Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3940-13T2
10-14-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. IAN E. BEERLE, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Kennedy and O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment No. 13-02-0231. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant pled guilty to a single count indictment charging him with possession of a controlled dangerous substance, heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and was sentenced to four years of imprisonment, together with fines and penalties. Defendant now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and argues:
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE AS THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP THE CAR, THE SEIZURE OF THE DRIVER WAS LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE PROFFERED PURPOSE OF THE STOP, AND THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CLAIM PLAIN VIEW. U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. Art. I, para. 7.We have considered this argument in light of the law and the facts, and we affirm.
I.
The facts developed at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence are as follows. On November 21, 2012 at 1:15 a.m., Detective John Elwell observed a motor vehicle being driven with a broken taillight. Rather than emitting the color red upon application of the brakes, one of the taillights emitted a white light with a yellow tint. Elwell believed that this was a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, "the maintenance of lamps statute," and decided to follow the vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, the driver pulled to the side of the road "in the 300 west block of Roberts Avenue and turned the lights out." Elwell also stopped, parking his patrol car one block back. No one entered or exited the vehicle he was watching, and, five minutes later, the vehicle pulled away, made a U-turn, and proceeded back in the direction from which it came. Elwell then stopped the vehicle.
Detective Elwell asked the driver, Amanda Paratee, where she was coming from. Paratee responded but denied stopping on Roberts Road. At this point, Elwell asked Paratee to step out of the car so he could question her out of the presence of defendant, who occupied the front passenger seat. Elwell recognized defendant from an encounter a week earlier, when he had responded to a call that defendant had overdosed on heroin.
Before questioning defendant, Elwell opened the passenger door in order to ensure that defendant's hands were visible and to alleviate any concerns for officer safety. Upon opening the door, Elwell saw an open bottle of liquor on the floor at defendant's feet, as well as a number of plastic baggies with blue wax paper inside, secured with a rubber band — a common method for packaging heroin known as a "bundle" — near the door handle.
Elwell secured the bundle and arrested defendant and Paratee for possession of CDS. A search of defendant at the time of his arrest produced empty "wax paper pieces consistent or similar to the ones that were inside [the] bundle. [And] . . . a small amount of marijuana."
During the stop, Elwell also examined the damaged taillight. He observed that the light had been broken and that red tape had been placed over the lens in an apparent attempt to conceal the damaged lens.
The motion judge found Elwell credible and concluded that the damaged taillight provided him with a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the stop of the vehicle. She also concluded that Elwell justifiably opened the passenger door because, based on his knowledge of defendant's history of drug abuse, he had a reasonable concern for officer safety. Finally, the motion judge found that the heroin by the door handle was in plain view and accordingly upheld the seizure.
II.
The factual findings of the Law Division following witness testimony on a motion to suppress evidence are accorded deference on appeal. Those findings must be upheld "so long as [they] are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court "should give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Id. at 244.
Only the trial court's factual findings — not its legal conclusions — warrant deference on appeal. Legal rulings are subject to de novo review. State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011).
Defendant argues that Elwell's initial stop of the vehicle was unjustified; that he detained the vehicle longer than necessary; and that Elwell "had no right to open the passenger-side car door." We disagree.
"'[A] police officer is justified in stopping a motor vehicle when he has an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a motor vehicle offense,'" a less strenuous standard than probable cause. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999) (quoting State v. Smith, 306 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673 (1979))). "To satisfy the articulable and reasonable suspicion standard, the State is not required to prove that the suspected motor-vehicle violation occurred." Ibid. Elwell believed that Paratee's taillights were not in good working order, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-66:
All lamps, reflectors and other illuminating devices required by this article shall be kept clean and in good working order and, as far as practicable, shall be mounted in such a manner as to reduce the likelihood ofThe difference in illumination of a vehicle's two rear lights presented a reasonable basis for an officer to investigate a possible ongoing violation of the statute requiring taillights to be in "good working order" under the statute, in our view.
their being obscured by mud or dust thrown up by the wheels.
The differences could easily be distracting to fellow motorists, and could also possibly indicate the presence of an electrical problem in the vehicle. The motion judge credited Elwell's testimony that the light emitted from one of Paratee's taillights was "substantially different" from the other, both in color and intensity. Accordingly, the motion judge correctly concluded that the stop was justified by Elwell's reasonable belief that a vehicle and traffic law was violated.
Further, defendant's reliance on State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), for the proposition that an "officer's erroneous belief that a statute was being broken, when in fact it was not" invalidates a stop and search, is misplaced. In Puzio, supra, we specifically distinguished cases where an officer's understanding of a statute was directly contradicted by the plain and unambiguous terms of the statute, from cases "where the officer correctly understands the statute but arguably misinterprets the facts concerning whether a vehicle, or operator, has violated the statute." Id. at 382. Under the latter circumstances, a stop is justifiable because "it is only necessary that the officer have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation." Ibid.
N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 requires the taillights to be kept in "good working order." The statute does not specifically exclude variance in the illumination of each taillight as a possible violation of its terms. Accordingly, Puzio does not apply. Elwell's observation that one taillight was substantially brighter than the other reasonably informed Elwell's belief that the taillights were not in fact in good working order and the stop was therefore justified.
Defendant next argues that Elwell had no reason to question the driver or to open the passenger door before he questioned defendant. Again, we disagree.
Following a justifiable traffic stop, an officer may properly ask questions relating to the driver's presence in the area, destination and purpose. See United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1993); see also State v. Baum, 199 N.J. 407, 423-24 (2009). If during the course of an investigative motor vehicle stop circumstances give rise to suspicions about illegal activity beyond the traffic offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry to address those suspicions. Baum, supra, 199 N.J. at 423 (citing State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 470-80 (1998)).
A driver's inconsistent statements concerning his or her whereabouts entitles an officer to expand the scope of the stop and ask additional, more intrusive questions. See State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. Super. 452, 464 (App. Div. 2000)(citing United States v. Lynton, 161 F.3d, 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1998)). In addition to expanding the scope of the inquiry, the officer may also lengthen the detainment of the motorist when the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in unlawful activity. See Baum, supra, 199 N.J. at 424. Here, Elwell's broadened inquiry and extended detainment were justified by Paratee's denial that she had pulled-over on Roberts Avenue; the odd nature of the stop itself, see State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 513 (2003) (the circumstances and location of a defendant's parked car may give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing); and Elwell's familiarity with defendant's history of drug abuse, see State v. Citarella, 157 N.J. 272 (1998) (officer's knowledge of defendant's history with illicit drugs may contribute to reasonable and articulable suspicion).
Even though, when viewed individually, there may be an innocent explanation for some of the facts, when viewed as a whole in light of Elwell's experience and knowledge, "they form a minimal level of objective justification for [Elwell's] conduct." Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 513.
Finally, a police officer may open a motor vehicle's passenger side door where "'some facts or facts in the totality of the circumstances . . . create in a police officer a heightened awareness of danger that would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in securing the scene in a more effective manner.'" State v. Mai, 202 N.J. 12, 22-23 (2010) (quoting State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 618-19 (1994)). In Mai, supra, the Court recognized that "'traffic stops may be dangerous encounters' and that 'the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle,'" and that a stop takes place during an early morning hour, increase the possible sources of harm to the officer. 202 N.J. at 24 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)).
Here, the stop took place at approximately 1:15 in the morning. After Elwell asked Paratee to exit the vehicle, he walked her to the rear of the vehicle where he placed her with a second officer on the scene. During this time, defendant was unattended in the passenger seat. Elwell then approached the passenger side door and, to ensure officer safety, opened the door before questioning defendant so that defendant's feet and hands would be visible. The motion judge concluded that Elwell's need to see defendant's hands was further justified by Elwell's knowledge of defendant's past illegal drug abuse. Hence, given the totality of the circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer would secure the scene by opening the passenger door. Mai, supra, 202 N.J. at 22-23.
The remainder of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION