Opinion
2015 KA 0087
07-07-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CECIL RAY BEALS
Ricky J. Babin District Attorney and Donald D. Candell Stephen P. Sheets Assistant District Attorneys Gonzales, Louisiana Counsel for State/Appellee Gwendolyn K. Brown Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Cecil Ray Beals
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF ASCENSION STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 31,028 HONORABLE RALPH TUREAU, JUDGE Ricky J. Babin
District Attorney
and
Donald D. Candell
Stephen P. Sheets
Assistant District Attorneys
Gonzales, Louisiana Counsel for State/Appellee Gwendolyn K. Brown
Louisiana Appellate Project
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Cecil Ray Beals BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, and THERIOT, JJ. McDONALD, J.
Codefendants, Cecil Ray Beals, Darryl Jones, and Calvin K. Williams, were charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1. The trial court denied a motion to sever the codefendants for trial. Defendant Beals entered a plea of not guilty. Following a trial by jury, defendant Beals was found guilty as charged. Defendant Beals was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant Beals now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to sever and to the overruling of his objections regarding juror misconduct, witness sequestration, and discovery provided by the State. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the adequacy of the record on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
Codefendants, Calvin K. Williams and Darryl Jones, were likewise found guilty of second degree murder and have appealed to this Court. State v. Williams, 15-0509 (La. App. 1 Cir. ___/___/___), ___So.3d ___; State v. Jones, 15-0649 (La. App. 1 Cir. ___/___/___), ___So.3d ___. As to the statement of facts, and to the extent that the codefendants have raised the similar arguments based on a record that is consistently applicable to each defendant, this Court's opinions for the three cases include largely uniform language.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Saturday, January 12, 2013, between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m., Marvin Joe Mayers, who lived on Panama Road in Sorrento, Louisiana, was walking his dog when he heard gunshots and then saw a silver or gray vehicle, with a spoiler on the back and a stripe down the side, speed down the road. He told his girlfriend what he saw and heard before leaving for work that morning. Subsequently, Shawn Dunbar, a driver in the area travelling from Panama Road to LV Road discovered a body, later identified as victim, Gerald G. Wilkins, on the side of the road in a wooded area. Mr. Dunbar immediately reported his discovery to a 911 dispatcher and a nearby resident. At approximately 8:00 a.m., officers of the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office (APSO) were dispatched to the wooded area on LV Road. Deputy Chris Williams arrived at approximately 8:04 a.m. and noted that it was foggy with low visibility in the area. He secured the scene, called the APSO criminal investigation division (CID), and took statements from Mr. Dunbar and other potential witnesses. Deputy Williams learned that shots had been fired during the early morning hours. When found, the victim's body was positioned face down, partially in the roadside ditch, and partially on the roadway.
APSO CID personnel arrived at the scene at approximately 8:30 a.m. and took photographs. Lieutenant Gerald Whealton, an APSO crime scene investigator, noted that the victim's hands were not scuffed or injured, his shirt was not torn or dirty, nor were his clothes disheveled; thus, Lt. Whealton concluded that the victim had not been involved in a struggle. Lt. Whealton further noted that, while the ground was wet from recent rainstorms, and filthy with dirt and debris that was blown around the area, the victim's shoes were relatively dirt and debris free, indicating that he did not walk to the location where he was found. When the victim's body was turned over, the officers discovered a suspected crack pipe in his left hand, noting that a push rod and a lighter were still clenched in his hand. Additionally, the victim's pants' zipper was down, his genitals were exposed, and the front of his pants were wet, indicating that he was urinating at the time of his murder. The victim was not found with a cell phone, wallet, or any form of identification. The victim's fingerprints were collected and taken to the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab, and the victim was later identified.
Lt. Whealton observed a bullet exit wound to the upper left back area of the victim's head and a bullet entry wound to the lower center back of his head. He noted that the entry wound bled to the left side of the victim's body, over his left shoulder, with a strong stream from the back of the head that decreased down to his neck and dribbled down the left side of his head, suggesting that the victim was on the ground at the time of the shot. He observed a second bullet entry wound behind the victim's right ear, which exited through the victim's forehead. Lt. Whealton noted that the pattern of the blood drippings for this injury suggested that the victim was on the ground at the time of this shot also. He estimated that the bullet recovered from the ground was either a .38 caliber or a 9mm and noted that there were no shell casings found at the scene, indicating that a revolver was probably used in the shooting. Ty Gautreau of the Ascension Parish Coroner's Office pronounced the victim dead when he arrived at the scene. The victim's death certificate was later issued, indicating that the cause of death was gunshot wounds to the head.
During their investigation, the police identified three individuals, defendant Beals, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Williams, who became suspects in the victim's murder. The victim, Mr. Jones, Mr. Williams, and defendant Beals, who lived in Mr. Jones' garage, regularly met up at Mr. Jones' house, and they were all there the day and evening before the murder. Marvin McGee, an associate of the codefendants who was also at Mr. Jones' house that day, and who spent the night there, testified that between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., he noticed that Mr. Jones' vehicle was gone. Mr. McGee also testified that he loaned Mr. Williams one of the two cell phones that he had that night and that Mr. Jones' vehicle was gone at some point after he gave Mr. Williams the phone.
Mr. Jones' vehicle, a silver 2000 Chevrolet Impala, matched the description provided by Mr. Mayers, the Sorrento resident who heard the gunshots and saw a vehicle speeding down Panama Road. Records for the cell phone that Mr. Williams had that night showed that the cell phone was initially used in Baton Rouge, was used in Sorrento around the time of the murder, and was then taken back to Baton Rouge. In addition to these cell phone records, surveillance video from a convenience store located 1.4 miles from the murder scene showed that, at 3:38 a.m., defendant Beals exited Mr. Jones' vehicle and entered the store, and an unidentified driver pulled the car around. There appeared to be a passenger in the back seat of the vehicle.
