Opinion
No. C6-97-142.
Filed October 14, 1997.
Appeal from the District Court, Rock County, File No. K395117.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, State Attorney General, Catherine M. Keane, Assistant Attorney General, and Donald R. Klosterbauer, Rock County Attorney, (for Respondent).
Lawrence W. Pry, Assistant State Public Defender, (for Appellant).
Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Short, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor did not learn of facts during witness interviews that should have been disclosed under Minn.R.Crim.P. 9.01. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 1995, appellant Adams was convicted of third and fourth degree criminal sexual conduct. During trial, appellant's counsel objected twice on the grounds that the prosecutor failed to disclose the substance of prior oral statements of witnesses, but the trial court overruled both objections. When appellant sought review of a post-conviction court holding that denied his claims, he argued that the prosecutor violated Rule 9.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the nondisclosure prejudiced him. We reversed and remanded the matter for the trial court to review the substance of the undisclosed statements, if they existed, and to determine whether Adams was prejudiced by the prosecutor's nondisclosure.
On remand, the trial court found that because it was the usual practice of the prosecutor, when interviewing witnesses, to make notes of any inconsistencies or exculpatory statements, and because the prosecutor made no additional notes in this case, there was no new information to disclose to the defense. The court further determined that the prosecutor complied with the discovery rules, that appellant was not prejudiced, and that the original sentence should be reinstated.
DECISION
"[T]his court will only reverse a trial court's findings of fact if, upon review of the entire evidence, we are `left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" In re Guardianship of Dawson, 502 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn.App. 1993) (quoting Gjovik v. Strope, 401 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. 1987)), review denied (Minn. Aug. 16, 1993).
Appellant, both in a brief of counsel and a pro se brief, argues that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor failed to obtain any statements that were not properly disclosed. Appellant observes: (a) that the prosecutor admitted not disclosing testimony about incidents where appellant sat in a chair outside his mobile home, intimidating the victim; (b) that the prosecutor also admitted learning where appellant's girlfriend went when she left appellant's mobile home, evidence that the prosecutor didn't disclose; and (c) that the prosecutor admitted, when challenged about his opening statement, that his information came from disclosed transcripts and conversations with witnesses.
The record shows that the two items of information the prosecutor admitted he received but did not disclose had no relevance. Charges against appellant arose from conduct that took place in appellant's trailer while he and the victim were on his couch. Appellant's girlfriend was present but in the other room. It was previously disclosed that the girlfriend admitted leaving the trailer at one time. The fact that her absence involved going to an Amoco station to get aspirin is not relevant to appellant's conviction. Additionally, the fact that appellant sat outside in a chair ten feet from victim's trailer, causing her to be afraid, is not relevant. Furthermore, when the victim's father testified to this fact, appellant's objection to relevance was sustained and the prosecutor did not argue these facts at closing. See State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 386-87 (Minn. 1992) (holding it was significant that prosecutor based closing on evidence that would have been contradicted by exculpatory information not disclosed, thereby exploiting the effects of the nondisclosure).
There was ample evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's note-taking practices demonstrated that he made all material disclosures he was bound to make. This evidence conflicts with the prosecutor's statement about the sources of information for his opening statement, but this statement constitutes a meaningless generality that has not been tied to any particular item of information received in an interview and not disclosed.
Also on remand, appellant raised additional objections as to the prosecutor obtaining information regarding (1) the layout of appellant's mobile home; (2) items appellant's girlfriend left in appellant's trailer; (3) appellant's girlfriend's concerns about appellant's relationship with victim; and (4) statements made by the victim's father to the sheriff. Although appellant did not cite any of these items as a basis of prejudice on this appeal, we note each item was either disclosed or irrelevant. Any failure to disclose these items was not shown to be prejudicial.