Opinion
2021 KA 1341
09-16-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ARTHUR BREAUX
Antonio Tony M. Clayton District Attorney Terri Russo Lacy Assistant District Attorney Port Allen, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Lieu T. Vo Clark Mandeville, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Arthur Breaux Arthur Breaux Dixon Correctional Institute Jackson, Louisiana Defendant/Appellant In Proper Person
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of West Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket No. 190086 Honorable Tonya S. Lurry, Judge Presiding
Antonio "Tony" M. Clayton
District Attorney
Terri Russo Lacy
Assistant District Attorney
Port Allen, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Lieu T. Vo Clark
Mandeville, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Arthur Breaux
Arthur Breaux
Dixon Correctional Institute
Jackson, Louisiana
Defendant/Appellant
In Proper Person
BEFORE: MCDONALD, McCLENDON, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
MCCLENDON, J.
Defendant, Arthur Breaux, was charged by bill of information with home invasion, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:62.8 (count 1); attempted second degree murder, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1 and LSA-R.S. 14:27 (count 2); and second degree robbery, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:64.4 (count 3). Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty on counts 1 and 3 and not guilty of attempted second degree murder (count 2). For the home invasion conviction, defendant was sentenced to twentyeight years imprisonment at hard labor and fined $5,000.00. For the second degree robbery conviction, he was sentenced to thirty-seven years imprisonment at hard labor. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Defendant now appeals, designating one counseled assignment of error and one pro se assignment of error. We affirm the convictions and sentences.
FACTS
Leon Altazan hired defendant to help work farmland that Leon owned in Maringouin. Defendant worked on and off for Leon for about one-and-a-half months. Each day that defendant worked, Leon would pay him with cash that he kept in the pocket of his blue jeans that he always wore.
In his opening statement, the prosecutor said Leon was eighty-five-years old.
On the night of December 10, 2018, defendant, along with an accomplice, Hosie Scott, went to Leon's house in Port Allen. Leon was asleep in his bedroom and his blind wife was asleep in another bedroom. Defendant reached his hand through the pet door on the back door and unlocked it. It was too dark inside, so defendant and Hosie left to get a flashlight and returned. Defendant then went into Leon's bedroom while Hosie stayed outside in the hallway. Defendant took Leon's blue jeans that were near Leon's bed and handed them to Hosie. Defendant then reentered Leon's bedroom, jumped on top of Leon, and began choking him. Leon woke up and tried to call for help from Brent, his neighbor. Defendant told Leon, "Brent can't help you now where you at mother f-- . Leon's bedroom was dark and he could not see defendant's face, but he immediately recognized defendant's voice. Leon could not move his arms, so he started kicking defendant. Defendant had a bad leg, which caused him to have a pronounced limp. Leon kicked defendant in his bad leg or in the groin, causing defendant to fall off the bed onto the floor. Defendant got up, and he and Hosie left the house.
Leon's wallet, in his blue jeans taken by defendant, contained hundreds of dollars. Defendant gave Hosie about $550.00, and defendant kept the rest. When defendant was later apprehended at his girlfriend's apartment, he had $1,160.00 in cash.
Defendant testified at trial. He denied any involvement in the home invasion and insisted he had never been in Leon's house. According to defendant, on the night of the incident, Hosie called him and asked him for a ride. Defendant drove his white Trailblazer to a park in Port Allen and picked up Hosie. Defendant gave Hosie some money to buy drugs for Hosie and defendant. Hosie was dropped off at a location close to Leon's house, but when Hosie did not return, defendant left to go buy drugs. After buying the drugs and driving around, somehow, he and Hosie met up. Hosie got in defendant's vehicle and told defendant that he "hit a lick for $2,500.00."
Defendant has prior convictions for armed robbery, felony forgery, battery, and theft.
COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole counseled assignment of error, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for home invasion and second degree robbery. Specifically, defendant contends, regarding the home invasion conviction, that the State failed to prove he had the intent to use force or violence upon the person of another. Regarding the second degree robbery conviction, defendant contends the State failed to prove Leon suffered serious bodily injury.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; LSA-Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.
