Opinion
AANCR180157961T
07-02-2019
STATE of Connecticut v. Aaron BRESKY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Wilkerson Brillant, J.
The court rules on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. On January 15, 2019 and March 22, 2019, evidentiary hearings were held on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The evidence included the defendant’s exhibits A through MM and testimony from the defendant, Aaron Bresky, retired detective Gerald Tenney of the Ansonia Police Department, and detective Lieutenant Wayne Williams of the Ansonia Police Department (Police). In support of his motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the state’s information should be dismissed because the prosecution is untimely. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the prosecution is barred by the applicable five years statute of limitations. See General Statutes § 54-193(b). Furthermore, the defendant argues that the state’s untimely prosecution is due to the state’s unreasonable delay in executing the arrest warrant. In response, the state argues that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1990) § 54-193(c), now § 54-193(d), because the defendant fled from Connecticut to California with knowledge of an ongoing investigation into his criminal conduct. Furthermore, the state argues that the defendant has not met his burden of providing evidence to suggest that he was not evasive, available, and readily approachable as this categorization has been applied in order for the burden of proof to have shifted to the state. Based on the following findings of fact as supported by the evidence and for the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the prosecution is untimely and thus barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the defendant’s motion is granted.
General Statutes § 54-193 provides:
(a) There shall be no limitation of time within which a person may be prosecuted for (1) a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d or 53a-169, (2) a violation of section 53a-165aa or 53a-166 in which such person renders criminal assistance to another person who has committed an offense set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection, (3) a violation of section 53a-156 committed during a proceeding that results in the conviction of another person subsequently determined to be actually innocent of the offense or offenses of which such other person was convicted, or (4) a motor vehicle violation or offense that resulted in the death of another person and involved a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-224.
(b) No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) of this section, for which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed.
(c) No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, except within one year next after the offense has been committed.
(d) If the person against whom an indictment, information or complaint for any of said offenses is brought has fled from and resided out of this state during the period so limited, it may be brought against such person at any time within such period, during which such person resides in this state, after the commission of the offense.
(e) When any suit, indictment, information or complaint for any crime may be brought within any other time than is limited by this section, it shall be brought within such time.
FACTS
The court makes the following findings of fact. On December 22, 2009, the defendant, Aaron Bresky, resided at 27 Cottage Avenue, in Ansonia, Connecticut. On said date, the police executed and served the defendant with a search warrant of his residence. The police seized two of the defendant’s computers, storage media and a router. (Defendant’s testimony, Transcript (Tr.) Page (p./pp.) 5.) During the search and seizure of his residence, the defendant was aware that child pornography was the subject of the search and seizure warrant. The defendant was fully cooperative with the police by assisting them with the search including providing them with passwords to the computers. (Tr. pp. 5-8, 50.) On that same day, at the request of the police, the defendant agreed to meet with police detectives Tenney and DeNigris. He voluntarily drove himself to the police department to be interviewed. (Defendant’s Exhibit (Ex./s.) B.) The defendant signed his sworn statement in which he admitted to possessing child pornography. (Tr. pp. 9-10, 52; Def. Ex. C.) The police informed the defendant that once they receive the forensic report for the examination of the defendant’s computers/equipment that an arrest warrant charging him with possession of child pornography would be forthcoming. (Tr. pp. 43, 53; Def. Ex. B.) The police did not arrest the defendant that day and he was free to leave. (Def. Ex. E.)
On January 6, 2010, Detective Tenney requested that the computers be examined by the Connecticut State Police Computer Crime Unit’s forensic laboratory (forensic laboratory). (Tr. pp. 67-68; Def. Ex. D.) On or about January 22, 2010, Detective Tenney transported the computer tower and laptop to the forensic laboratory. (Tr. pp. 54, 61; Def. Ex. E.) On August 30, 2011, almost two years after the defendant’s admission, the defendant moved to California. (Tr. pp. 22-23.) Within a few weeks of moving to California, the defendant established residence at 16761 Viewpoint Lane, Apt. 202, Huntington Beach, California, where he lived for over six and one-half years until his arrest by the Huntington Beach Police on March 16, 2018. (Tr. pp. 18, 24-25, 27, 108.)
