Opinion
Docket No. 29043.
Filed February 24, 2004.
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge.
Order granting motion to suppress evidence, reversed.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Paul S. Sonenberg argued.
The State appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence. The district court determined that cocaine discovered in the search of a vehicle was the fruit of an illegal seizure that occurred when an officer pulled behind the stopped vehicle and shone the patrol car's spotlight on the car. We reverse.
I. FACTUAL PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are as follows: At approximately 2 o'clock in the morning Officer David Marshall of the Post Falls Police Department was on patrol when he noticed that the driver of a white vehicle displayed a "panic look" upon making eye contact with the officer. The driver of the white vehicle then accelerated as if to get away from the officer. Officer Marshall followed the car for about a quarter mile until it turned into a cul-de-sac, where it stopped momentarily next to a parked blue car. The white car then pulled forward and stopped in front of the blue car. Three individuals got out of the blue car and entered the white car. At no point did Officer Marshall observe what he believed to be violations in the operation of these vehicles.
As Officer Marshall drove by the blue car he noted that it had five occupants. He was able to recognize some of the individuals in the blue car from prior criminal activity. Officer Marshall pulled in behind the white vehicle and stopped his patrol car. He did not activate his overhead emergency lights, but he did shine the patrol car's spotlight into the white vehicle's driver-side rear window before exiting his patrol car.
The driver of the white car was Jesse Munro Baker. When Baker noticed the police car, he was on his way to pick up friends who were in the blue car. After the friends got in Baker's car, he was about to leave, but then thought the officer was stopping him. At the time of the subsequent suppression hearing, Baker recalled that the officer's overhead lights were on, but after reviewing the videotape of the stop at the suppression hearing, he acknowledged that only the spotlight was used. Upon approaching Baker's car, Officer Marshall detected a strong odor of marijuana. Information obtained subsequent to this point led to Baker's arrest.
The district court concluded that Baker initially stopped of his own free will, but reasonably believed he was being detained when Officer Marshall turned the spotlight on Baker's vehicle. The district court further concluded that the detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and was therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State appeals, contending the district court erred in finding that Baker was detained upon the officer's activation of the spotlight.
II. ANALYSIS
On reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. We freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. It imposes a standard of reasonableness upon the authority of government agents to detain individuals, and thereby safeguards the individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct.App. 2002). Thus, before officers may conduct an investigative detention, they must have reasonable suspicion that the detained person is or has been engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302, 912 P.2d 664, 670 (Ct.App. 1995); State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 866-67, 893 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Ct.App. 1995).
A police/citizen encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny, however, unless it is nonconsensual. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). "`So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business,' an encounter between police and an individual is consensual." State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 613, 7 P.3d 219, 222 (2000) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434). "A seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only `when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.'" Nickel, 134 Idaho at 612-613, 7 P.3d at 221-22 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16). See also State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 441, 34 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Ct.App. 2001); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct.App. 1991). The critical inquiry is whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's requests and terminate the encounter. State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653, 978 P.2d 212, 213 (1999); State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 184, 997 P.2d 641, 645 (Ct.App. 2000); State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830, 832, 933 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct.App. 1997).
The question presented here is whether the officer's use of a spotlight to illuminate a parked vehicle constitutes the sort of show of authority that would lead reasonable people to believe that they are not free to leave. It is clear, of course, that an officer's activation of the patrol car's overhead emergency lights constitutes a show of authority that will effectuate a seizure because Idaho Code §§ 49-625 and 49-1404 prohibit a motorist from driving away from a police officer who has given that visual signal to stop. See Maddox, 137 Idaho at 824, 54 P.3d at 467; State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692, 991 P.2d 878, 880 (Ct.App. 1999). This Court has drawn a distinction between use of such emergency lights, which by law constitute a directive to stop, and amber flashing lights. In State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 603-04, 861 P.2d 1266, 1268-69 (Ct. App. 1993), we held that use of the latter did not constitute a detention. In that case, an officer activated his amber flashing lights after stopping behind a vehicle that was parked on the side of the road. The amber flashers are used, we noted, to alert oncoming traffic to the vehicles parked alongside the roadway and do not constitute a directive for drivers to stop or to remain in place as do emergency lights pursuant to I.C. §§ 49-1404 and 49-625. Pick, 124 Idaho at 604-05, 861 P.2d at 1269-70.
An officer's use of a spotlight to illuminate another vehicle is likewise insufficient to constitute a seizure. Spotlights, like amber flashing lights, do not under Idaho statutes obligate a driver to remain on the scene until the police officer allows the driver to depart. Spotlights have the purpose of illuminating an area, enabling the officer to gain more information about the nature of the vehicle, its occupants, and the circumstances that the officer is confronting. The spotlight can significantly enhance officer safety. We agree with the State that an officer is not constitutionally required to choose between conducting a consensual encounter in the dark or turning on a spotlight and thereby effectuating a detention that may not be supported by reasonable suspicion. A rule that an officer's use of a spotlight creates a per se detention would discourage officers from using such lights when necessary for their safety or the safety of others.
Although the employment of a spotlight, of itself, does not constitute a show of authority that restrains the movement of the individual who was thereby illuminated, use of a spotlight may, of course, be considered among other factors in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a detention has occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Packer, 15 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1994); People v. Roth, 268 Cal.Rptr. 66 (Cal.Ct.App. 1990); People v. Trujillo, 773 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1989); Mosby v. State, 575 So.2d 304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Mulholland, 794 A.2d 398 (Pa.Super. 2002).
Applying the totality of the circumstances test here, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that Baker had been detained before Officer Marshall noticed a marijuana odor coming from the car. Officer Marshall did not activate his overhead emergency lights and did not block Baker's vehicle or otherwise physically confine him, display a weapon, use threatening words or tone, or take any action indicating to Baker that he was not free to leave. He merely followed Baker, observed him for a short time, and used his spotlight to illuminate the area before approaching Baker. There is no indication that the spotlight was used for any purpose other than to provide added safety and visibility for the officer.
We conclude that the initial contact between Officer Marshall and Baker was a consensual encounter and thus not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The order of the district court granting Baker's motion to suppress evidence is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Judge PERRY and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.