Opinion
No. 6315.
August 1, 1974. Rehearing Denied September 10, 1974. Writ Granted October 25, 1974.
APPEAL FROM JUVENILE COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE SOL GOTHARD, J.
D. Douglas Howard, Jr., Laurence D. Rudman, New Orleans, for Stephanie Wallace King, respondent and appellant.
M. L. Juran, Metairie, for Coby Allen King, Allison Beth King, Lisa Robin King and Daniel Seth King, appellees.
Before GULOTTA, BOUTALL and SCHOTT, JJ.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Jefferson, declaring Coby Allen King, Allison Beth King, Lisa Robin King and Daniel Seth King to be neglected children and awarding custody of the said neglected children to their father, Frederic King, pending further orders of the court. From this judgment, an appeal was taken by Mrs. Stephanie Wallace King, the children's mother, who had custody of the children during the period of alleged neglect. There are two issues posed on this appeal: (1) that the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Jefferson did not have jurisdiction to entertain this matter and (2) that the judgment of neglect was erroneous upon the facts shown. We shall take up these matters in turn.
JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT.
The general facts are these. Mrs. Stephanie King brought a divorce action against her husband Frederic King in New York, where the parties then lived, in the matter entitled Stephanie King v. Frederic King, Index No. 35297/1971 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, and in that proceeding she was awarded, among other things, an order for custody of the minor children, alimony and support pendente lite, dated February 25, 1972. In this order Frederic King was granted visitation rights. Mr. King later moved to the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, where he is presently domiciled. In the exercise of his visitation rights, Mr. King visited his children in New York during the weekend of October 5, 1973, visiting with the children that Friday, but on the following day, without the knowledge of their mother, he picked up the children and flew with them to Jefferson Parish. Mr. King asserts that he intended to return with the children the next day, but after talking to the children he concluded that they had been subjected to such poor treatment by their mother, that to insure their well-being it was necessary to have them examined by knowledgeable, expert persons who could advise him whether the welfare of the children was imperiled. Accordingly he sought medical and psychiatric advice, as well as an examination by the Probation Department of the Juvenile Court, and based upon these findings he concluded that the welfare of the children demanded that he keep them with him in Jefferson Parish.
As a result of these examinations, report was made to the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Jefferson that the children were neglected children, and accordingly a petition was filed on October 9, 1973 in that court in the interest of the four children, the petition being signed by Milo Faustermann, Juvenile Probation Officer of that court. The inquiry showed, and the evidence presented on the trial bore out, that all of the acts complained of took place while the children were in the custody of their mother in New York. Upon the filing of the petition, considering the reports to him, the court rendered an order declaring that an emergency exists and the children should be placed in the temporary custody of their father.
In attacking the jurisdiction of the court, Mrs. King urges to us that she was domiciled in New York and had custody of the children under the New York order; that whatever activity took place, it took place in New York wherein she and the children were domiciled, and that any inquiry into these facts could only be conducted by the New York Court. In partial support of this contention, appellant relies upon the recent case of Smith v. Ford, 288 So.2d 71 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974) which holds that the jurisdiction conferred upon the district court in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 10(5) can only be exercised when some acute emergency obliges the state to intervene for the immediate necessities of the child's welfare, in what is ordinarily the province of the state of the child's domicile. Although we note that there is some general similarity in facts in that case and this case, we do not believe that case to be appropriate to this appeal, and we specifically make no comment herein as to the holding. Suffice it to say that the court of inquiry was the district court in the Smith case, and the question before the court was solely one of custody. In this case, we have an inquiry in the Juvenile Court concerning neglect of children, which is an entirely different matter.
The jurisdiction for a neglect hearing in the Juvenile Court is set out in LSA-R.S. 13:1570 A (1 and 2) as follows:
§ 1570 Jurisdiction
"Except as otherwise provided herein, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
"A. Concerning any child whose domicile is within the parish or who is found within the parish:
"(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and support of such child neglects or refuses, when able to do so, to provide proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical, surgical or other care necessary for his well-being; or who is abandoned by his parent or other custodian; or who is otherwise without proper care, custody or support; or who is a live born human being, as defined in R.S. 13:1569(16)(e), who survives and is not killed in an abortion attempt.