State witness Jeremiah Billingsley knew defendant Beals and Mr. Jones and testified that, while he and defendant Beals were incarcerated together, defendant Beals disclosed the facts surrounding the murder. Specifically, defendant Beals told Mr. Billingsley that, before the murder, the victim had stolen from Mr. Jones multiple times. Defendant Beals offered to "take care" of the victim when he first began stealing from Mr. Jones, but Mr. Jones made it clear that the victim was not to be touched. Mr. Billingsley further testified that defendant Beals told him that, as the victim continued to steal from Mr. Jones, "they" took the victim to Sorrento, and when the victim got out of the car to urinate, "that's when he was taken care of."
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
In assignment of error number three, defendant Beals argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. Defendant Beals specifically contends that the State never proved who killed the victim. Defendant Beals contends that the evidence consisted of contradictory testimony of Marvin McGee, a drug addict who admitted that he could not recall the events of the night and early morning hours before the victim's body was discovered, and the testimony of Jeremiah Billingsley, whom defendant Beals describes as a "pathological liar with a brain injury." Defendant Beals argues that the State's witnesses were not credible. Defendant Beals contends that there was no evidence placing him in Mr. Jones' vehicle, which was alleged to have been used to transport the victim to the scene of the murder. Defendant Beals further notes that his cell phone was not placed in Sorrento. While conceding that the State presented a photograph to show that he was at a convenience store within the vicinity of the crime scene, defendant Beals notes that the evidence did not place him at the crime scene. Defendant Beals argues that there was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in the offense.
When issues are raised on appeal, both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43, 101 S.Ct. 970, 972, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude that all of the elements of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992).
In conducting the review under Jackson, we also must be expressly mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, i.e., "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." LSA-R.S. 15:438; State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 486, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157 and 00-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732. When a case involves circumstantial evidence, and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987).
The crime of second degree murder, in pertinent part, is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. LSA-R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. LSA-R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder. State v. Buchanon, 95-0625 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So.2d 663, 665, writ denied, 96-1411 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So.2d 923. Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Delco, 06-0504 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1143, 1146, writ denied, 06-2636 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1160. Under LSA-R.S. 14:24, all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.
Dr. Christopher Tape, an expert in forensic pathology, performed the victim's autopsy. Dr. Tape testified that the victim's cause of death was three gunshot wounds to the head. Two of the gunshot wounds did not break the skull. Specifically, the gunshot wound on the upper left back area of the victim's head was described as a grazing wound that went under the skin, above the bone, and exited close to the entry. Dr. Tape indicated that the gunshot wound that entered at the victim's right ear and exited from the right forehead above the eyebrow may have been inflicted when the victim was on the ground, though there was no definitive proof. This was the second gunshot wound that did not enter the victim's skull. Dr. Tape testified that both of these gunshot wounds were inflicted at a close proximity and had stippling, which is gun powder residue from the barrel of a gun. The fatal gunshot wound, the one that entered the back of the victim's head and fractured his skull with no exit, did not have any stippling, indicating that it was not shot within close proximity like the other two gunshots. Dr. Tape recovered the bullet causing the fatal wound from the victim's skull at the point of the fracture or disruption.
Mr. Mayers, the State witness who lived on Panama Road near the crime scene, testified that he was walking his dog between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m. on January 12, 2013, when he heard three steady gunshots coming from down the road. Mr. Mayers, a former sergeant in the Marine Corps, ascertained that the gunshots were fired from a large caliber weapon. Immediately after the gunfire, he heard a motor "crank up" and observed a silver or gray vehicle with a spoiler on the back and a stripe down the side, speeding down the road, passing him with its lights off. The lights were turned on after the vehicle passed the next house as it sped down the road. Mr. Mayers told his girlfriend what he saw and heard before leaving to go to work. After being shown a photograph of Mr. Jones' vehicle, Mr. Mayers confirmed that it resembled the vehicle he saw that morning. During cross examination, Mr. Mayers indicated that the area was not foggy at the time and noted that there were two street lights on.
Mr. McGee, also a State witness, testified that he knew the codefendants, as they all lived in the same Baton Rouge neighborhood, Mayfair, located between Staring Lane and Bluebonnet Boulevard, and Perkins Road and Highland Road. Mr. McGee visited Mr. Jones daily. He used nicknames for Mr. Jones ("Hooper") and Mr. Williams ("Dirt"), while referring to defendant Beals by his first name, Cecil. On Friday, January 11, 2013, Mr. McGee was at Mr. Jones' house all day doing some indoor painting and spent the night there. Mr. McGee testified that Mr. Jones hired him to paint the inside of the house and that he was being paid with cash and drugs. He noted that many different people came to the house throughout the day, including defendant Beals, Mr. Williams, Mr. Jones' girlfriend, Mr. Jones' mother, and the victim, whom Mr. McGee referred to as "Budda." He testified that the victim was only there during the day and left before dark. When asked what the visitors did, Mr. McGee stated, "Just coming through, partying or drinking, smoking, whatever, just stopping to visit or whatever." When asked what they were smoking, he specified that it was "[w]eed, dope, cigarettes, smoke."
Mr. McGee had two cell phones with him at Mr. Jones' house that day. Mr. Williams asked to borrow one of the cell phones late in the evening. Mr. McGee noted that he gave Mr. Williams the one with a phone number that began with the first three digits of "274." About an hour later, Mr. McGee went into the garage where Mr. Williams and defendant Beals had been, but neither of the men were present, and Mr. Jones' vehicle was gone. Mr. McGee further testified that Mr. Jones did not leave the house that night.
