Opinion
No. 1-1056 / 01-1108
Filed April 10, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, James C. Bauch, Judge.
Defendant appeals his judgment and sentence following a guilty plea to driving while barred. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Allan W. Vander Hart, County Attorney, and Andrea Dryer, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Following a written guilty plea to the offense of driving while his license was barred, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561 (1999), Theodore Barnes was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed two years and ordered to pay a mandatory $500 fine. Barnes appeals, alleging his plea was invalid as he was not informed the fine could be imposed. Although the State contends Barnes's failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment precludes him from challenging the guilty plea on appeal, the district court's failure to personally advise Barnes of this right to file such motion and its attendant consequences preserves the matter for our review. State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Iowa 2001). Upon conducting such review for correction of errors at law, State v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Iowa 1998), we find the plea must be vacated.
While we agree Hook has an impractical effect on what is an otherwise expedited written plea process for misdemeanor offenses, the plain language of the case, and the rules it interprets, require this result.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b) prohibits the district court from accepting a guilty plea until it has determined the plea was voluntary, intelligent, and with a factual basis. In order to comply with this mandate the court must ensure the defendant understands a number of things, including any mandatory minimum punishment and the maximum possible punishment attached to the particular crime. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b)(2). When a defendant is not informed of such direct penal consequences, his plea is neither knowing nor voluntary. White, 587 N.W.2d at 246.
Formerly Iowa R. Crim. P. 8(2)(b).
Although Barnes waived his right to an in-court colloquy, it is undisputed he was never directly informed a fine was a direct penal consequence of the plea. The potential for a fine imposition was not mentioned in either the written guilty plea or at the sentencing hearing, and there is no indication in the record that Barnes otherwise understood he would be subject to a fine. See id; State v. Yarborough, 536 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (finding a defendant can make an intelligent plea, even if not directly informed of specific elements of the crime, so long as he or she otherwise adequately understands the nature of the offense).
The failure to satisfy the requirements of rule 2.8(2)( b) renders Barnes's plea involuntary. White, 587 N.W.2d at 246. Contrary to the State's assertion, we do not undertake a harmless error analysis to ascertain if the lack of information about the fine somehow impacted Barnes's decision to enter a guilty plea. Cf. Stovall v. State, 340 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Iowa 1983) (finding that misinformation about a punishment renders a plea involuntary if the misstatement induced the plea). We therefore reverse and remand this case for further proceedings, at which time Barnes shall be allowed to withdraw his plea.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.