The defendant’s apartment lease, his utilities and his cellular (cell) phone were in his name. His apartment address was on his tax returns, on department of motor vehicle records and on other bills. (Tr. pp. 25-26.) The defendant also possessed a Facebook account in his name and posted accurate information about himself. (Tr. p. 27.) The defendant’s cell phone number was the same phone number that he had in Connecticut and it had never been changed and had been always a valid working number. (Tr. p. 34.) The defendant lived openly and publicly in California. Between 2010 and 2013, Detective Tenney diligently checked on the status of the investigation of the computers. (Tr. p. 69; Def. Exs. G-M.) On April 15, 2013, over three years later, the forensic laboratory returned the report confirming child pornography. (Tr. p. 55; Def. Exs. N, S.) Subsequently, Detective Tenney ascertained through the Lexis-Nexus law enforcement portal that the defendant resided at 16761 Viewpoint Avenue in Huntington Beach, California, and confirmed with Detective Tunstall of the Huntington Beach Police that the defendant still resided at that same address. (Tr. pp. 57, 76, 94-95, Def. Ex. Q.)
Detective Tenney drafted an arrest warrant and on May 22, 2013, the defendant was charged with child pornography in the first degree. (Tr. pp. 58, 78; Def. Ex. S.) Although Detective Tenney had requested that the arrest warrant be extraditable, it was not authorized as such. (Tr. 78, 81, 90-91; Def. Exs. Q, U-W.) Detective Tenney had asked his supervisor, Detective Sergeant Lynch whether they would go to California to get the defendant, but Detective Tenney did not receive a response regarding whether to extradite the defendant before Tenney retired in September 2016. (Tr. pp. 59, 90, 96.) Despite Detective Tenney having the defendant’s cell phone number, he did not call the defendant once the arrest warrant was issued on May 22, 2013. (Tr. p. 79.) Thus, as of September 2016, the warrant still had not been executed on the defendant and the defendant was still living in California. (Tr. p. 59.) No one else worked on the case file prior to Detective Tenney retiring. (Tr. p. 97.)
Detective Tenney did not have any further communications with the defendant after the initial interview in December 2009. (Tr. p. 56.) The defendant did not hear from the police ever again until he turned himself into the Ansonia Police Department in April 2018. (Tr. pp. 16-18.)
In 2018, the clerk of the Superior Court in Milford contacted Lieutenant Wayne Williams of Ansonia Police Department to inquire about the status of the evidence and arrest warrant. (Tr. pp 111-12; Def. Ex. X.) At which time, Lieutenant Williams contacted the State’s Attorney’s office to receive authorization for extradition of the defendant, which was authorized. (Tr. pp. 103-04.) Lieutenant Williams verified the defendant’s same California address through Lexis-Nexus and provided it to the Huntington Beach Police in California. (Tr. p.104.) The arrest warrant was executed on the defendant in California. (Tr. pp. 111-13; Def. Ex. CC.)
The defendant was taken into custody on or about March 15, 2018 in California. (Tr. pp. 107; Def. Ex. DD.) The defendant posted bail and was released from custody with the understanding that he organize his affairs and he return to Connecticut to turn himself in to the Ansonia Police Department, which he did on April 17, 2018. (Tr. p. 27-28, 120.) There were no extradition proceedings conducted. (Tr. pp. 27-28, 119-20.)
DISCUSSION
"An accused’s primary protection from having to answer to stale criminal charges is the statute of limitations." State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11, 16-17, 364 A.2d 225 (1975). "A statute of limitations ... [ensures] that a defendant receives notice, within a prescribed time, of the acts with which he is charged, so that he and his lawyers can assemble the relevant evidence [to prepare a defense] before documents are lost [and] memor[ies] fade ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jennings, 101 Conn.App. 810, 818, 928 A.2d 541 (2007). "The policies underlying statutes of limitations are best served when exceptions are interpreted narrowly in favor of the accused and the state has a strong incentive to ensure that a defendant is provided timely notice of charges." State v. Swebilius, 325 Conn. 793, 814, 159 A.3d 1099 (2017).