Home Invasion
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:62.8(A) defines home invasion as follows:
[T]he unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling, or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by a person, where a person is present, with the intent to use force or violence upon the person of another or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property of another.
To convict defendant of home invasion, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) defendant entered the home without permission or authorization; (2) that the place he entered was an inhabited dwelling or a place used in whole or in part as a home by another person; (3) that a person was present in the home when defendant made entry; and (4) defendant had the intent to use force or violence against a person in the home or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property. See State v. Smith, 2013-0143 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/21/14), 141 So.3d 853, 859, writ denied, 2014-1470 (La. 5/15/15), 170 So.3d 155.
Defendant in brief takes issue only with the fourth element of home invasion. According to defendant, he entered Leon's house with the intent to only commit a theft inside, and there was no evidence he entered the residence with the intent to use force or violence on Leon or his wife. Defendant suggests that the inquiry is not whether an act of force or violence was committed, but whether he had the intention to commit an act of force or violence against a person when the entry was made; the fact he entered when he believed Leon would be asleep refutes the idea he intended to use force or violence on him. Defendant notes that only when Leon began moving in his bed did defendant physically engage him.
In State v. Collier, 2013-189 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 161 So.3d 653, 654, writ denied, 2013-2554 (La. 4/11/14), 137 So.3d 1213, the defendant, late in the evening, knocked on the door of elderly victims, Rufus and Neva Kelly. Mr. Kelly opened the door, and the defendant charged into the house with a gun drawn. He swung the pistol at Mr. Kelly, who "caught the blow" on his hand. The defendant shoved the pistol under Mr. Kelly's chin and announced that a robbery was in progress. Upon learning that another person was in the house, the defendant walked Mr. Kelly to the bedroom where they found Mrs. Kelly waiting with a small-caliber rifle. The defendant threatened to kill her husband if she did not relinquish the weapon, so she complied. A second man then entered the house, and the two offenders collected money from various locations throughout the house. They then duct-taped the victims' hands behind their backs, ordered them to sit in the living room, and left. Id. at 654. The defendant was convicted of home invasion and argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to prove the intent element of the crime since the evidence did not demonstrate he intended to use force or violence upon the Kellys. Id. at 655. The defendant noted that Mr. Kelly testified that the defendant swung at him but thought the defendant was only trying to get him to move back. Further, according to the defendant, he and his partner did not want to hurt the victims and did not hurt them; the defendant noted the testimony of his co-defendant's ex-girlfriend regarding co-defendant's statement to her that he and the defendant did not plan to hurt anyone. Id. In finding no merit to the defendant's argument, the third circuit found:
While Defendant may not have initially intended to use force, the record shows that he entered the Kelly home with a firearm and jammed it under Mr. Kelly's chin. When Mrs. Kelly mounted a defense, Defendant threatened to kill her husband. Defendant duct-taped the victims' hands behind their backs. These actions demonstrate that during the robbery Defendant intended to use force or violence against the victims.Id. at 655-56 (emphasis added).
In the instant matter, after defendant handed Leon's jeans to Hosie, defendant went back into Leon's bedroom. According to Hosie, defendant had told him that Leon kept one or two revolvers in a dresser drawer somewhere. Within moments of the defendant going back into Leon's bedroom, defendant attacked Leon. According to Hosie, when Leon "made like a movement, like a sleep movement," defendant "pounced on him." Leon testified that he was awakened by defendant choking him. At any rate, when Leon stirred in his sleep, defendant could have simply walked out of the bedroom and left the house.
Moreover, the offense of home invasion does not require the actual use of force or violence against a person, but only the intent to use such force or violence. See State v. Rivera, 2011-1460 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 2012 WL 2023356, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-1596 (La. 1/25/13), 105 So.3d 65 (affirming the conviction for home invasion, noting that when the defendant entered the residence with pepper spray, he did not have to actually discharge the pepper spray, causing serious bodily injury to the victim, or touch the victim to be found guilty of home invasion; he only had to intend to discharge the pepper spray or forcefully touch the victim). Given defendant's actions of going back into Leon's bedroom, jumping on top of Leon while he slept, and choking him to the point where the choking ceased only because Leon fought back and kicked defendant, a rational juror could have inferred defendant's intent to use force or violence on Leon when he entered his home.