Mr. McGee saw defendant Beals and Mr. Williams again on the morning of Saturday, January 12, 2013, before daylight. At that time, estimated at about 4:00 a.m., Mr. McGee found his borrowed cell phone in the garage and defendant Beals was back in the garage. Mr. McGee testified that he later gave the cell phone away. Mr. McGee learned about the victim's death later that day. After they were all questioned by the police, Mr. Jones asked Mr. McGee to retrieve the phone, bring it to him, and not give it to the police. Mr. McGee told Mr. Jones that he gave the phone to someone he called "Skinny," whom he also identified as "Lacey."
On cross examination, Mr. McGee confirmed that the victim often came to Mr. Jones' house and that defendant Beals lived in Mr. Jones' garage. Mr. McGee testified that he did not know when Mr. Jones retired for the night and noted that, when he tried to wake Mr. Jones the next morning, he did not get a response to his knock or his phone call and assumed Mr. Jones was sleeping. He confirmed that he was at the house and remained awake all night and that he did not see Mr. Jones leave. Mr. McGee estimated that it was between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. when he first noticed that Mr. Jones' vehicle was gone, but Mr. McGee did not see the vehicle as it was driven off and did not know who left in the vehicle.
Mr. McGee confirmed that he was using drugs, including crack cocaine, at the time, and when asked if he had problems recalling the events, he noted that the incident occurred over a year before the trial. He recalled seeing the victim leave Mr. Jones' house on foot. Despite his initial testimony, after reviewing his police statement, Mr. McGee confirmed that the victim could still have been at Mr. Jones' house as late as 9:00 p.m., after dark, but confirmed that after the victim left, he noticed that defendant Beals was gone. Mr. McGee also testified that the victim had enemies, noting that he robbed an individual identified as Justin Thomas ("Roach") and that Mr. Thomas retaliated by shooting at the victim's mother's house. Mr. McGee further confirmed that the victim used counterfeit money to purchase drugs in the past. Mr. McGee denied ever being threatened with charges related to the victim's murder. He confirmed that many people did not like the victim. When further questioned about his drug use and ability to recall things that occurred while he was under the influence, Mr. McGee testified, "Actually, I have a pretty clear recollection under the influence of crack, not weed but crack." He further testified that he used both drugs around the time of the murder and characterized his crack cocaine use as an "everyday thing."
On redirect examination, Mr. McGee was asked to clarify his earlier testimony as to whether Mr. Jones was in the car that night. Mr. McGee responded, "I think I said he couldn't have came past me 'cause I was in the kitchen and he would have come through the hallway to get to the car." Mr. McGee acknowledged that he was not in the kitchen the whole time, specifically confirming that he was in the garage and on the back patio at times, and that he would not have seen Mr. Jones if he departed during those times and could not confirm for a fact that Mr. Jones did not leave that night.
Detective Latonya Sullivan of the APSO CID was dispatched to the scene on LV Road and interviewed Mr. Dunbar and Mr. Mayers. After the victim was identified, Detective Sullivan contacted the victim's mother, Cheryl Wilkins, who provided the victim's cell phone number. Detective Sullivan learned that the victim frequented Mr. Jones' house and hung out with Mr. Jones and Mr. Williams. APSO Detective Sergeant Mike Bruner collected video footage from several gas stations and restaurants along Highway 22 in Sorrento, near the area of the crime scene. Detective Bruner noted that, coming from Baton Rouge, he would take the I-10 towards New Orleans, exit at Highway 22, and then travel straight down to LV Road to arrive where the victim's body was located. The police identified defendant Beals and Mr. Jones' vehicle from the January 12, 2013 surveillance video at Speedy Junction on Highway 22 at I-10, just 1.4 miles from the crime scene. The vehicle shown in the video was consistent with the class and characteristics of a 2000 Chevrolet Impala and had a spoiler in the back and a black stripe down the side. As Detective Bruner noted, at 3:38 a.m., defendant Beals walked into the Speedy Junction, stayed in the store for approximately twenty to thirty seconds, and then returned to Mr. Jones' vehicle. Detective Bruner further noted that, as defendant Beals was walking around the gas pumps, the vehicle was pulling around, obviously occupied by a driver; the front passenger seat was empty; and, an "outline" of what appeared to be an occupant was visible in the back seat. When asked if the "outline" could have been something other than a person (such as a bag, hanging clothing, or a car seat), Detective Bruner agreed that it could, but stated that, in his opinion, the outline was of a person.
On January 15, 2013, Mr. Jones met with the police at the East Baton Rouge Violent Crimes Unit and was interviewed. Mr. Jones drove the Impala to the sheriff's office, confirmed that it was his vehicle, and provided his cell phone and home phone numbers. Mr. Jones stated that the victim was at his house the night of January 11, 2013, at 9:00 p.m., that the victim left between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., and that he never saw the victim again. Mr. Jones also stated that defendant Beals lived in his garage and often borrowed his vehicle. He confirmed that defendant Beals and Mr. Williams were at his house that night, as was his girlfriend, Nicole Billingsley, who lived with him. According to Detective Sullivan, Mr. Jones denied having any issues with the victim and specifically stated, "I did not kill Budda, I did not send Budda with anyone to get killed." In a subsequent interview with APSO officers, Mr. Jones confirmed that the victim was "somewhat of a troublemaker," and that "amongst his friends, he [Jones] gave instructions that [the victim] was not to be touched." He also indicated that he went to bed at approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder.