"(2) Whose occupation, behavior, environment or associations are injurious to his welfare."
The distinction between the jurisdiction of the district court to decide custody and the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to determine whether children are neglected children, thus placing at issue custody, is clearly shown in the case of In re Owen, 170 La. 255, 127 So. 619 (1930), wherein the Supreme Court discussed a history of the prior jurisprudence and the prior statutory law. The court stated:
"The line of demarcation between the courts exercising general civil jurisdiction with respect to the care, custody, and control of minors and the juvenile courts is well defined. These courts, in dealing with the welfare and interest of minors under a given age, are entirely independent of each other. Where the contest is between the parents, or between a parent and a third person, as to who should have the control and care of the minor, the court exercising general civil jurisdiction is the proper and exclusive tribunal to decide the issue.
"But, where a child is neglected or delinquent, and where the parent contributes to, or is responsible for, such neglect or delinquency, then the state has the paramount right in the interest of the welfare of the child to say who shall have the care, custody and control of the child, and the juvenile court has been made the special and exclusive tribunal for determining such issue.
"There is no force in the contention that this is not a proceeding by the state. It is true that the proceeding was initiated by the affidavit of individuals, but the charge as stated is quasi criminal, and it was made on behalf and in the interest of the state in the proper exercise of its paramount right to determine the best interest and welfare of the children in the manner provided by law." 127 So. 622.
The rationale of the above quotation has been reiterated in numerous cases. See In re Cruse, 203 So.2d 893 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967).
Addressing ourselves now to the question of whether this particular Juvenile Court could entertain the petition, we note in R.S. 13:1570 that the court has jurisdiction over any child who is found within the parish or whose domicile is within the parish. This is further clarified in § F of the Statute which declares that the policy of the State is that the child should be presented to, and his case heard in the court of his domicile regardless of the parish in which such act is committed or such other conditions exist. However the act further provides that this shall not be construed to deprive the court of any parish of jurisdiction if the child or his parent is at the time the conditions exist present in the parish. A reading of this section would indicate the possibility that no provision has been made for a case such as this wherein the child is found within the parish, but the act or condition has existed outside of the state. This omission is explained by reference to R.S. 13:1571.5, which was brought into being by Act 140 of 1972, which grants the Juvenile Court the discretion to transfer the hearing to the courts of another state wherein the minor may be domiciled or may later become domiciled, if such court would accept jurisdiction. Thus, as we interpret the statute, when a child in this state is sought to be declared a neglected child, the Juvenile Court of the parish in which the child is found may either accept jurisdiction and itself try the matter, or may decide to transfer it to the state of the minor's domicile if acceptance is obtained. The Juvenile Court of Jefferson, having decided to make the inquiry itself, must then make a finding of neglect in order to sustain its jurisdiction. See State In Interest of Toler, 262 La. 557, 263 So.2d 888 (1972). Also In re Rome, 251 So.2d 435 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971). This is true even when the mother has been previously granted the temporary custody of the children in a proceeding of separation from bed and board or divorce in the district court. State v. Tomasella, 200 La. 60, 7 So.2d 615 (1942).
ON THE MERITS.
The Juvenile Court is a court devoted to the furtherance of the welfare of children, and the primary concern in child neglect cases is the welfare and best interest of children. In the case of In re State ex rel. Thaxton, 220 So.2d 184 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1969), the court stated that the burden of proving that a parent is unfit or incapable of caring for a child rests with the state who has in fact and in law interceded in the affairs of the parent for the sake and in the interest of the child. In cases involving the custody of children a great deal of discretion is accorded to the trial judge and his decision will not be reversed on appeal except in the clearest case of abuse of such discretion. With these principles in mind we proceed to examine the evidence presented herein.
The testimony of Mr. King is that in 1972 he moved from New York to the New Orleans area where he had obtained the position of Assistant Vice-President for Health Affairs at the Tulane Medical Center. In Thanksgiving of that year he brought his children to visit with him over the Thanksgiving holidays under the weekend visitation right granted by the New York court. On July 31, 1973 he again brought the children down to visit with him at his home in Metairie, Jefferson Parish for two weeks pursuant to the summer visitation rights granted him. At the end of these two weeks, the children refused to return to their mother's home. After some discussion with his wife about the matter he kept the children here, enrolled them in the public schools until September 14, 1973, at which time Mrs. King and her mother came to Louisiana and tried to take the children back to New York. However at the airport the oldest child, Coby, managed to escape. After seeking legal advice, Mr. King turned the child over to his mother to return to New York.
On October 6, 1973, King again exercised his weekend visitation right and decided to bring his children to his home in Metairie in order to spend the Yom Kippur religious holiday with them. He had round trip tickets to return the children to New York the next day and intended to do so but the children refused to return to their mother's home because of the treatment they claimed they had been afforded by their mother. King then sought the consultation and counsel of Dr. Richard Brunstetter, a medical doctor and psychiatrist who is Director of Child Psychiatry at Tulane Medical School. He also had the children interviewed by Walter Rothschild, a juvenile probation officer attached to the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Jefferson. Based upon what the children told him and the results of this examination, he decided that the children needed his immediate protection for their welfare.
The bulk of the evidence concerning the treatment of the children is furnished by the children themselves, and we set it out herein in detail. There is of course some variance in the testimony of the children but basically they tell the same story. Indeed, it appears that the children had discussed this matter to considerable extent so that their testimony, for the most part, was quite similar. One of their biggest objections is that their mother was living for some time with a man named Beck, and then, since January 1973 with a man named Ronnie Jacoby. This latter relationship seems to be the major source of trouble between them.
In summary, they testify as follows. The mother was seldom home in the afternoon when the children came home from school. She came home at dinner time with Jacoby. The children testified that their mother and Jacoby daily drank alcoholic beverages. The children testified that they were subjected to gross profanity by Jacoby and their mother. Jacoby, the children testified, called the two eleven year old girls "you fucking bitches," among other profanities. Jacoby was described as being violent, and as physically striking and abusing the children. Jacoby, according to the testimony, on one occasion, during an argument, threw an object at the mother, missing her and breaking the wall, after which he smashed a door so hard the glass broke. He also had punched a hole in the wall through a heart containing the words, Ron loves Steph.
The children testified that their mother hit them almost daily for failing to eat their dinner fast enough. They were for the most part struck with her sandal, but also with her hand.
The girls testified that on one occasion one of them, after discovering a listening device attached to the phone by their mother, broke it accidentally and so informed her mother. The mother, in response, struck the girl across the face, splitting her lip. She then put the girls out of the house in the rain and left them there for several hours.
Allison testified that Jacoby kissed her on the lips, although she tried to avoid him. She stated she would wipe her mouth afterward.
There was testimony that on one occasion the mother took the children to Dennis Beck's apartment, where people were drinking and gambling. A man there pushed Lisa against a chair bruising her face, but drawing no response or action by the mother.
The children's testimony showed a general pattern of lack of care by the mother for the children. In the mornings, the mother was in bed with Jacoby. The children had no breakfast, and made lunches for themselves, which they took to school. When the children came home from school, there was no one at home. The mother was not employed.
On one occasion, one of the children, home alone after school, suffered an allergic reaction to a bee or yellowjacket bite. The child had the presence of mind to go to the house of a neighbor, who obtained medical assistance.
At dinner time the mother came home with Jacoby. The children expressed resentment that the mother and Jacoby ate gourmet foods, steak and lobster, while the children were given inexpensive foods. There was testimony concerning abuse by Jacoby when the children unwittingly helped themselves to fruit he purchased for his own consumption. After dinner, the girls had to do the dishes from the children's dinner, as well as Jacoby and their mother's, who ate separately. The mother never assisted them.
On Friday and Saturday evenings, the children were left home alone while the mother and Jacoby went out. The children testified to being home sick from school, in some instances under a doctor's care and on medication, and that their mother left them home alone when they were sick and she went bowling.
The children testified about an absence of maternal direction regarding personal cleanliness, Lisa stating that she just took a shower when she smelled so bad she had to.