The factfinder can accept or reject the testimony of any witness. To resolve conflicting testimony relative to factual matters, the factfinder must make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence. State v. Eby, 2017-1456 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/6/16), 248 So.3d 420,426, writ denied, 2018-0762 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.3d 1153. See State v. Mire, 2014-2295 (La. 1/27/16), 269 So.3d 698, 700 (per curiam). The Jackson standard of review does not permit a reviewing court to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for the factfinder's, assess the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh evidence. See State v. McGhee, 2015-2140 (La. 6/29/17), 223 So.3d 1136, 1137 (per curiam); State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 422 (per curiam). Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the factfinder, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert, denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict based on an exculpatory hypothesis of mitigatory circumstances presented to, and rationally rejected, by the factfinder. Eby, 248 So.3d at 426-27. In this case, it is clear from the guilty verdict that the jury rejected the theory that defendant had no intent to attack Leon when he entered his home but only the intent to take Leon's money.
After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the guilty verdict on the home invasion charge. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that defendant was guilty of home invasion. This assignment of error is without merit.
Second Degree Robbery
Second degree robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury. LSA-R.S. 14:64.4(A)(1). "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness; extreme physical pain; protracted and obvious disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or a substantial risk of death. LSA-R.S. 14:2(C).
Defendant does not contest the "taking" element of second degree robbery. He argues only that the State failed to prove the "serious bodily injury" element of the offense. According to defendant, the only injuries Leon sustained were scratches on his neck that drew blood; his injuries were tended to at his home, and he did not seek treatment at a hospital. Thus, defendant contends, since there was no evidence of serious bodily injury, the State did not prove he committed second degree robbery. Defendant cites to State v. Helou, 2002-2302 (La. 10/23/03), 857 So.2d 1024, wherein the supreme court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of serious bodily injury. In Helou, the victim was struck in the face and was treated at the hospital for a bloody nose. Id. at 1025. The Helou court found that the victim's only malady was a loss of blood. There was no evidence of "extreme physical pain" and the supreme court would not infer that the loss of blood was tantamount to "extreme physical pain." Since there was no evidence of any severe injury, the supreme court found that a punch to the nose, resulting in the presence of blood alone, without more evidence, did not satisfy the "serious bodily injury" element of second degree battery. Id. at 1028-29.
Helou is a second degree battery case. At the time of the instant offenses in 2018, LSA-R.S. 14:34.1 provided, in pertinent part:
A. Second degree battery is a battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury[.]
* * *
B. For purposes of this Section, the following words have the following meanings:
* * *
(3) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.
Thus, since "serious bodily injury" as defined in LSA-R.S. 14:2(C) is the same definition of "serious bodily injury" formerly used in the second degree battery statute, second degree battery cases are useful in determining whether the victim suffered a serious bodily injury.
Despite defendant's assertion, Leon suffered more than just scratches on his neck. Leon testified that defendant tore the skin on his throat and that the choking hurt his throat. Leon was not wearing a shirt when attacked. Defendant either struck or scratched Leon on the left side of his chest. That is, defendant both choked and struck Leon several times. At any rate, still shots from police body cameras of Leon's wound show a fairly deep, bloody gouge on Leon's chest. Moreover, defendant failed to address the choking itself. Leon testified that he "woke up choking to death." Leon indicated that when defendant was on top of him and choking him, he felt like he was dying. While being choked, Leon tried to scream for his neighbor, Brent. Leon testified that when he said "Brent," the name "just came out a squeak" because that was "all the air I had left." On redirect examination, the following exchange took place with Leon:
Leon testified that after several "licks" from defendant, he started kicking defendant.
Q. Mr. Altazan, do you remember being asked on cross-examination about what you told an officer the night of this crime?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you recall telling the officer "I was fighting for my life. He had his hands around my neck choking me. I had to kick him off me. I thought I was going to die"?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that how you felt that night?