On January 16, 2013, Detective Sullivan interviewed Ms. Billingsley, defendant Beals, and Mr. McGee. Ms. Billingsley indicated that defendant Beals often drove Mr. Jones' vehicle. Ms. Billingsley further stated that defendant Beals, Mr. Williams, and Mr. McGee were at Mr. Jones' house the day and night before the murder.
In his interview, defendant Beals stated that he had family in Sorrento but he had not been there since childhood. He confirmed that he often drove Mr. Jones' vehicle to make "runs" and to pick up packages and that he drove it on the night in question but did not leave Baton Rouge. Defendant Beals described the victim as a "screw up." When asked if he killed the victim, defendant Beals stated, "If I would have killed Budda[,] I would have shot him in broad daylight from a distance. I would have not walked up on him from the back and shot him." Notably, at the time defendant Beals made this statement, details concerning how the victim had been shot had not been made public. During cross examination, Detective Sullivan confirmed that the victim had several enemies. She further confirmed that fingerprints and DNA were collected from Mr. Jones' vehicle and acknowledged that the only prints identified belonged to Ms. Billingsley. Detective Sullivan indicated that the vehicle was noted as having been cleaned out and washed.
Detective Sergeant David Baldwin, APSO investigator, also took part in the police interviews. Detective Baldwin noted that, while defendant Beals initially denied being in Sorrento, after he showed him still shots from the Speedy Junction surveillance video footage, including a close-up of himself near the entrance of the store, defendant Beals confirmed that it was him in the photograph. Defendant Beals further acknowledged that Mr. Jones' vehicle was shown in another still shot from the surveillance footage. Defendant Beals, however, still denied being in Sorrento.
Detective Bruner and Detective Sullivan testified regarding the records for the victim's cell phone, other cell phones identified by the investigators as relevant to the case, and the "SIM-con" report from a phone identified as belonging to Mr. Jones. The phone records for Shawn Aikens, Mr. Williams' half-brother, were also among the records obtained. Mr. McGee's cell phone, the one he loaned to Mr. Williams the night before the murder, was in the victim's call detail records. For the time period of January 11, 2013, at 5:57 p.m., to January 13, 2013, at 11:21 p.m., in addition to call logs, Detective Bruner obtained text message logs and cellular data logs. The call detail records for Mr. Jones' phone were for a similar time range.
On January 11, 2013, at 10:41 p.m., the victim's cell phone was used to call Mr. Jones' cell phone utilizing towers in the Mayfair area where Mr. Jones' house is located in Baton Rouge. At 1:00 a.m. on January 12, 2013, Mr. McGee's cell phone, in the Mayfair area, was used to call Mr. Jones' cell phone, which was in South Baton Rouge at that time. Mr. McGee's cell phone, still in the Mayfair area, was then used to call the victim's cell phone, which was in the Industriplex Park area of Baton Rouge. Specifically, at 1:15 and 1:36 a.m., Mr. McGee's cell phone was used to call the victim's cell phone. At 3:16 a.m., Mr. McGee's cell phone was used to call Shawn Aikens' residence on Panama Road in Sorrento. Again, at 3:17, 3:18, and 3:21 a.m., Mr. McGee's cell phone showed calls to Mr. Aikens' residence. Using a tower near the murder scene, Mr. McGee's cell phone was used to call Mr. Jones' cell phone several times between 4:00 and 4:23 a.m., the latter which was in the Mayfair area of Baton Rouge. At 4:24 a.m., Mr. McGee's cell phone had moved from Highway 22 and I-10, north towards Baton Rouge, when it was used to again call Mr. Jones' cell phone, which was in Baton Rouge. At 5:16 a.m., the victim's cell phone was back in the Mayfair area, as determined through triangulation data. By 6:14 a.m., when Mr. McGee's cell phone was used to call Mr. Jones' cell phone, both phones were in the Baton Rouge/Mayfair area. Thus, the records show that Mr. McGee's cell phone started in Baton Rouge and then travelled to Sorrento around the time of the murder, and back to Baton Rouge, but there was no indication that Mr. Jones' cell phone ever left Baton Rouge. Detective Bruner noted that defendant Beals' cell phone records were sparse during the relevant time period and there was a lapse in the data, meaning no calls were being placed or received during the relevant time.
As noted by Detective Sullivan, although Mr. Jones' cell phone remained in Baton Rouge, his phone records show that, in addition to incoming calls from Mr. McGee's cell phone, Mr. Jones had several missed calls from his home number to his cell number, and that outgoing calls were made, and a text message was sent, from his cell phone during the time frame that he claimed to be at home and asleep. Detective Bruner also testified regarding the connection and duration of the phone calls and noted that, while some of the calls to Mr. Jones' cell phone were unanswered and thus had a zero- second elapsed timeframe, others, based on the duration, appeared to have been unanswered, or consisted of messages left on a voicemail.
Ms. Billingsley, Mr. Jones' girlfriend, also testified at the trial. Ms. Billingsley began living with Mr. Jones after she separated from her ex-husband, Jeremiah Billingsley, and she lived with Mr. Jones for approximately three years. She testified that defendant Beals lived in the garage at Mr. Jones' house approximately two of those three years, that she knew defendant Beals and Mr. Williams well, and that she also knew the victim, though she was less familiar with him. When asked if the victim ever spent the night at Mr. Jones' house, she stated, "He would really stay all night and was smoking, you know, 'cause we'd all be up drinking and smoking." She confirmed that she was living with Mr. Jones at the time of the murder and that many people were in and out of Mr. Jones' house on the day and night in question. She stated that defendant Beals and Mr. Jones were there but did not recall seeing Mr. Williams or Mr. McGee. Ms. Billingsley confirmed that she had difficulty remembering the night leading up to the murder and that she was constantly drinking and using drugs at the time. She also confirmed that she was reluctant or upset about being interviewed by the police and that she told defendant Beals that he should be the one to be interviewed, because he did not like the victim and had previously stated one month before the murder that he would "chop off his head with a machete." She later added that defendant Beals "talks a lot" when asked if she took his statement seriously. Regarding the victim, she added, "But everybody didn't like him . . . he was always loud[] and . . . rude to everyone." She stated, however, that Mr. Jones seemed to like the victim and did not have any problems with him. When asked if Mr. Jones left that night, she stated, "Not that I know of." She added that she and Mr. Jones were in bed together all night. She denied using Mr. Jones' phone that night, and when asked if the phone was ringing that night, she stated that "it was always ringing a lot."
