Opinion
No. 1-812 / 01-0412.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, ROBERT C. CLEM, Judge.
Elizabeth Ann Anzaldo appeals her conviction and sentence following her Alford plea to second-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
William C. Bracker, Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Mark Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Defendant Elizabeth Ann Anzaldo appeals her conviction and sentence following her Alford plea to second-degree theft. Anzaldo argues her guilty plea proceeding was defective. She specifically argues the district court erred in accepting her Alford plea for several reasons. Therefore, she claims her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment. In addition, Anzaldo contends her trial counsel was ineffective in several other respects. We affirm.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On July 7, 2000, an Iowa State Trooper stopped Anzaldo for speeding in Woodbury County. She was driving a 1995 Ford pickup truck. She had no vehicle registration, identification, or proof of insurance. A routine license and registration check revealed a fraudulent expiration sticker on the license plate and a mismatched VIN number. The trooper also discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen on June 14, 2000. Upon further questioning, Anzaldo admitted that her driver's license was suspended in Nebraska. Anzaldo also gave conflicting stories as to how she came to be driving the stolen truck, including one story that indicated she knew the pickup had been stolen. The trooper arrested Anzaldo for speeding, improper registration, no proof of insurance, no driver's license, and first-degree theft.
Matthew DeWitt's 1995 red Ford Ranger pickup truck was reported stolen from his Council Bluffs home in the early morning hours of June 14, 2000.
On July 20, 2000, Anzaldo was charged by trial information with second-degree theft in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1(4) and 714.2(2) (1999). On January 26, 2001, Anzaldo entered an Alford plea to second-degree theft. After an extensive colloquy with Anzaldo, the court accepted her plea. On March 2, 2001, she was sentenced to an indeterminate five-year prison term and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $4,469.62. Anzaldo appeals.
II. Standard of Review. We review challenges to guilty pleas for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. However, we review Anzaldo's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001).
III. Validity of the Alford Plea. Anzaldo contends the district court erred by accepting her Alford plea because (1) she did not benefit from the plea; (2) a factual basis did not exist to support the plea; (3) the district court did not properly inquire into the possible defense of diminished capacity; and (4) she was not competent to enter the plea. We disagree.
It is well established the entry of a guilty plea pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) waives all defenses and objections, which are not intrinsic to the plea itself. State v. Antenucci, 608 N.W.2d 19, 19 (Iowa 2000). A failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment prior to sentencing precludes direct appeal of a conviction. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a).
Although the district court informed Anzaldo at the guilty plea proceeding of the requirement of filing a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve error pursuant to rule 2.8(2)(d), Anzaldo never filed such a motion. However, Anzaldo argues her trial counsel was ineffective for permitting her to plead guilty and for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment. This is an exception to our error preservation requirement. Keene, 630 N.W.2d at 581.
A. Benefit of Alford Plea. Anzaldo claims that she received no benefit from entering an Alford plea to second-degree theft. We disagree. First of all, the plea agreement stated that the State would agree to make no sentencing recommendation. Secondly, Anzaldo received the benefit of entering an Alford plea. An Alford plea is different from a guilty plea in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167-68, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171-72 (1970). This permits the defendant to avoid a full trial, placing the dispute as to the State's evidence and the defendant's claimed innocence to be settled by a judge. Id. at 32, 91 S.Ct. at 165, 27 L.Ed.2d at 168.
Thirdly, during the plea colloquy, Anzaldo personally informed the court that it was in her best interest not to go to trial. She stated she would not make a good witness on her own behalf. In addition, she agreed that the State's evidence and testimony would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed the crime. Therefore, we find Anzaldo received a benefit from entering the Alford plea. The Alford plea allowed her to avoid a full trial as she requested, allowed her not to admit participation in the crime, and the State agreed to stand silent at sentencing.
B. Factual Basis of Alford Plea. Anzaldo also claims a factual basis did not exist to support her Alford plea. We recognize the district court may not accept a guilty plea without first determining that the plea has a factual basis. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b). Moreover, the record must disclose the factual basis. Keene, 630 N.W.2d at 581. "The record to support a factual basis for a guilty plea includes the minutes of testimony, statements made by the defendant and the prosecutor at the guilty plea proceeding, and the presentence investigation report." Id. This record, as a whole, must disclose facts to satisfy the elements of the crime. Id. However, the trial court is not required to extract a confession from the defendant. Id. "Instead, it must only be satisfied that the facts support the crime, `not necessarily that the defendant is guilty.'" Id. (quoting 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 174, at 199 (1999)). We have carefully reviewed the entire record before the district court and conclude that a factual basis was established for the plea.