A. Never been there before like that.
In State v. Young, 2000-1437 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 847, 848, the defendant choked the victim, Mr. Fred Hambrick. The defendant was convicted of second degree battery and argued on appeal that there was no evidence that he intended to inflict serious bodily injury on Mr. Hambrick or that Mr. Hambrick actually suffered serious bodily injury, as medical testimony indicated that Mr. Hambrick only showed signs of throat trouble. Id. at 850-51. In affirming the conviction, the supreme court noted that Mr. Hambrick's treating physician testified that the defendant's act of choking Mr. Hambrick could have resulted in a substantial risk of death. Also, three months after the defendant's arrest, Mr. Hambrick explained that he was still having throat problems caused by the defendant's attack. Id. at 852. The supreme court found that a jury could reasonably determine that the defendant intended to inflict an injury on Mr. Hambrick that involved the impairment of a bodily function or a substantial risk of death without his consent. Id. at 853.
Similarly, the jury herein could have reasonably determined that defendant's act of choking an elderly man could have resulted in a substantial risk of death. The testimony of a victim may present sufficient evidence to establish that the victim sustained serious bodily injury, without the testimony of any expert. State v. Cornwell, 2017-0044 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/27/17), 2017 WL 4314372, *5 (unpublished). The jury may also have determined that the gash in Leon's chest, coupled with the other injuries and the pain he suffered, satisfied the "serious bodily injury" element. See State v. Accardo, 466 So.2d 549, 551-53 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1204 (La. 1985) (finding the State proved the "serious bodily injury" element despite no testimony from the victim that she suffered "extreme pain," where the defendant struck the victim on her head with a fist or a blackjack, causing pain and swelling to her head).
After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the guilty verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that defendant was guilty of second degree robbery. See Calloway, 1 So.3d at 418.
The counseled assignment of error is without merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his pro se assignment of error, defendant argues that the prosecutor did not reveal the agreement that Hosie Scott had with the State. According to defendant, the State's failure to disclose to him that Hosie testified for the prosecution in exchange for a lenient sentence violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
The rule established in Brady is that upon request, the State must produce evidence that is favorable to the accused where it is material to guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. See also State v. Bright, 2002-2793 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 37, 41. Failure to do so violates a defendant's due process rights. Id. The Brady rule applies to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence, including evidence that impeaches the testimony of a witness when the reliability or credibility of that witness may determine guilt or innocence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Bright, 875 So.2d at 41; State v. Knapper, 579 So.2d 956, 959 (La. 1991). A Brady violation occurs when the evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). See State v. Golden, 2016-1659 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/2/17), 223 So.3d 4, 11.
While both the prosecutor and Hosie repeatedly indicated that Hosie did not make any kind of arrangement with the State in exchange for his testimony, defendant avers that Hosie lied on the witness stand. This contention implicates the decision in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). To prove a Napue claim, the accused must show that the prosecutor acted in collusion with the witness to facilitate false testimony. When a prosecutor allows a state witness to give false testimony without correction, a conviction gained as a result of that perjured testimony must be reversed, if the witness's testimony reasonably could have affected the jury's verdict, even though the testimony may be relevant only to the credibility of the witness. Id. at 269, 79 S.Ct. at 1177. Furthermore, fundamental fairness to an accused, i.e., due process, is offended "when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id. When false testimony has been given under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a new trial unless there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged false testimony could have affected the outcome of the trial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). See State v. Broadway, 96-2659 (La. 10/19/99), 753 So.2d 801, 814, cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1056,120 S.Ct. 1562, 146 L.Ed.2d 466 (2000).