Ms. Billingsley confirmed that her ex-husband, Mr. Billingsley, had in the past falsely accused Mr. Jones of threatening to kill him. When further asked about Mr. Billingsley's tendency to lie, she stated, "He got into an accident and half the skull was taken off so he kind of, you know, he's not right a little bit." She described Mr. Billingsley as a "pathological liar" who believes his own lies.
Mr. Billingsley, Ms. Billingsley's ex-husband referenced above, also testified. Mr. Billingsley knew defendant Beals and Mr. Jones but did not know Mr. Williams. Mr. Billingsley confirmed that he suffered brain damage and neurological problems after a work-related accident and had to relearn how to walk and speak after being in a coma for several months. He also confirmed that he had a drug problem in the past. He testified that he had his drug problem under control at the time of the trial and that his mental health was "fine." Mr. Billingsley was incarcerated with defendant Beals in Ascension Parish after the murder. He testified that he had a conversation with defendant Beals in which defendant Beals told him that he was in jail for murder and that "they" were having problems with a guy (the victim) at Mr. Jones' house who was stealing "dope" from Ms. Billingsley, stealing from Mr. Jones, and being a bully. Defendant Beals stated that he wanted to "take care of him" after the initial incidents but Mr. Jones "said no, don't worry about it." Defendant Beals further told Mr. Billingsley that the victim continued to steal from Mr. Jones. Mr. Billingsley specifically testified, "Well, I think a day or a couple days later the guy stole some more from Hooper [Jones]. Him and Cecil - well, Cecil, Dirt or Calvin Williams, whatever his name is, and the victim they left the house." Mr. Beals specifically told Mr. Billingsley that "three people left and two people came back." When asked what happened afterwards, Mr. Billingsley testified that Mr. Beals said "they" went out to Sorrento. Mr. Billingsley added, "[T]hey went down some road down in Sorrento by a bayou or some -- or a boat landing and the guy said he had to use the bathroom to urinate, and when he got out the car that's when he was taken care of." After that, "they" left and went back to Mr. Jones' house in Baton Rouge. Defendant Beals told Mr. Billingsley that the weapon would never be found and that the only evidence the police had against them included pictures from a gas station in Sorrento and cell phone signals in the area. On January 29, 2013, while still incarcerated, Mr. Billingsley reported defendant Beals' statements to the police. Mr. Billingsley denied that he had seen any news or read any information about the murder.
Mr. Billingsley admitted to previously filing a false police complaint against Mr. Jones alleging that Mr. Jones tried to kill him. He stated that his trial testimony in this case was truthful and denied holding any grudges against Mr. Jones regarding Mr. Jones' relationship with his ex-wife. Detectives Sullivan and Baldwin were recalled to confirm that, during their interview with Mr. Billingsley, the details he provided were consistent with the investigation and independently provided by him.
Defense witness Tiesha Johnson, Mr. Williams' girlfriend of nine years and the mother of his child, testified that she was with Mr. Williams on the night of January 11, 2013. She stated that she picked him up from Mr. Jones' house between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., and that they then went to her family's home on Clayton Drive and stayed there until the next morning. The next morning, around 8:00 a.m., she dropped Mr. Williams off in Mayfair.
Detective Sullivan was called again as a defense witness regarding the crime lab report for the DNA and fingerprint analysis of Mr. Jones' vehicle. She confirmed that she made notations that Ms. Billingsley could not be excluded from one of the DNA samples from the inside interior of the front passenger door panel. Detective Sullivan noted that the sample along with others was limited.
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. Thus, an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Williams, 01-0944 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 932, 939, writ denied, 02-0399 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 135.
As noted, here, defendant Beals argues trial testimony indicating his guilt was unreliable, that there was conflicting testimony, and that there was insufficient evidence of his involvement and/or participation in the crime. The evidence presented by the State included surveillance video showing defendant Beals in the vicinity at the time of the shooting, exiting the vehicle that sped away from the scene just after the shots were fired. Though defendant Beals argues that Mr. Billingsley was not credible, the jury heard all of the testimony, including the details of the murder that Mr. Billingsley provided, which were consistent with the evidence collected by the police during the investigation. The guilty verdict in this case indicates the jury rejected defendant Beals' hypothesis of innocence and concluded that after being driven to Sorrento in Mr. Jones' vehicle, the victim was murdered by the codefendants. We cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See Ordodi, 946 So.2d at 662. We find that, based on the record, including the trial testimony, cell phone records, and surveillance evidence, the jury could have reasonably rejected the hypothesis of innocence and concluded that defendant Beals had the specific intent to kill the victim and participated in the commission of the murder as a principal. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). We are convinced that any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of second degree murder. Due to the foregoing conclusions, this assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In assignment of error number one, defendant Beals argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever. Defendant Beals notes that the motion to sever was based on antagonistic defenses among the codefendants. Defendant Beals also specifically notes that, at the hearing on the motion, counsel for Mr. Jones argued that his defense was antagonistic to his codefendants since there was evidence that they took Mr. Jones' car and "did whatever they were doing." Defendant Beals notes that Mr. Williams' counsel argued that Mr. Williams had no reason to kill the victim and emphasized the fact that defendant Beals was also related to Mr. Williams' half-brother who lived in close proximity to where the body was discovered.
The motion to sever was actually filed by codefendant Jones.
Defendant Beals also contends that trying the codefendants in the same proceeding led to the introduction of other crimes evidence without a pretrial hearing, contending that the record is replete with references to Mr. Jones and Mr. Williams selling narcotics. Defendant Beals argues that the introduction of the other crimes evidence painted him in a negative light before the jury and prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Defendant Beals specifically notes that the trial court recognized the difficulty of the codefendants being tried together in the midst of the trial when his counsel objected to testimony regarding the codefendants being involved in a drug trade. Defendant Beals contends that drug trade evidence was admitted without a pretrial hearing on other crimes evidence and contends that it would not have been admissible in a separate trial without the codefendants. Defendant Beals argues that testimony presented during the trial pointed to Mr. Jones as the leader of a drug ring, showed that Mr. Williams was aggressive, and that he, by contrast, is mild mannered and non-violent. Defendant Beals argues that forcing him to go to trial with the codefendants was prejudicial because it painted him in a bad light. Defendant Beals concludes that the ends of justice would have been served if he were tried separately from the codefendants.
Defendants who are jointly indicted are to be tried together unless the court finds that justice requires a severance. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 704. The courts have permitted a severance to codefendants whose defenses are antagonistic to each other. Defenses are antagonistic when each defendant intends to exculpate himself by putting the blame for the offense on a codefendant. However, a mere allegation that the defenses are antagonistic is insufficient because convincing evidence of actual antagonism must be present to justify a severance. Where the ends of justice will best be served by a severance, it should be granted. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 704, Official Revision Comment (d). An accused is not entitled to a severance as a matter of right; the decision is one resting within the sound discretion of the trial judge. A denial of a motion to sever will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Reversal of a conviction for failure to sever where antagonism is shown is not always mandated unless prejudice can be shown. State v. Price, 93-0625, 93-0626 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/11/94), 636 So.2d 933, 936-37, writs denied, 94-0742 (La. 6/17/94), 638 So.2d 1091 and 94-1566 (La. 10/14/94), 643 So.2d 159. Further, justice does not require severance where only the extent of each defendant's participation in the offense is at issue. State v. Gaskin, 412 So.2d 1007, 1012-13 (La. 1982). Whether justice requires a severance must be determined by the facts of each case. State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729, 741 (La. 1984).
In State v. Bradford, 367 So.2d 745, 747 (La. 1978), the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the following policies regarding criminal trial joinder:
Where a crime involves more than one actor, the need arises to balance the interest of the State in trial economy against the rights of defendants to separate trials. Joinder expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congestion of the trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to serve on juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise be called upon to testify only once.
Another policy consideration implicit in the mandate of [LSA-C.Cr.P.] art. 704 that jointly indicted defendants shall be jointly tried is the need to present the whole case at one time where, as here, several defendants are involved in the same transaction. The State's policy is supported by the general principle that the State decides when, how, and whom to prosecute and should therefore be permitted to join offenders under appropriate circumstances. (Citations omitted.)
In reviewing a pretrial motion for severance, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Lavigne, 412 So.2d 993, 997 (La. 1982), held: "[I]t is incumbent upon us to review the validity of the ruling without regard to whether at trial substantial other evidence was introduced or whether [the defendant's] conviction would have been a certainty irrespective of the joint trial." Where it is clear from the record that a codefendant would give exculpatory testimony if a severance were granted, the denial of a severance is an abuse of discretion. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 704, Official Revision Comment (c)(2). However, the burden is on the movant to establish that the codefendant would, in fact, testify at a separate trial and the exculpatory nature of his proposed testimony. State v. Turner, 365 So.2d 1352, 1354 (La. 1978).
After reviewing the record in this case, we cannot say defendant Beals' defense was antagonistic to the codefendants' defenses. Defendant Beals failed to establish the probability that a codefendant would in fact testify at a separate trial and present exculpatory evidence. The codefendants all relied on a defense that someone else committed the murder, while the State's theory and the evidence indicated that they committed the offense as a group and that all three codefendants were culpable as principals. The evidence did not clearly point to one defendant so as to exculpate the other. See State v. Dilosa, 01-0024 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 657, 669-70, writ denied, 03-1601 (La. 12/12/03), 860 So.2d 1153 (extent of participation of each defendant in the transaction is not grounds for granting a severance). In noting potential difficulties in the State's attempt to elicit testimony regarding the nature of the codefendants' relationship, the trial court stated that hearsay inadmissible as to one defendant would not be allowed even if it could be considered admissible as to another defendant. On appeal, defendant Beals claims that the trial court nonetheless allowed the introduction of other crimes evidence including references to Mr. Jones and Mr. Williams selling drugs. However, in support of this claim, defendant Beals largely refers to ambiguous references and/or statements that were made among the parties outside of the presence of the jury. We further note that the jury was apparently able to separate the evidentiary implications, as defendant Beals and Mr. Williams were unanimously found guilty, while Mr. Jones was found guilty based on a ten of twelve concurrence. Defendant Beals has failed to make a showing of prejudice. Considering the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of defendant Beals' motion to sever. Assignment of error number one is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In his second assignment of error, defendant Beals argues that the trial court erred in denying his objections regarding juror misconduct, an alleged violation of the sequestration order by a State witness, and the State's alleged withholding of evidence. Defendant Beals argues that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Regarding the claim of juror misconduct, defendant Beals notes that juror Rondall Lawrence spoke to Mr. Williams' half-brother, Shawn Aikens, and admitted that he knew Mr. Aikens. Defendant Beals further notes that the trial court did not ask Mr. Lawrence if he also knew Mr. Williams. Defendant Beals contends that had he known of Mr. Lawrence's relationship with Mr. Aikens and possibly Mr. Williams during jury selection, he could have challenged Mr. Lawrence for cause. Defendant Beals concludes that allowing Mr. Lawrence to continue to serve on the jury violated his right to a fair trial.
Defendant Beals notes that on the last day of the trial, Mr. Jones' counsel informed the trial court that State witness Detective Moody was outside of the courtroom speaking to witnesses, including Detective Baldwin, who the defense was going to recall, and Detective King, who was subsequently called to the stand to testify. Defendant Beals argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial as to this violation of the sequestration order.
Defendant Beals further contends that initially during the testimony of Detective Sullivan on the last day of the trial, it became apparent that the State failed to turn over the handwritten notes of investigators. Defendant Beals contends that, once notes were received, the defense could not tell which set of notes belonged to which investigator. Defendant Beals further contends that numerous people who had confrontations with the victim were interviewed during the investigation and that the notes contained information from the interviews that may have been favorable to defendant Beals and pointed out weaknesses in the State's case. Defendant Beals argues that it was prejudicial and unfair to obtain this evidence on the last day of the trial, as there was insufficient time to review the information. Defendant Beals concludes that the State prevented him from obtaining a fair trial by withholding the investigators' notes. Juror Rondell Lawrence
A juror shall not be challenged for cause by the State or the defendant after having been accepted by the challenging party, unless the ground for the challenge was not known by the challenging party prior to acceptance. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 795(A). If it is discovered after a juror has been accepted and sworn that he is incompetent to serve, the court may, at any time before the first witness is sworn, order the juror removed and the panel completed in the ordinary course. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 796. Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who become unable to perform or disqualified from performing their duties. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 789(A). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797(3) allows for a juror to be challenged for cause if it is reasonable to conclude that a juror's relationship with the defendant, the victim, the district attorney, or the defense attorney would influence the juror's verdict. A trial court is granted great discretion in determining whether to seat or reject a juror for cause, and such rulings will not be disturbed unless a review of the voir dire as a whole indicates an abuse of that discretion. State v. Jones, 474 So.2d 919, 926 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2906, 90 L.Ed.2d 992 (1986). The law does not require that a jury be composed of individuals who are totally unacquainted with the defendant, the prosecuting witness, the prosecuting attorney, and the witnesses who may testify at trial. Rather, the law requires that jurors be fair and unbiased. State v. Stewart, 08-1265 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/09), 15 So.3d 276, 288, writ denied, 09-1407 (La. 3/5/10), 28 So.3d 1003. Disclosure during the trial that a juror knows or is related to a witness or the victim is not sufficient to disqualify a juror unless it is shown that the relationship is sufficient to preclude the juror from arriving at a fair verdict. State v. Holland, 544 So.2d 461, 465 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1989), writ denied, 567 So.2d 93 (La. 1990). The connection must be such that one must reasonably conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. See State v. Hodgeson, 305 So.2d 421, 424-25 (La. 1974).
During the lunch break on the first day of the trial, the defense told the trial court that one of the jurors, Mr. Lawrence, needed to be questioned since he "high-fived" Shawn Aikens (a former suspect and the half-brother of codefendant Williams). The trial court asked Mr. Lawrence if he ever talked about this case with Mr. Aikens and he responded, "No, sir, but I know Shawn from just like growing up around the -- around the same area." He denied that the relationship would have any bearing on the case. There were no further objections or requests for additional questioning and the trial resumed.
In Holland, a juror sent a letter to the trial judge during the trial to inform him that he had just learned he was possibly related to the victim. The juror stated that, even if he was related to the victim, it would not affect him or the process of his decision making and he could be fair and impartial. The defendant challenged the juror for cause. The trial judge denied the challenge and stated that there was nothing to make him conclude that any possible relationship would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. The defendant objected to the ruling. On appeal, the Second Circuit said the trial judge did not err in concluding that the possible relationship, of which the juror was unaware during voir dire, would not prejudice the defendant or prevent a fair trial. As such, the Second Circuit found no abuse of the trial judge's discretion in denying the challenge for cause. Holland, 544 So.2d at 465-66.
In this case, while the defense attorney did initially request that juror Lawrence be questioned, there was no motion to have him removed for cause. Further, Mr. Lawrence indicated that his relationship with Mr. Aikens would not have any bearing on the trial. There was no indication that Mr. Lawrence was withholding any other information and no request for additional questioning was made. Mr. Lawrence assured the trial court that the relationship would not affect his verdict and there was nothing in his voir dire responses to refute this assertion. Based on the record, we find no merit in defendant Beals' argument that allowing Mr. Lawrence to continue to serve on the jury violated his right to a fair trial. Witness Sequestration
An order of sequestration is designed to prevent witnesses from being influenced by the testimony of witnesses who have already testified and to strengthen the role of cross examination in developing the facts. State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118, 132 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 202, 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983). A violation of a sequestration order does not warrant a mistrial absent an indication that the violation materially prejudiced the defendant. See State v. Kimble, 546 So.2d 834, 842 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989).
In Kimble, this Court found that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a mistrial made on the ground that the sequestration order was violated by a witness who remained in the courtroom after giving testimony. There, the defendant failed to show how he was prejudiced, because the State witness who allegedly was in the courtroom during the testimony of the defense witness did not testify again and thus, his testimony was neither influenced by, nor corrupted by, the alleged violation of the sequestration order. Kimble, 546 So.2d at 842.
In this case, on the last day of the trial, defense attorney Shannon Batiste (representing defendant Beals) moved for a mistrial after defense attorney Jarrett Ambeau (representing Mr. Jones) contended that there was a violation of sequestration. Mr. Ambeau stated that he observed Detective Moody talking to witnesses outside of the courtroom. The trial court stated that it would question the detective before the end of the day. The State later informed the trial court that Detective Moody was instructing others to look for witnesses who were not outside of the courtroom. The trial court stated that it was acceptable for the detective to line up witnesses but offered to still question the detective. Mr. Ambeau declined and there were no further objections. Based on our review, defendant Beals has not shown that there was any actual violation of the sequestration order and further has failed to show any prejudice. Discovery Violation
As defendant Beals notes, during the trial testimony of Detective Sullivan, one of the defense attorneys, Mr. Ambeau, indicated he did not receive handwritten police notes as a part of the State's pretrial discovery. The trial court instructed the detective to retrieve the handwritten notes, show them to the district attorney first, and then make them available to the defense. When the State later recalled Detective Sullivan to the stand, Mr. Ambeau informed the court that he had not had sufficient time to review the extensive notes. The State noted that the defense had open-file discovery and could have retrieved any information they wanted but did not try to retrieve the notes in question. The trial court did not delay the recall but informed the defense that the detective could be called again if necessary.
Pretrial discovery procedures are designed to eliminate unwarranted prejudice to a defendant that could arise from surprise testimony. See State v. Mitchell, 412 So.2d 1042, 1044 (La. 1982). Discovery procedures enable a defendant to properly assess the strength of the State's case against him so he can prepare his defense. State v. Roy, 496 So.2d 583, 590 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1986), writ denied, 501 So.2d 228 (La. 1987). If a defendant is lulled into a misapprehension of the strength of the State's case by the failure to fully disclose, such a prejudice may constitute reversible error. State v. Ray, 423 So.2d 1116, 1118 (La. 1982).
In this case, we find no violation of discovery. The record reflects that the State agreed to provide open-file discovery. Thus, defendant Beals was provided access to any and all evidence in the State's file. Even if a discovery violation occurred, it would not constitute reversible error without actual prejudice to defendant Beals' case. See State v. Francis, 00-2800 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 1029, 1033. Defendant Beals has failed to show how the late discovery of the evidence in question was prejudicial. We find no merit in assignment of error number two.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR
In his fourth assignment of error, defendant Beals argues that the appellate record is incomplete. Defendant Beals specifically notes that the court reporter certified that the May 15, 2014 transcript was incomplete due to a thirteen-minute skip in the recording tape. Defendant Beals notes that, while the May 19, 2015 minute entry states that defense counsel's motion for mistrial was denied, the transcript does not reflect a ruling. Defendant Beals further notes that the sentencing transcript does not reflect a ruling on his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, while the minutes reflect that the motions were denied. Defendant Beals contends that the supplementation of the record did not resolve this issue. Defendant Beals further notes the record indicates that his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was denied on September 22, 2014, the day before the motion was designated as having been filed. Defendant Beals contends that it is unclear what plea deal was made to him and that it cannot be determined whether any prejudicial errors occurred during the thirteen-minute skip in the recording. Defendant Beals concludes that he should be granted a new trial due to prejudicial omissions from the record.
Louisiana Constitution Article I, §19 guarantees defendants a right of appeal "based upon a complete record of all the evidence upon which the judgment is based." Material omissions from the trial transcript bearing on the merits of an appeal requires reversal. See State v. Boatner, 03-0485 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 149, 153; State v. Robinson, 387 So.2d 1143, 1144-45 (La. 1980) (reversal required when the record failed to contain the testimony of a state and defense expert witness); State v. Ford, 338 So.2d 107, 109-10 (La. 1976) (reversal required when the record was missing the testimony of four state witnesses and the voir dire of prospective jurors). On the other hand, inconsequential omissions or slight inaccuracies do not require reversal. See State v. Goodbier, 367 So.2d 356, 357 (La. 1979) (reversal not required when the record does not include a transcript of the voir dire examination and the court reporter's affidavit indicated that counsel made no objections during voir dire). Finally, a defendant is not entitled to relief due to an incomplete record absent a showing of prejudice based on the missing portions of the transcripts. State v. Castleberry, 98-1388 (La. 4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749, 773, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 893, 120 S.Ct. 220, 145 L.Ed.2d 185 (1999).
In this case, the trial transcript reflects that defendant Beals' motion for mistrial was abandoned when the trial court offered to question Detective Moody and defense counsel declined. As noted by defendant Beals, the minutes for the date of sentencing, July 14, 2014, indicate that the trial court denied the post trial motions just before imposing the sentence. While the sentencing transcript does not include the ruling on the posttrial motions, the trial court apparently denied the motions just before asking defendant Beals if he wished to waive sentencing delays as indicated in the transcript. As further noted by defendant Beals, the record reflects that while a pro se motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was filed on September 23, 2014, the trial court's handwritten date of denial was September 22, 2014, a day before the filing. Nonetheless, the trial court had already denied the counseled motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and the pro se motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was untimely, as it was filed after the sentence was imposed. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(A). Further, the case was technically on appeal at the time the pro se motion was filed because the trial court had already granted defendant Beals' motion for appeal. Considering the foregoing, defendant Beals has failed to show that there are any material omissions or that he was prejudiced based on any omissions or inaccuracies. Assignment of error number four is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Cecil Ray Beals' conviction and sentence are affirmed.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.