Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3491-14T4
06-15-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANGEL ARRIAGA, a/k/a ENRIQUES TORRAL, Defendant-Appellant.
Louis G. DeAngelis, attorney for appellant. Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fuentes and Koblitz. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-07-0641. Louis G. DeAngelis, attorney for appellant. Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Angel Arriaga appeals from his March 3, 2015 conviction, after a jury trial, of fourth-degree knowingly driving with a suspended license for a second driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). The trial judge sentenced defendant to the mandatory minimum custodial sentence of 180 days, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c). Defendant challenges the pre-trial denial of his motion to suppress based on a purportedly improper car stop, the admission of a certified municipal court disposition at trial, and the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We affirm.
Defendant's motion to stay the sentence was denied by the trial judge and we denied his subsequent emergent application filed two months later.
I
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, the State called one witness: Plainfield Police Officer Noah Benson, who had only been on the job six to eight weeks and drove with a field training officer seated next to him in his patrol car during the stop. Officer Benson testified to the following. On March 2, 2013, at approximately 12:30 p.m., his police car was the fourth car stopped in a single line at a red traffic light on West End Avenue, which has one lane in each direction. Defendant was driving the second car from the light, a 2006 Honda. The front car had its right turn signal on. When the light turned green, the Honda, "radically turned to the left, crossing over the double yellow line, and going past [the front] car onto oncoming traffic to get around the car instead of waiting for it to turn right." Half of the Honda went across the double yellow line into oncoming traffic before returning to its own lane in the middle of the intersection. The officer stopped the Honda and charged defendant with improper passing, N.J.S.A. 39:4-85, and driving while suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. The officer decided to give defendant "a break" by not charging him with careless or reckless driving.
Defendant testified he was stopped at the light in one of two lanes of traffic. He denied he swerved to the left in passing the car in front, saying he went straight ahead after waiting for the car in front of him to turn right. Defendant also stated Officer Benson was driving next to him in the second lane of traffic that had formed on the one-lane roadway. Defendant said the officer was stopped behind a car that was turning left. The trial judge found Officer Benson more credible and determined the evidence of "erratic driving resulting in improper driving" justified the motor vehicle stop.
At trial Officer Benson testified substantially as he had at the motion hearing. Detective Justin Marranca of the Union County Prosecutor's Office then testified, presenting two Automated Traffic System (ATS) certified dispositions he had received from the North Plainfield Municipal Court reflecting defendant's prior two convictions for DWI. The most recent conviction reflected a violation date of May 18, 2011, plea date of November 29, 2011 and disposition date of September 13, 2011. Detective Marranca acknowledged a violation could not be disposed of prior to the plea date, and that he had seen other mistakes in dates entered into the ATS.
Defendant did not testify or call any witness. The jury convicted him of driving while suspended for his second DWI. The trial judge convicted defendant of driving while suspended, and dismissed the improper passing violation.
Defendant was sentenced to a concurrent ten days in jail on this charge as well as a $1500 fine, twelve months suspension of his license and registration, and $158 in mandatory fees and penalties. --------
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I: THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT THE APPELLANT COMMITTED A TITLE 39 VIOLATION IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THE STOP OF THE APPELLANT'S VEHICLE.
POINT II: EVIDENCE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS ADMITTED CONTRARY TO APPELLANT'S 6TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. (ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT III: THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE APPELLANT WHEN DECIDING THE APPELLANT MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO R. 3:18-1.
II
In his first point, defendant argues his motion to suppress should have been granted. Our Supreme Court recently set forth the standard of review we must follow in our review.
We are bound to uphold a trial court's factual findings in a motion to suppress provided those "findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." Deference to those findings is particularly appropriate when the trial court has the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Nevertheless, we are not required to accept findings that are "clearly mistaken" based on our independent review of the record. Moreover, we need not defer "to a trial court's interpretation of the law" because "[l]egal issues are reviewed de novo."
[State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007); and then quoting State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 327 (2013)).]
Defendant argues the stop of his car was unconstitutional. Unquestionably defendant was protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution from an unreasonable stop of his car. See State v. Baum, 199 N.J. 407, 423 (2009); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. A reasonable and articulable suspicion that a driver committed a traffic violation furnishes cause to stop the car. State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-40, modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002). The defendant need not be guilty of the traffic violation. State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 303-04 (1994) (changing lanes without signaling); State ex rel. D.K., 360 N.J. Super. 49, 52-55 (App. Div. 2003) (obscured license plate). Even an officer's mistaken understanding of the statute may justify a motor vehicle stop. See State v. Sutherland, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2016) (slip op. at 2). But see State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378, 383 (App. Div. 2005) (holding to the contrary).
Defendant was found not guilty of the improper passing traffic violation. N.J.S.A. 39:4-85 states in pertinent part:
The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass at a safe distance to the left thereof and shall not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle.The trial judge, finding insufficient testimony concerning defendant "overtaking another vehicle," acquitted defendant of that traffic violation.
Defendant argues the officer neither testified as to what was unsafe about defendant's swerve around the stopped car in front, nor laid a basis for the violation of any other traffic violation. Unsafe driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(a), prohibits "any person [from] driv[ing] or operat[ing] a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property." Officer Benson's observations of defendant swerving rapidly around a stopped car at an intersection on a one-lane road provided the officer with reasonable suspicion of the charge of unsafe driving. Whether Officer Benson testified to sufficient facts regarding the traffic in the area or the nature of the intersection to prove a violation beyond a reasonable doubt is not significant. Officer Benson stopped defendant's Honda based on the reasonable and articulable belief that defendant violated the traffic laws.
III
For the first time on appeal, defendant next raises the issue that the admission of the certified ATS dispositions violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Because defendant did not object to the admission of these certified ATS dispositions at trial, we apply the plain error standard of review. See R. 2:10-2 (stating "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result"). A trial judge's evidentiary rulings are subject to an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015).
"[A]dmission of an out-of-court testimonial statement violates the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine that witness." State v. Wilson, 442 N.J. Super. 224, 239 (App. Div. 2015), certif. granted, 224 N.J. 119 (2016); see also U.S. Const. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 197 (2004). "[M]ost statements contained in documentary evidence admitted under well-recognized 'hearsay exceptions . . . by their nature [are] not testimonial—for example, business records." Wilson, supra, 442 N.J. Super. at 241 (quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at 55, 124 S. Ct. 1367, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 195). N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) allows business records into evidence with the proper foundation "unless the sources of information or the method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not trustworthy." Defendant argues the mistaken dates on the most recent certified DWI disposition "indicate that it is not trustworthy." The earliest date on that disposition, the violation date of May 18, 2011, however, is not in dispute, nor is the finding of guilt.
A second DWI conviction carries a mandatory two-year license suspension. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2). Defendant was stopped on March 2, 2013, within two years of the violation date of the second DWI conviction. Even if the other two dates on the disposition were transposed, or incorrect in any way, defendant would still be guilty of driving while suspended for his second DWI conviction. Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting this certified disposition as evidence of defendant's guilt.
IV
Finally, defendant argues his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case and again at the end of trial should have been granted. Defendant argues the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof by presuming defendant was aware of the date his suspension began for the most recent DWI despite the confusion raised by a disposition date prior to a plea date. When considering a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the trial court is obligated to give "the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom." State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 406 (2008) (quoting State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967)). Properly applying that standard the judge determined "a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." See Reyes, supra, 50 N.J. at 458-59. Although the second certification contained an error, it did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 537 (2007) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 334 (2005)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1146, 128 S. Ct. 1074, 169 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2008).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION