Opinion
No. 5-311 / 04-0283
Filed May 11, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert (Trial) and Eliza J. Ovrum (Sentencing), Judges.
Shawn Thomas Bean appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance and manufacturing a controlled substance. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie Cox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Shawn T. Bean appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture more than five grams of methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2003), and manufacturing less than five grams methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6). Bean argues that (1) his counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the district court improperly instructed the jury on the law regarding accomplice testimony, and (2) the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as the evidence was insufficient to convict him of either offense. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the jury could have reasonably found the facts as follows:
In August of 2003 the Des Moines police conducted a consent search of a house in Des Moines, Iowa. The primary resident of this house was Monique Johnson, but Lisa Wolfe, Tara Smith, Jennifer Jarvis, and Bean also resided at this address. When the police arrived at the residence at approximately 8:30 a.m., they found Bean lying on a couch in the living room. Bean told the officers he lived at the residence. The officers then conducted a search of the entire house, attic access, and garage. As a result of this search, the officers discovered a host of paraphernalia associated with methamphetamine production.
Bean was charged by amended trial information with one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of manufacturing methamphetamine. Johnson, Smith, Jarvis, and Wolfe all entered into plea agreements with the State for reduced charges in exchange for their testimony against Bean. A jury trial held in December of 2003 resulted in a verdict of guilty on both counts. Following the return of the jury verdicts, Bean moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. Bean was sentenced to ten years in prison on each count, with the sentences merged.
II. Accomplice Instruction.
Bean argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the district court did not instruct the jury that Johnson, Smith, Jarvis, and Wolfe were accomplices, as a matter of law. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2004). In order to prevail on these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Bean must demonstrate both breach of duty and prejudice. State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 2002). To demonstrate prejudice Bean must show, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted).
In order for a witness to be considered an accomplice, the facts must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the witness was involved in some way in the commission of the crime. See State v. Douglas, 675 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Iowa 2004). Only if the facts are not disputed and not susceptible to different inferences may the question of whether a witness is an accomplice be determined as a matter of law. State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1999). As a preliminary matter, we note the State does not argue that the witnesses are not accomplices, but instead, it contends that it provided sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of Johnson, Smith, Jarvis, and Wolfe. The State concedes in its brief argument that,
the role of the women as [Bean's] accomplices was undisputed and the jury could not have found otherwise. Each of the four women admitted her participation with Defendant in the conspiracy to manufacture meth and explained her specific role in it. Given the undisputed fact that all four women admitted involvement in the conspiracy with Defendant, the jury could not have reached a conclusion other than finding that they were his accomplices.
Moreover, our review of the record reveals that each of these witnesses admitted involvement in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Therefore, we conclude that Johnson, Smith, Jarvis, and Wolfe were accomplices as a matter of law. Thus, the district court should have instructed the jury to this effect, and Bean's trial counsel did fail in an essential duty in neglecting to request such an instruction. State v. Berney, 378 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 1985) (stating the determination of whether a witness is an accomplice where the facts are not in dispute, is a questions of law for the court).
Because we conclude Bean's trial counsel failed in this essential duty, we do not address Bean's alternative claim that the jury should have received a special interrogatory on accomplices as provided by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.22(2).
The State argues that despite this failure, no prejudice resulted as the result of the trial could not have been different had such an instruction been provided because the jury could not draw any inference from the undisputed facts other than that the witnesses were accomplices. We agree.
Each one of the witnesses in question admitted to participating in the methamphetamine production operation occurring at the house. In fact, the witnesses detailed exactly what each one's involvement was. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the jury would have concluded that the witnesses were not accomplices. See People v. Luker, 63 Cal.2d 464, 472 (Cal. 1965) (stating that the error of not instructing the jury that one of three defendants was an accomplice as a matter of law was not prejudicial, where the jury convicted all three defendants and must necessarily have determined that all three were accomplices). Furthermore, even if the jury somehow were to conclude the witnesses were not accomplices, there was an overwhelming amount of evidence corroborating the witnesses' testimony. Thus, the lack of an objection by counsel to the district court's failure to instruct the jury that the witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law was not prejudicial. See Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 633-34 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (holding that the trial court's failure to give accomplice-witness instructions as to two witnesses in capital murder prosecution who were accomplices as a matter of law was harmless error, where accomplices' testimony was corroborated by non-accomplice evidence); Howell v. State, 882 P.2d 1086, 1092-93 (Okla.Crim.App. 1994) (holding any error of trial court in refusing to instruct jury that witness was an accomplice as a matter of law and that accomplice's testimony must be corroborated was harmless where independent physical evidence and defendant's own testimony corroborated testimony of accomplice).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Bean argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the accomplices' testimony is not corroborated and no other evidence ties him to the manufacture or conspiracy charges. We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001). A jury's verdict is binding if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence is evidence that could convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence we review the record in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 1997).