"A statute of limitations claim is an affirmative defense for which the burden rests with the defendant to prove the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence ... Despite this, once a defendant puts forth evidence to suggest that she was not elusive, was available and was readily approachable, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the delay in executing the warrant was not unreasonable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Woodtke, 130 Conn.App. 734, 740, 25 A.3d 699 (2011). Practice Book § 41-8(3) provides that a defendant may raise a statute of limitations defense in a pretrial motion to dismiss the information. The relevant statute of limitations asserted in this matter is General Statutes § 54-193(b), which provides: "No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) of this section, for which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed."
In the present matter, the defendant argues that prosecution is barred pursuant to § 54-193(b) because the execution of the arrest warrant was unreasonably delayed. Therefore, the defendant argues, the continued prosecution violates his right to due process. In response, the state contends that the defendant did not meet his burden in proving that he was available for arrest as that term has been applied during the five-year statute of limitations period. Alternatively, the state argues that the statute of limitations period should be tolled because the defendant fled from Connecticut when he moved to California. The state further argues that the applicable standard of review is set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 1990) § 54-193(c), now 54-193(d), which provides: "If the person against whom an indictment, information or complaint for any of said offenses is brought has fled from and resided out of this state during the period so limited, it may be brought against such person at any time within such period, during which such person resides in this state, after the commission of the offense."
Connecticut appellate authority has directly addressed the issues presented before this court. In State v. Ward, 306 Conn. 698, 713, 52 A.3d 591 (2012), the defendant committed a crime in Connecticut and immediately fled to his home state of Massachusetts. The police had no knowledge of the defendant’s identity. Id., 704. The information or arrest warrant was not issued until long after the statute of limitations expired when the police finally became aware of the defendant’s identity. Id. Because the arrest warrant was not issued within the statute of limitations, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the defendant fled in order to determine whether the statute of limitations tolled pursuant to General Statutes § 54-193(c), now § 54-193(d). In the court’s decision, it held that "§ 54-193(c) may toll the statute of limitations when a defendant absents himself from the jurisdiction with reason to believe that an investigation may ensue as the result of his actions. Certainly, the defendant herein, as a result of his conduct in the victim’s home, had reason to believe that an investigation would ensue." Id., 711. Therefore, the court held that the trial court had properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the state had shown probable cause that the statute had been tolled. Id., 714-15.
In State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 450 n.12, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987) the court addressed General Statutes § 54-193(c), now § 54-193(d), and held that this subsection "which tolls the statute as to a person who has fled from and resides outside the state after the commission of the offense, simply extends the time within which an indictment, information or complaint may be brought." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) As further noted, § 54-193(d) "addresses a completely different situation than that addressed by subsection (b) ... This provision serves to extend the period of time- initially established by § 54-193(b)- during which the indictment, information or complaint may be brought in certain cases." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Culbreath, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CR14-0147852-S (December 2, 2014, Blue, J.).
Unlike in Ward, the warrant or information in the present matter was issued within the statute of limitations period. Therefore, the court shall analyze the defendant’s motion to dismiss under the burden shifting framework of State v. Swebilius, supra, 325 Conn. 793; see also State v. Crawford, supra, 202 Conn. 443.
The first issue presented is whether the defendant has met his burden of putting forth evidence to suggest that he was not elusive, was available, and was readily approachable for the burden to then shift to the state to prove that the delay in executing the warrant was not unreasonable. Our Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen an arrest warrant has been issued, and the prosecutorial official has promptly delivered it to a proper officer for service, he has done all he can under our existing law to initiate prosecution and to set in motion the machinery that will provide notice to the accused of the charges against him. When the prosecutorial authority has done everything possible within the period of limitation to evidence and effectuate an intent to prosecute, the statute of limitations is tolled." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Crawford, supra, 202 Conn. 450. Additionally, the court held that "in order to toll the statute of limitations, an arrest warrant, when issued within the time limitations of [General Statutes] § 54-193(b), must be executed without unreasonable delay." Id., 450-51.
"As articulated by the Appellate Court, this test raises a rather low evidentiary bar for the burden of proof to shift. The defendant need not prove that he was not elusive, was available and was readily approachable, and the court need not find such facts. Rather, the defendant need only put forth evidence to suggest that he was not elusive, was available, and was readily approachable. A suggestion is more in nature of a hint or insinuation and lacks the element of probability. Facts which merely suggest do not raise an inference of the existence of the fact suggested, and therefore a suggestion is much less than an inference or a presumption." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Culbreath, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CR14-0147852-S. "[O]nce the defendant has demonstrated his availability for arrest, he has done all that is required to carry his burden; the burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate that any period of delay in executing the warrant was not unreasonable." State v. Swebilius, supra, 325 Conn. 804.
In determining what it means to be "not elusive, available and readily approachable," Connecticut courts have analyzed the specific factual circumstances of each case in deciding whether sufficient evidence has been submitted to suggest that the defendant was available for apprehension for the burden to then shift to the state. In making this determination, Connecticut courts have considered (1) the location of the defendant during the relevant time period; (2) efforts made by the defendant to evade police detection or apprehension; and (3) the state’s knowledge of the defendant’s whereabouts.
First, Connecticut courts have generally associated a defendant who remains in Connecticut with being not elusive, available, and readily approachable. Nevertheless, a defendant who resides outside of Connecticut during the relevant time period does not automatically preclude a court from finding that the defendant was not elusive, was available, and was readily approachable. See State v. Derks, 155 Conn.App. 87, 94, 108 A.3d 1157, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 930, 110 A.3d 432 (2015) (holding that the burden did not shift because the defendant moved to Colorado and had multiple addresses there rendering him unavailable); Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 122 Conn.App. 271, 285-86, 999 A.2d 781, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 913, 4 A.3d 831 (2010) (holding that the burden did not shift as the defendant was in Puerto Rico and not readily available); State v. Soldi, 92 Conn.App. 849, 853-54, 887 A.2d 436, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 913, 895 A.2d 792 (2006) (holding that the burden should have shifted to the state as evidence demonstrated the defendant lived continuously in Connecticut); State v. Culbreath, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CR14-0147852-S (finding that the burden shifted to the state as the defendant was incarcerated out of state in a federal prison); State v. Gauthier, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, Docket No. MV-11-0074499-S (September 11, 2012, Mullins, J.) (finding that the burden shifted to the state as the defendant had not left Connecticut during relevant time period).
The second factor Connecticut courts have examined is whether the defendant has made efforts to evade apprehension by the authorities. Courts have considered a wide variety of factual circumstances when making this determination, such as the timing of the defendant’s actions. For example, in Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 122 Conn.App. 277, evidence was submitted that the defendant departed for Puerto Rico three days after his encounter with the police. The court held that "the evidence was uncontroverted that the petitioner left Connecticut for Puerto Rico within days of learning of the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse ... The timing of the petitioner’s relocation ... is compelling." Id., 285. Similarly, in State v. Derks, supra, 155 Conn.App. 94, the defendant had abruptly departed for Colorado leaving behind his wife and child following the complaint of sexual assault being made to the police. The court held that the burden never shifted from the defendant to the state, as evidence was submitted of the defendant being elusive based upon the timing of his actions. Id., 89, 94-95.
