Opinion
112,329.
06-05-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Norman C. BRAMLETT, Appellee.
Michael R. Serra, deputy county attorney, Jason W. Belveal, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. J. Richard Lake, of Holton, for appellee.
Michael R. Serra, deputy county attorney, Jason W. Belveal, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
J. Richard Lake, of Holton, for appellee.
Before SCHROEDER, P.J., ATCHESON and BRUNS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The State has brought an interlocutory appeal from a ruling of the Jefferson County District Court suppressing admissions Defendant Norman C. Bramlett made in response to allegations he had sexually molested his granddaughter. The district court found a detective's questioning of Bramlett to be a custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings. The relevant circumstances, all of which are undisputed, do not support the district court's legal conclusion to grant the motion to suppress. We, therefore, reverse and remand with directions that the district court deny the motion to suppress.
Facts and Procedural History
We draw the facts about the encounter between Bramlett and Jefferson County Sheriff's Detective Kirk W. Vernon from the evidence presented during the hearing on the motion to suppress. Vernon was the only witness to testify at the hearing, so his account is, for all practical purposes, uncontroverted. More general information about the case appears elsewhere in the appellate record.
In mid-July 2013, Vernon received a report that Bramlett's 10–year–old granddaughter had said Bramlett touched her breasts and pubic area during visits to his house. The girl said Bramlett had touched private parts of her body multiple times. As part of the investigation, Vernon interviewed the victim, her parents, and other potential witnesses.
On July 30, Vernon called Bramlett and asked if he would come to the sheriffs office in the next day or two to discuss a “very sensitive” investigation on which he might have information. Bramlett asked the nature of the investigation, and Vernon declined to reveal any more information over the telephone. Vernon did not tell Bramlett he was a suspect. Nonetheless, Bramlett asked if he should bring a lawyer with him. Again, Vernon demurred, saying he could not advise him in that regard. Bramlett told Vernon he would be at the sheriff's department within an hour.
Bramlett drove to the sheriff's department and arrived late in the morning. Although the configuration of the department is not entirely clear from the evidence, we gather there is a main reception area upon entering the building. A locked door separates the sheriff's department from the main entryway. Within the department are administrative offices and at least one interview room. Down another corridor and behind another set of locked doors is the county jail. Vernon set up video recording equipment for the interview room in anticipation of Bramlett's arrival.
When Bramlett arrived, Vernon took him through the locked door into the sheriff's department to the interview room. Nothing in the record indicates Vernon could have conducted a private, recorded interview in another part of the building fully accessible to the public. Vernon had Bramlett take a seat in the interview room. The door to that room remained open during the entire interrogation, which lasted between 35 and 40 minutes. Although Bramlett obviously was a suspect, Vernon did not tell him so. Bramlett was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained during the interrogation. Vernon did not explicitly tell Bramlett he was free to leave. Nor did he say Bramlett could not leave. During the course of the interrogation, Bramlett did not ask to leave or to call anyone.
For the first 20 minutes or so, Vernon got background information from Bramlett and discussed his computer use. Only then did Vernon turn to the allegations of sexual misconduct. Almost as soon as Vernon raised the issue, Bramlett acknowledged he had touched his granddaughter's breasts through her clothing five or six times in the last 6 months. He equivocated about touching the girl's pubic area but conceded that might have happened.
At that point, Vernon informed Bramlett of his Miranda rights. Bramlett asked if the admissions he already made could be used against him. Vernon said they could. Bramlett then asked about the nature of the charges that might be filed against him. Vernon generally discussed possible offenses and confirmed they would be felonies. And Vernon went on to tell Bramlett he would not be free to leave, functionally arresting him. Bramlett then chose to invoke his right to remain silent and terminated the interrogation. Throughout the questioning, Vernon maintained a calm, professional demeanor. He did not raise his voice or become accusatory in tone or attitude.
The State charged Bramlett with one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, a felony violation of K.S.A.2011 Supp. 21–5506(b)(3)(A) and (c)(3). Bramlett filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Vernon during the July 30, 2013, interrogation. The district court granted the motion in a bench ruling following an evidentiary hearing on July 25, 2014. The State has timely filed an interlocutory appeal as provided in K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3603.
