Opinion
Docket No. 494, 1998.
April 20, 1999.
Appeal from Superior Court, New Castle County, CA 98A-01-011.
AFFIRMED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
STATE OF DELAWARE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. RANDALL ARMISTEAD, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 494, 1998. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: March 30, 1999. Decided: April 20, 1999. Revised: May 7, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 98A-01-011
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and HARTNETT, Justices.
ORDER
This 20th day of April 1999, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The State of Delaware appeals to this Court on the ground that the Superior Court erred when it affirmed a decision of the Industrial Accident Board ("the Board") awarding additional compensation to cover the daily expenses of room and board at a care facility. We disagree and affirm.
(2) Randall Armistead worked as a State Trooper for the State of Delaware. On June 16, 1987, in the course of his duties as a trooper, Armistead's vehicle was struck head-on by a fleeing suspect. As a result of the accident, Armistead suffered severe brain trauma that requires him to reside in the supportive residential setting of ReMed.
(3) In September 1997, the State's insurer reduced the amount of medical expenses that it would pay to the facility from $255.00 per day to $229.00 per day, and omitted the daily costs of room and board.
(4) Armistead petitioned the Board for the cost of room and board. The Board ruled that such costs were compensable under the Delaware Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"). As a result, the State filed an appeal in the Superior Court of Delaware, and Armistead filed a Motion to Affirm, which the Superior Court ultimately granted.
19 Del. C. § 2301 et. seq.
(5) In reviewing a decision of the Industrial Accident Board, "[t]he function of this Court is . . . to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence." Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Issues involving the construction of the Act, however, involve questions of law that the Court reviews de novo.
Hebb v. Swindell-Dressler, Inc., Del. Supr., 394 A.2d 249, 250 (1978).
Olney v. Cooch, Del. Supr., 425 A.2d 610, 614 (1981).
Page v. Hercules, Del. Supr., 637 A.2d 29, 32 (1994).
(6) The issue of whether room and board is compensable under the Act is a question of statutory construction and, therefore, a question of law. Therefore, this Court reviews the Board's decision de novo.
(7) Because the issue of whether room and board is compensable under the Act is one of first impression, the Board focused on the particular set of facts in the instant case. In doing so, the Board concluded that because ReMed offers packages of benefits and does not separately charge for each service, room and board is an inherent part of the package. Accordingly, it should not be considered separately for purposes of compensability. Additionally, the Board found that room and board is an inherent part of the supportive care package that contributes to Armistead's rehabilitation process.
(8) In support of the Board's decision, it should be noted that when construing the workers' compensation statute, courts must apply statutory construction principles "in the context of the settled policy that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to promote its `twin purposes of providing a scheme for assured compensation for work related injuries without regard to fault and to relieve employers and employees of the expenses and uncertainties of civil litigation.'"
Streett v. State, Del. Supr., 669 A.2d 9, 12 (1995) (quoting New Castle County v. Goodman, Del. Supr., 461 A.2d 1012, 1014).
(9) Having concluded that room and board is compensable under the Act, the Board then determined that it was also medically reasonable and necessary. Since this finding is factual, this Court reviews it to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence.
(10) At the time of the accident, Armistead's doctors opined that he would never be able to walk or talk again. At present, however, despite continued problems with memory, the Board found that Armistead has achieved an independent level of functioning at ReMed. Therefore, to separate out the room and board component of Armistead's program at ReMed and conclude that they are not part of the package that contributes to his healing makes little sense. Therefore, the Board was correct in concluding that room and board is both reasonable and necessary for Armistead's rehabilitation.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is
AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. NORMAN VEASEY Chief Justice