Furthermore, Connecticut court have found that when a defendant is living openly, the defendant is more likely to be viewed as being not elusive, available and readily approachable. Connecticut courts have found a defendant to be "living openly" during the relevant time period based upon a defendant maintaining a valid driver’s license, registering a vehicle, maintaining the same telephone number and contact information, maintaining a formal residence, paying for utilities, having direct family members attending public school, not avoiding contact or communication with the police, and being incarcerated in a federal correctional facility. See State v. Woodtke, supra, 130 Conn.App. 739-45 (holding that defendant "was not elusive and was available in New Haven during the time period"); State v. Soldi, supra, 92 Conn.App. 853-54; State v. Gauthier, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. MV-11-0074499-S (holding that the defendant who had not left Connecticut did nothing to evade arrest, and therefore, the burden shifted to the state to determine whether the delay was reasonable).
Lastly, as previously discussed with the two prior factors of location and evasion, Connecticut courts have examined whether the state knew of the defendant’s actual whereabouts during the relevant time period. In State v. Soldi, supra, 92 Conn.App. 853-54, evidence was submitted that the police knew about the defendant’s whereabouts, along with her different residences in Connecticut. During the hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, a police officer had testified about efforts made to contact the defendant by sending mail to her residence and by telephone. Id. In State v. Gauthier, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. MV-11-0074499-S, evidence was submitted that suggested the police had knowledge of the defendant’s location. The defendant had lived in the same house, had not left the state and maintained the same phone number. Id. Furthermore, the court found that the police had driven by the defendant’s home on multiple occasions in order to serve the arrest warrant. Id.
In State v. Culbreath, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CR14-0147852-S, the warrant was issued within the statute of limitations period and the court held that the burden shifted to the state to prove that the delay in executing the warrant was reasonable. The defendant in the matter was accused of having committed sexual assault. When the New Haven police attempted to execute a warrant for the defendant at his address, however, the defendant no longer resided at this address. On March 17, 2005, the defendant had been arrested in New Haven by federal authorities on federal narcotics charges, was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment, and housed in multiple federal correctional institutions outside Connecticut. The defendant was initially housed in a federal correctional institution in Rhode Island, was transferred to Brooklyn, New York, and subsequently to West Virginia. Id. When the New Haven Police attempted to locate the defendant, they made a single attempt by checking three law enforcement databases available and went to his last known address, but failed to locate him. An internet search engine was not utilized as part of this search effort.
In 2013, when Detective Crespo was assigned to locate the defendant, he checked a federal prison website and was able to locate the defendant and to ascertain that he was in federal custody. In its decision, the court held that "[j]udged by this forgiving [burden-shifting] standard, Culbreath has put forth evidence to suggest that he was not elusive, was available and was readily approachable. During the entire eight-year period between the signing of the warrant and his arrest, Culbreath was incarcerated in [f]ederal correctional facilities under his own distinctive name. He was not in any way hiding out, attempting to elude capture, or making himself unavailable or unapproachable ... At a minimum, the undisputed evidence suggests that this is the case." (Emphasis in original.) Id.
In contrast, in Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 122 Conn.App. 277, evidence was submitted that the police had limited knowledge of the defendant’s actual whereabouts. The police became aware that the defendant had fled to Puerto Rico, but they had no actual knowledge of his whereabouts. Id. The police testified to attempting to ascertain the defendant’s location in Puerto Rico, but they were unsuccessful. Id. The Appellate Court noted that the trial court had found that "[w]hile the trial transcript reveals that the authorities may have been aware [that] the petitioner was in Puerto Rico as early as 1995, there is no indication that they knew his exact address or how to directly contact him." Id., 278. Finally, in State v. Derks, supra, 155 Conn.App. 94, the Appellate Court held, that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and further noted that "the defendant eluded authorities and was difficult to apprehend, as he was living in Colorado [and had multiple addresses in Colorado], which the authorities did not know."