In this matter, defendant would ask this court to simply infer Hosie was promised a deal in exchange for his testimony and, as such, lied on the witness stand, because he received only a ten-year suspended sentence and had two charges against him not pressed, whereas defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-eight and thirty-seven years. However, there was nothing unreasonable about Hosie's sentence or anything in the sentence he received that suggests he was promised some type of deal by the prosecution before testifying at defendant's trial. Hosie pled guilty to home invasion instead of going to trial. Defendants often receive sentencing benefits from pleading guilty. See State v. Gilliam, 2001-748 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/15/02), 807 So.2d 1024,1028, writ denied, 2002-0512 (La. 11/1/02), 828 So.2d 562 (noting the defendant's sentence arrived at as part of a plea bargain, wherein she was advised of the sentence which she would receive by pleading guilty, and the plea bargain was "highly successful" in the sense that she received a sentence considerably below the statutory maximum). See also State v. Batiste, 2009-521 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 981, 984-85; State v. Rodriguez, 550 So.2d 837, 842-43 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1989). Further, it appears the charges against Hosie for attempted second degree murder and second degree battery were dropped or nol prossed because the facts, as established at the trial of defendant, revealed that it was only defendant who attacked Leon, while Hosie stood in the hallway. At trial, Leon's testimony, which had nothing to do with Hosie's testimony, clearly identified defendant as his attacker.
At any rate, with two continuances granted by the trial court for the motion for new trial, defense counsel was given several opportunities posttrial to put Hosie on the witness stand and question him about any plea agreements in exchange for his testimony, but chose not to do so because defense counsel was unable to secure the presence of his own witnesses at the hearing. Hosie had already testified at defendant's trial that he had not received a deal in exchange for his testimony. He further indicated that he had previously met with District Attorney Tony Clayton, who had made no promises to him whatsoever. On cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
Q. Did anyone ever tell you they would help you if you helped yourself or told the story and implicated Mr. Breaux?
A. You're speaking of this instance?
Q. Yes, sir, help Mr. Breaux.
A. I done told you I haven't been promised anything. Ain't nobody told me nothing. I'm basically throwing myself on the mercy of the court basically.
On redirect examination, the following exchange took place:
Q. And now you're at the mercy of the court, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have never uttered one fact about this case to Mr. Clayton, have you?
A. No, sir.
At the motion for new trial hearing, after defendant had already been granted two continuances, defense counsel sought another continuance because Hosie had not yet arrived at the court and because a defense witness did not show. In denying the motion for continuance, the trial court stated:
With regard to the second Motion for New Trial that was filed and the witnesses not being here, the Court did continue it two times and the defense did have the opportunity to go forward with just Hosie Scott on those two occasions, chose not to and I understand that it was because you were trying to get all three witnesses here.
So we had one witness, one witness, and now we're at zero witnesses. But I can't continue to delay this matter for witnesses that either are avoiding - I don't even want to speculate on why they're not here.
Defense counsel then argued his motion for new trial. He stated, "It's our understanding and we believe that no promise of any set sentence was made." However, according to defense counsel, it did not seem "conscionable" that Hosie would have testified at defendant's trial about his own participation in the offenses charged without having had "some insurances." The prosecutor replied in pertinent part, "As an Officer of the Court, I can tell you that no plea offer was made to Hosie Scott prior to trial and nothing was conditioned on his testimony at all." The prosecutor added: "But Hosie Scott was not offered anything at all. Other than, we asked him to tell the truth. That's it, Your Honor." In denying the motion for new trial, the trial court stated in pertinent part:
I think it's a common practice for the District Attorney's Office to pick a defendant, whether they think they're more culpable or less culpable, to see who's going to be willing to testify in the State's favor or just provide truthful testimony. So that didn't come across as anything unusual.
Mr. Scott came across extremely credible on the stand. I think that the jury found him extremely credible. And there [were] a lot of other factors and evidence presented in this matter.
If I'm not mistaken, I think I did offer for the defense to take the -to question Mr. Hosie Scott while he was present and then recess the hearing for the other defendants [sic]. I just want the record to be clear on that, because Mr. Hosie Scott was here twice. And I know for sure on the second appearance, I offered to start the hearing and then recess it to try to get the other ones here on the off chance that he didn't show up this time. And the defense chose not to go forward in that manner.
Defendant has not provided any evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that Hosie perjured himself at trial or that he had confected a deal with the State in exchange for his testimony. Defendant's argument is wholly unsubstantiated. Having provided only bare assertions and conclusory allegations with no supporting evidence, defendant has not shown in any way that the prosecutor withheld evidence in violation of Brady. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we reject defendant's contention and relegate him to post-conviction relief if evidence in this regard is subsequently obtained. See State v. Broadway, 753 So.2d at 814.
This pro se assignment is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.