C. Diminished Responsibility Defense. Anzaldo also claims that the district court erred by failing to inquire into a possible diminished responsibility defense during the plea colloquy. The record in this case reveals, and Anzaldo concedes, the district court fully complied with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b) in accepting Anzaldo's guilty plea. Our rule does not require the court to inform the defendant regarding possible defenses. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). In addition, contrary to Anzaldo's contention, the court did inquire into possible defenses during the plea colloquy. Anzaldo's attorney advised the court that he had discussed a defense of diminished responsibility with his client, but Anzaldo chose not to go forward due to her unwillingness to go to trial.
D. Competency to Enter Plea. Anzaldo claims her Alford plea was defective because the district court failed to determine her competency when accepting the plea. We disagree. Iowa Code section 812.3 requires a competency hearing "if the record contains information from which a reasonable person would believe a substantial question of the competency exists." State v. Rieflen, 558 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Iowa 1996). The relevant factors in determining whether a section 812.3 hearing should be held include (1) defendant's irrational behavior; (2) any demeanor at trial that suggests a competency problem; and (3) any prior medical opinion on the defendant's competency to stand trial. Id. In applying these factors, the district court judge must decide whether the defendant has a present ability to (1) appreciate the charges; (2) understand the proceedings; and (3) assist effectively in the defense. Id. at 152-53. In addition, the district court need not conduct an independent inquiry over and above the plea colloquy unless there exists, at the time of the plea, an unresolved doubt concerning competency. State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa 1977); State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21, 23-24 (Iowa 1975).
Our role is to review all of the factors known to the district court at the time the plea was entered and determine if a substantial question of Anzaldo's competency reasonably appeared. State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa 1979). After a careful review of the record, we conclude there is no evidence in the record to suggest an independent competency inquiry was necessary in this case.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel — Motion in Arrest of Judgment. Anzaldo claims her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment. We disagree. We have stated above that the district court went through an extensive plea colloquy with Anzaldo and committed no error in accepting her Alford plea. Trial counsel may not be considered ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue. State v. Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1998). This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel — Other Claims. Anzaldo finally contends her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) investigate and interview witnesses; (2) determine whether she could cooperate with law enforcement to determine the person responsible for the theft of the vehicle; (3) adequately determine whether she possessed the required physical and mental abilities to withstand trial; (4) request a continuance to enable her to obtain the required medical treatment to allow her to participate at trial; (5) communicate with each other; (6) continue the hearings until counsel familiar with her condition could be present; (7) file a motion to suppress the custodial statements she allegedly made; and (8) file a defense of diminished responsibility.
Following a valid guilty plea only those challenges that are fundamental to the plea itself still remain available to the defendant. State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa 2000). Our supreme court has recently held that "if the undercurrent of the ineffective assistance claim is an issue designed to question the validity of the conviction, it, too, is waived." Id. (citing Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000)). In Speed, our supreme court held we would not hear ineffective assistance claims that did not "bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea." Speed, 616 N.W.2d at 159.
We hold that Anzaldo's ineffective assistance of counsel claims one through seven fall within the Speed rationale. None of these claims imply her plea was uninformed or involuntary. Accordingly, we hold that Anzaldo waived these ineffective assistance claims upon pleading guilty. We also conclude Anzaldo's ineffective assistance of counsel claim eight is without merit. We discussed this claim fully in Divisions III and IV. For the reasons previously stated, we conclude counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty. In addition, we conclude Anzaldo is unable to show prejudice. Therefore, we affirm on this issue.
Even if we were to consider these claims on this direct appeal, we find these allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are too general in nature to allow us to address these allegations or preserve them for a postconviction relief proceeding. Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994). Anzaldo neither explains how counsel failed in an essential duty, nor specifies how an act or omission on the part of trial counsel would have affected the result. See id.
AFFIRMED.