We have set out the testimony with this detail because the mother has produced testimony of herself and her mother, Mrs. Ann Wallace, which denies in large part most of the incidents and particularly the relationship between Jacoby and Mrs. King, and insists that some of the items of which the children complain are either isolated incidents or completely exaggerated by the children. We agree that a number of the things mentioned above and complained of by the children are not really grounds for depriving the mother of the custody of her children. However the question of the relationship of Mrs. King and Jacoby is of the utmost importance in this matter, and there is a sharp conflict between the testimony of the children and that of their mother. The trial court did not give reasons for its judgment, but it did declare the children to be neglected within the purview of the juvenile law, and we must assume that the question of credibility was resolved in favor of the children.
The record discloses that the children were examined by Dr. William Thurman, a pediatrician, who testified that Daniel King had a form of "cradle cap" attributable to lack of scalp cleanliness, and that Coby had a case of poison oak which had not received necessary medical attention. However, other than this the children were in good health and are not suffering from any child abuse. Considerable support is given the children's testimony by Dr. Richard Brunstetter, the child psychiatrist, who testified that the three oldest children were desperate in their desire not to have to remain living with their mother. The youngest child, Daniel, missed his mother and feels that he would be happier in New York if his father was living with the family there. The doctor expressed his opinion that the children were having emotional problems as a result of their treatment, but he also felt that the children would not resort to lying to achieve their end, however he does feel that the children's stories are embellished to some degree.
It is apparent in this case that we are faced with an issue of credibility of the witnesses. The general rule is that the trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses, that his findings must be accorded great weight, and we may not disturb his finding based on credibility unless it is apparent that he has committed manifest error. An examination of this record discloses no such manifest error. Considering then, that the testimony of the children is basically true, we cannot find that he has abused the discretion granted him in the determination of whether these children are neglected children under the statute and in determining that their best interest and welfare is to be placed in the custody of their father pending further orders of the Juvenile Court. Finding no error in the court's judgment, we must affirm it.
Accordingly, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant's costs.
Affirmed.
SCHOTT, J., dissents with written reasons.
From my examination of the record I am convinced that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the children and the exercise of such jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case may have prevented the mother of these children from obtaining justice, and encourages chaos in the orderly administration of justice as well as disrespect for the law and courts.
On October 15, 1971, Stephanie King initiated domestic proceedings against her husband, Frederic King, in the Supreme Court of New York, where they were both domiciled and residing at that time. These proceedings contain statements by both parties, bitterly attacking the behavior and character of each other, impuning each other's moral conduct and reflecting upon each other's suitability as custodian of the four children born of their marriage. The proceedings terminated with an order signed by the court on February 25, 1972, awarding to Mrs. King the custody of the four children with visitation rights in favor of the father, and for the payment of $250 per week to Mrs. King as temporary alimony and support for the children.
In July, 1972, Mr. King moved to Jefferson Parish in connection with his taking a position in New Orleans, and shortly thereafter in the exercise of his visitation rights and with the approval of Mrs. King he brought his children to Louisiana for the celebration of a holiday. When this visit reached its planned conclusion King decided not to return the children and it became necessary for Mrs. King, accompanied by her mother, to come to Louisiana and by force return the four children to their domicile in New York.
On Friday, October 5, 1973, while King was in New York in the exercise of his visitation rights he obtained the cooperation of his four children, ages 12, 11 (twins) and 8, to board an airplane with him in New York and to return to his home in Jefferson Parish. This was done without knowledge or consent on the part of Mrs. King, and the four small children made their exit with no baggage or belongings other than the clothes which they were wearing. Shortly after their arrival in Jefferson Parish, on Saturday, October 6, 1973, Mr. King's attorney arranged with the Probation Counselor for the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Probation Department to initiate an investigation concerning these children, upon informing him that these children were being denied their constitutional rights and were in need of the supervision of the court.
On October 9, 1973, the Chief Probation Counselor filed a petition in behalf of the State and in the interest of the children on the jurisdictional allegations that "they are alleged to be neglected children in that their environment is injurious to their well-being. This Court has jurisdiction under the provisions of R.S. 13:1570A(2)." The petition prayed that formal jurisdiction be taken by the Juvenile Court. Thereupon the court issued an order awarding to King temporary custody of the children, effective October 7, 1973, "considering that an emergency exists and the Court being of the opinion that it is for the best interest of the minor children." Mrs. King excepted to the jurisdiction of the court and a lengthy trial was held on November 26, 1973, resulting in a judgment, signed on January 28, 1974, declaring the four children to be neglected children and awarding custody to their father. The only reasons assigned were "After a lengthy hearing, considering the testimony of all witnesses and particularly the testimony of the four King children, together with the pleadings and the evidence, the law and the evidence being in favor of Mr. Frederic King, petitioner."