Legal Analysis
When law enforcement officers subject individuals to custodial interrogations, they are obligated to inform those individuals of various constitutional rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 496, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012). Here, Bramlett contends he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes when he was placed in the interview room at the sheriffs department. Everyone agrees he was not informed of his Miranda rights until the end of that interrogation.
A person is in custody if he or she has been formally arrested or has been deprived of his or her freedom in a significant way functionally equivalent to an arrest. Miranda, 384 U.S. 444, 478–79. The test explores whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude he or she could not terminate the questioning and leave. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (“Our decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”); Warrior, 294 Kan. at 497, 277 P.3d 1111 ; State v. Fritschen, 247 Kan. 592, 601–03, 802 P.2d 558 (1990) (discussing and adopting the objective standard of evaluating whether a person was in custody for purposes of Miranda ). The Kansas Supreme Court has identified eight factors to be considered in assessing whether an encounter between government agents and an individual constitutes a custodial interrogation. Warrior, 294 Kan. at 496, 277 P.3d 1111 ; State v. Morton, 286 Kan. 632, 640, 186 P.3d 785 (2008), cert. denied 555 U.S. 1126, 129 S.Ct. 903, 173 L.Ed.2d 158 (2009). As outlined in Warrior, 294 Kan. at 496, 277 P.3d 1111, those factors are:
“(1) the time and place of the interrogation; (2) the duration of the interrogation; (3) the number of law enforcement officers present; (4) the conduct of the officers and the person subject to the interrogation; (5) the presence or absence of actual physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed guard; (6) whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) whether the person being questioned was escorted by the officers to the interrogation location or arrived under his or her own power; and (8) the result of the interrogation, for instance, whether the person was allowed to leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the interrogation.”
The criteria are to be considered collectively in light of the factual circumstances surrounding the challenged encounter. No one criterion predominates. And those criteria should not be evaluated in a scorecard fashion simply by tallying how many point toward a custodial interrogation and how many point the other way.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court applies the well known bifurcated standard that asks whether the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and, in turn, whether those findings warrant the ultimate legal conclusion. Warrior, 294 Kan. at 497, 277 P.3d 1111. The legal conclusion itself presents a question of law subject to unlimited review on appeal. 294 Kan. at 497, 277 P.3d 1111. Because the evidence bearing on the motion to suppress is undisputed in this case, the issue becomes purely a legal one in which this court owes no particular deference to the ruling in the district court. State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 485, 293 P.3d 718 (2013).
Without repeating the factual circumstances, we look at the designated factors bearing on the nature of the questioning. The time and place present mixed signals. The interrogation occurred during normal business hours. This was not some late-night examination of a subject rousted from bed to answer questions. Bramlett actually chose the precise time within the 2–day period Vernon suggested. But the interrogation took place at the sheriff's department—Vernon's home turf. A person subjected to a police station examination reasonably may feel isolated, cut off, and unable to leave in many situations. The Miranda Court acknowledged that sort of deliberately induced isolation in recognizing the obligation of law enforcement officers to inform suspects of their rights to refuse to answer questions and to request immediate legal representation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58 ; see State v. Fernandez–Torres, 50 Kan.App.2d 1069, 1079, 337 P.3d 691 (2014) (“Interrogation rooms, by design, tend to be cloistered, thereby imparting a sense of isolation that itself can be coercive.”).
The district court put considerable emphasis on the interview room being behind the locked entrance to the sheriff's department and Bramlett's inability to leave the department without someone opening the front door for him. This also bears on the fifth factor regarding physical restraint or its equivalent.
In context, we are considerably less concerned. Anyone coming into the sheriffs department to conduct business would have to go through the locked front door and could not leave without assistance from an employee. That would be true of a sales representative for an outside business contacting an administrative officer of the department or a crime victim meeting with a detective. So passing through that locked front door would not in and of itself lend a heavily custodial cast to a meeting generally or the encounter between Vernon and Bramlett specifically. Upon his arrival, Bramlett wasn't treated any differently than a witness might have been. The situation would have been different had Bramlett been locked in the interview room or had asked to leave and been refused. Here, however, the locked front door wasn't really an indicator of a custodial interrogation or a coercive environment, and a reasonable person would not have viewed it that way without something more. It might have become so had the interrogation turned distinctly accusatory or had it gone on for hours rather than minutes.
But the questioning of Bramlett lasted a little more than 30 minutes and was conducted by a single officer. Those factors cut against a custodial interrogation. As we have said, Vernon questioned Bramlett in a low-key, nonaccusatory manner. He really had no need to do otherwise. Bramlett readily admitted some of his granddaughter's allegations, and those admissions included legal elements of a serious sex offense.
The district court, however, was troubled by Vernon's actions in getting Bramlett to the sheriff's department—circumstances implicated in the factors considering the officer's conduct generally and how the suspect has arrived at the interrogation. Specifically, Vernon did not inform Bramlett he was a suspect, although he plainly was. Nor would Vernon provide any information about the nature of the investigation. Finally, Vernon declined to say whether Bramlett should bring a lawyer with him. Again, we are less troubled by that communication. At no time did Vernon affirmatively mislead Bramlett. He never suggested to Bramlett he was merely a witness or that he didn't need a lawyer. And Bramlett was neither guileless nor uneducated. The discussion between Vernon and Bramlett didn't particularly suggest a custodial interrogation in the offing—it actually was more inscrutable than anything else. Had Vernon told Bramlett to come in or he would be dragged in, that would tilt heavily toward the custodial. Similarly, had Vernon explicitly informed Bramlett he was a suspect in a felony investigation, that might have suggested a custodial situation to a reasonable person. Ultimately, the point here is not whether Vernon deceived Bramlett in some way but would a reasonable person have believed he or she was in custody during Vernon's questioning. The lead-up to the actual interrogation did not particularly foster that impression.
Weighing against a custodial interrogation was the mode of Bramlett's arrival at the sheriffs department—he came of his own volition and in his own vehicle. He was not delivered by a law enforcement officer. After he arrived, Bramlett was not handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained. Vernon did not display a firearm or other weapon or otherwise engage in a show of force or dominance. Other officers were not present for or in the immediate vicinity of the questioning as if to intimidate Bramlett by sheer numbers. Finally, of course, Bramlett was arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation and was not then free to leave. So that factor points toward a custodial interrogation. We tend to ascribe less significance to it, since Bramlett had no particular reason to think during the course of the brief questioning that he would not be permitted to go on his way at the conclusion. And more to the point, a reasonable person sitting where Bramlett sat could not have considered the interrogation to be custodial as it was unfolding based on what happened when it concluded.
Based on a holistic examination of the circumstances related to Vernon's questioning of Bramlett, we conclude the district court arrived at a legal conclusion that lacked support in the undisputed facts. A reasonable person would not have felt as if he or she were in custody—unable to halt the questioning or to leave—given the way Vernon communicated with Bramlett leading up to and during the interrogation. The district court, therefore, erred in granting the motion to suppress the statements Bramlett made. We reverse that ruling and remand to the district court with directions to deny the motion to suppress and to otherwise proceed in a manner consistent with this decision.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecutor was uncertain whether the district court had excluded Bramlett's statements as evidence based on a Miranda violation and, additionally, because they were the product of undue coercion rendering them involuntary. Involuntariness would have been an independent ground for excluding the statements. See State v. Whitt, 46 Kan.App.2d 570, 577, 264 P.3d 686 (2011). In light of the district court's clarification of its ruling, we understand Bramlett's statements were suppressed only because Vernon provided no Miranda warnings at the outset of the interrogation. Bramlett does not suggest otherwise in his response to the State's appeal. In an abundance of caution, however, we have reviewed the record evidence against the criteria for determining the voluntariness of a confession. See Fernandez–Torres, 50 Kan.App.2d at 1075–76. Those factors overlap with the ones for assessing the custodial character of police questioning of a suspect. We find no factual basis for suggesting Bramlett's free will was broken during the brief encounter with Vernon thereby rendering his admissions involuntary.
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Reversed and remanded with directions.