In the present case, although the defendant was residing out of state, the state was aware of his whereabouts unlike in Culbreath and could have easily executed the warrant within the statute of limitations period or sooner than it did in 2018. As set forth in State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 450-51 (1987), "some limit as to when an arrest warrant must be executed after its issuance is necessary in order to prevent the disadvantages to an accused attending stale prosecutions, a primary purpose of statutes of limitations ... Accordingly ... in order to toll the statute of limitations, an arrest warrant, when issued within the time limitations of § 54-193(b), must be executed without unreasonable delay ... [W]e expressly declined to adopt a per se approach as to what period of time to execute an arrest warrant is reasonable. A reasonable period of time is a question of fact that will depend on the circumstances of each case. If the facts indicate that an accused consciously eluded the authorities, or for other reasons was difficult to apprehend, these factors will be considered in determining what time is reasonable. If, on the other hand, the accused did not relocate or take evasive action to avoid apprehension, failure to execute an arrest warrant for even a short period of time might be unreasonable and fail to toll the statute of limitations." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Swebilius, 325 Conn. 793, 802-03 (2017); see also State v. Woodtke, 130 Conn.App. 739-40.
Unlike the defendant in Ward, here, the defendant’s identity was known to the police. After the search of the defendant’s home, the defendant voluntarily went to the police station and provided a sworn statement to the police in which he admitted to possessing child pornography. The police seized his computer and other devices for investigation. The police had the defendant’s cell phone number and knew where he lived both in Connecticut and subsequently in California. Unlike the timing of the defendants’ immediate departure out of state in Gonzalez and Derks, here, it was not until almost two years (1 year and 9 months) later that the defendant moved to California where he remained at the same address with the same cell phone number until his arrest in 2018. The defendant lived openly in California. Specifically, the defendant did not leave abruptly as did the defendants in both Derks and Gonzalez, but remained in Connecticut for twenty-one months after having his home searched, his computers seized, having been questioned by police and having provided a sworn statement admitting to possession of child pornography. The defendant did not evade police by moving to California, and his California address where he lived from 2011 until his arrest in 2018 was known to the police. The court finds that the defendant was available to be served with the arrest warrant.
Next, the burden shifts to the state to show that the delay in executing the arrest warrant was not unreasonable. Here, the arrest warrant was issued on May 22, 2013, one year and seven months prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations period. The issue is whether this delay in executing the warrant beyond the statute of limitations period of December 22, 2014 was not unreasonable. The arrest warrant was not executed until approximately three and one-half years after the statute of limitations period expired. The state had one year and seven months before the expiration of the statute of limitations period (December 22, 2014) to execute the warrant. The state has not provided a valid reason for why it did not obtain an extraditable warrant during this time other than to suggest that it could be costly. However, it did choose to obtain an extraditable warrant in 2018, three and one-half years after the statute of limitations period expired.
If the defendant had abruptly or within a few months moved to California, changed his cell phone number, lived at more than one or two addresses and/or changed his name to an alias or otherwise was difficult to find, the defendant would not have been available but would have been evasive and not readily approachable. Also, under those circumstances, the delay in executing a warrant may be reasonable if the police were trying to locate him. Instead, here, actually the defendant was easy to locate. The police knew who he was, knew his cell phone number and knew where he lived. "[I]t is undesirable ... to toll the statute of limitations in instances [in which] the warrant is issued but no effort is made to arrest a defendant whose whereabouts are known." State v. Swebilius, supra, 325 Conn. 814 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Had the police obtained the authorization to extradite in 2013 as they had obtained in 2018, the state would have been able to prosecute the defendant sooner. The defendant was arrested by the Huntington Beach California police on or about March 15, 2018, over three years after the statute of limitations period expired. After posting bail, the defendant returned to Connecticut on his own volition, therefore, there was no suggested cost to the state. When considering the totality of the circumstances, in that the state knew the California address of the defendant, the police requested an extraditable warrant in 2013 within the statute of limitations period and did not obtain one, but then obtained one approximately five years later in 2018 to serve the defendant at his same California address, and considering that the state provided no evidence to explain why its failure to serve the arrest warrant within the statute of limitations period was reasonable, the court finds the delay in executing the arrest warrant to be unreasonable. Therefore, the statute of limitations period is not tolled.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby Granted.
SO ORDERED.