OCME were in fact illegal drugs desired by users.
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1202-03 (Del. 2015).
2. As an initial matter, the PD recently filed an amended motion for postconviction relief in State of Delaware v. Nicole Cox, ID No. 1308001215, which among other things, challenges the constitutionality of this Court's June 4, 2014 amendment to Criminal Procedure Rule 61. The defendant contends, "[b]ecause the limitations established in the June amendment are not reasonably tailored to a legitimate purpose, they violate the due process clause of both the state and federal constitution and the open courts clause of the Delaware constitution." The constitutional claim is without merit. The defendant provides no binding authority and falls demonstratively short of bridging the analytical gap between its contentions and any recognized constitutional violation. Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court has found no constitutional issues with the amendment given the recent decisions in Brown v. State and Dickson v. State .
108 A. 3d 1201 (Del. 2015).
2015 WL 783376, at *1 (Del. Feb. 23, 2015).
3. Additionally, in the above referenced motion, the defendant also suggests that the Court amended Rule 61 with the insidious purpose of denying defendants due process and a full and fair hearing on potential Brady claims. Implicit in the argument is the unsubstantiated allegation that the Court cares more about judicial economy then upholding its oath of office. In addition to being patently false, it is highly offensive. Rather than excoriate the motion of counsel, I can only assume, at best, that counsel is overzealous in its advocacy for the defendants. At worst, this motion does not further the clients' interests and lacks an appropriate level of professionalism and respect for the Court.
4. The motions state that the relevant drugs recovered or seized were sent to the OCME for testing. None of the test results were attached to the motions. A Supplement of Factual Record was submitted for some of the captioned cases indicating the OCME test results were received by the defendant prior to entering a guilty plea. However, there has been no claim, or evidence to suggest, that the admissions at the time of the guilty pleas were conditioned on an OCME report. Additionally, in many of the captioned cases, preliminary hearings were waived, and guilty pleas were entered prior to any testing by the OCME. In other cases, the defendant "is neither incarcerated nor on probation due to the age of the case. Therefore, there can be no Rule 61 relief as the matter is moot." Accordingly, those cases are summarily dismissed.
State v. Absher, 2014 WL 7010788, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 3, 2014) (citing Ruiz v. State, 956 A.2d 643 (Del. 2008).
5. In all of the captioned cases, the defendants participated in a colloquy before this Court. The defendants were questioned carefully about the factual basis for his or her plea at which time the defendants freely acknowledge the illicit nature of the drugs as well as his or her guilt. The files reflect that there was a factual basis for each plea and that the defendants understood the pleas and their consequences, including the potential sentences. While accepting their pleas, the defendants knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their rights, including any complaints about the chain of custody of the drug evidence in their cases.
6. Recently, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed the fallout from the OCME in the context of a similar Brady claim. The Court held:
We agree with the State that evidence of the OCME investigation did not affect the validity of Brown's guilty plea and that Brown is not entitled to a new trial. In United States v. Ruiz, the United States Supreme Court held that the "Constitution, in respect to a defendant's awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor." Therefore, the "Constitution does not require the [State] to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant," because a defendant who pleads guilty decides to forgo "not only a fair trial, but also other
accompanying constitutional guarantees" and "impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary."The Court went on to explain:
In this case, Brown admitted that he was guilty of possessing and dealing heroin. The plea colloquy reflects that Brown knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty. By pleading guilty, Brown gave up his right to trial and his right to learn of any impeachment evidence. Brown is bound by the statements he made to the Superior Court before his plea was accepted, and Ruiz prevents him from reopening his case to make claims that do not address his guilt, and involve impeachment evidence that would only be relevant at trial.
Brown, 108 A. 3d at 1205-06 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002)).
Id. at 1206 (internal citations omitted).
7. Following the holding of Brown, "[w]hen a defendant like [those in the captioned cases] has admitted in his [or her] plea colloquy that he [or she] possessed [drugs]..., the OCME investigation provides no logical or just basis to upset his [or her] conviction." Accordingly, the State's failure - even where the pleas took place after the discovery of the OCME scandal - to provide Brady material, in the form of impeachment evidence has no bearing on the validity of the captioned cases' guilty pleas.
Id. at 1202. (The PD's recent Supplement to Factual Record and Reply to the State's March 3, 2015 Response attempts to distinguish the Brown ruling from the captioned cases. The Court is not persuaded.)
8. In Brown, the Court limited its holding in a footnote with the following explanation:
As in Ruiz, the impeachment evidence that came to light after Brown pled guilty and was sentenced did not go to his actual innocence or affect the voluntariness of his plea.... [O]ur decision is limited to the case before it and fact patterns like it, and that if materially different situations emerge, they must be dealt with on their precise facts. For example, where a defendant entered a reluctant, but fully informed, no contest or guilty plea to lesser charges with no prison sentence to avoid the risk of a lengthy prison sentence on more serious charges, while proclaiming his factual innocence and expressing incredulity that the substance he claimed was legal had tested to be illegal narcotics, a later revelation that evidence planting had occurred in the relevant police department and that the defendant had been one of the victims of that misconduct, that situation could raise distinct considerations from those in this case, where the defendant freely admitted that he possessed illegal drugs.Here, the captioned cases present no such factual scenario. In all of the cases, there are no claims of actual innocence. The mere existence of the ongoing scandal at the OCME does not ipso facto create a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice nor does it create a strong inference that the defendants are actually innocent. Finally, without specific facts like those referenced in the Brown footnote, the situation at the OCME does not warrant a finding of actual or presumptive involuntariness of the guilty pleas. The defendants have the burden to show clear and convincing evidence to contradict each of the admissions made to the Court. The defendants have failed to do so and are therefore bound by their knowing, voluntary, and intelligent representations to the Court. Accordingly, the Court will not vacate the defendants' guilty pleas and therefore the captioned cases' Rule 61 motions are summarily DISMISSED.
Id. At 1206 n. 30.
Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ William L. Witham, Jr.
Hon. William L. Witham, Jr.
Resident Judge
Dated: April 20, 2015 WLW/dmh
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Hon. T. Henley Graves
Hon. William C. Carpenter, Jr.
Kathleen M. Jennings, Esquire
Stephen R. Welch, Jr., Esquire
J. Brendan O'Neill, Esquire
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire
William T. Deely, Esquire