It has long been the law of Iowa that one cannot be convicted on the testimony of accomplices alone. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3); Douglas, 675 N.W.2d at 568. Thus, when the prosecution relies on this type of proof, "corroborating evidence independently linking the defendant to the offense is required." Douglas, 675 N.W.2d at 569.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.21(3) provides that corroborating evidence must "tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." The Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Ware, 338 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Iowa 1983), stated,
Corroborative evidence need not be strong and need not be entirely inconsistent with innocence . . . The requirement of corroborative evidence is met "if it can fairly be said the accomplice is corroborated in some material fact tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." [Citations omitted].
Even if each piece of evidence is not alone sufficient to corroborate an accomplice, the evidence as a whole may be sufficient corroboration. See State v. Willman, 244 N.W.2d 314, 315 (Iowa 1976).
During the search of the house, police officers found, scattered throughout, copious amounts of evidence indicating that methamphetamine had been manufactured on the premises. This evidence included: a bindle of methamphetamine, pseudoephedrine boxes and empty blister packs, tubing, coffee filters some of which contained sludge (a meth by-product), paper plates and plastic cups containing sludge, muriatic acid, propane tanks with blue tinged fittings, empty aluminum foil boxes, rock salt, Coleman lantern fuel, plastic bags with methamphetamine residue, empty lithium battery packaging, hydrochloric acid generators, tubing, and acetone. The police also found evidence of methamphetamine use in the home including a methamphetamine pipe and a notebook containing the house rules for drug activity and use. This physical evidence is consistent with the testimony of Bean's accomplices that Bean manufactured and used methamphetamine at this house.
Blue-tinged fittings indicate that something with a basic Ph was deposited in the propane tank, often anhydrous ammonia, a key component in methamphetamine production.
Moreover, expert testimony also corroborated the witnesses' testimony. Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation expert Nila Bremer testified that the above-listed items are indicative of methamphetamine production. In fact, Bremer was able to detail how the items found are used in the methamphetamine manufacturing process and even opined that the presence of all these items indicates that all five steps of the methamphetamine manufacturing process were carried out at this residence. Polk County Sheriff Deputy Lonnie Peterman testified that based on his knowledge and experience the ubiquitous nature of the methamphetamine paraphernalia throughout the house indicated that all the residents of the house participated in methamphetamine production. These expert statements are particularly significant in light of the fact that when the police searched Johnson's residence and found Bean on a couch, Bean admitted that he resided there and his admission is consistent with the testimony of his accomplices. See Douglas, 675 N.W.2d at 572 (noting that a defendant's out of court admissions may corroborate the testimony of an accomplice).
After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, we find sufficient corroborative evidence of the testimony of Johnson, Smith, Jarvis, and Wolfe. Therefore, we conclude substantial evidence exists in the record to support Bean's convictions. IV. Conclusion
Bean's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence addresses only the alleged lack of corroboration. He does not argue that the evidence is insufficient if the testimony of the witnesses is corroborated.
Witnesses Johnson, Smith, Wolfe, and Jarvis were accomplices as a matter of law. Thus, Bean could not be convicted based on their testimony alone. We conclude that their testimony was corroborated by the cumulative effect of the evidence viewed as a whole. Thus, there was sufficient evidence supporting Bean's conviction, and Bean's trial counsel's breach of duty in not requesting a jury instruction regarding the witnesses being accomplices as matter of law was not prejudicial. We accordingly affirm Bean's convictions.