LSA-R.S. 13:1570 prescribes as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided herein, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
A. Concerning any child whose domicile is within the Parish or who is found within the parish:
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and support of such child neglects or refuses, when able to do so, to provide proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical, surgical or other care necessary for his well-being; . . . or who is otherwise without proper care, custody, or support. . . .
(2) Whose occupation, behavior, environment or associations are injurious to his welfare." (Emphasis supplied)
It is apparent from this statute that for the court to have jurisdiction over these children they must be "found within the Parish" and on the basis of an evidentiary hearing the court must find that at least one set of the circumstances spelled out in the statute exists. Because the statute does contemplate such an evidentiary hearing for the court to determine whether it has jurisdiction Mrs. King's initial exception was properly overruled, but in my opinion after the testimony was heard the trial judge should have maintained her exception as a matter of law.
The words "found within the Parish" hardly seem to apply to the circumstances of the instant case where these children were brought to the State and thrust upon the jurisdiction of the court by trickery on the part of the father in collusion with his children. Had the evidence shown that any sort of an emergency existed so that the children were in immediate need of the protection of the State because of their condition when they arrived in Jefferson Parish it might be argued that the State had the obligation under the circumstances to take jurisdiction over these children, but it should be apparent from the resume of the evidence provided in the majority opinion that no such emergency existed and that these children were not in dire need of the protection of the State.
This Court in Smith v. Ford, 288 So.2d 71 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974) held as follows:
". . . only when some acute exigency obliges the state to intervene for the immediate necessities of the child's welfare, in what is ordinarily the province of the state of the child's domicile.
"Jurisdiction to decide custody of foreign infants in a state unrelated to them except by their brief physical presence is not a jurisdiction of choice but one of necessity. It exists because humanity could not abide a court's refusing to hear, because of jurisdictional technicalities, a child's screams from torture or despair. But a statutory grant of such transient jurisdiction is not merely another choice of custody forum, available for the convenience of a spouse. Most certainly such jurisdiction cannot be construed or suffered to invite the spiriting away of children from their long-established home by a seldom-seen parent."
The majority rejects this case as inapposite because it involved a question of custody alone, while the instant case involves an inquiry by the Juvenile Court into the question of neglect of children, but in my opinion there is no valid distinction between the cases. The question is purely one of jurisdiction. In the cited case jurisdiction was claimed on the basis of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 10(5) as to "a proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a minor if he is domiciled in, or is in, this state," and in the instant case jurisdiction is claimed on the basis of the statute containing language which is synonymous. The same judicial restraint over the exercise of jurisdiction should be applied in both cases.
But in addition to my belief that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in maintaining jurisdiction after the trial, I also believe that there is manifest error in the factual determination he had to make so as to bring the case within the purview of LSA-R.S. 13:1570A.(1) or (2).
The trial consisted almost exclusively of the testimony of the four children, the elder three of whom repeated one another's accusations against their mother as summarized by my colleagues in almost verbatim pattern. The record shows that these children did discuss among themselves and with their father and their attorney their testimony before and during the course of the trial. Their testimony far from being natural or spontaneous was carefully rehearsed and largely influenced by their father. On this point, it is most significant that two social workers employed by the Jefferson Parish Department of Welfare testified that when they interviewed the four children in the presence of their father and the woman living in his house they were impressed by the fact that they were being encouraged by their father in their responses, and were making an effort to answer their questions in such a way as would be acceptable or helpful to the father. The prevailing sentiment repeatedly expressed by the children was that they were unhappy with their mother and preferred to live with their father in Jefferson Parish. The only other witnesses who testified were the father, a pediatrician who examined the children, a psychiatrist who examined the children for 15 minutes on October 6 and 20 minutes on October 26, and the social workers. The pediatrician found the children to be in good health and contributed nothing to the case on the issue of neglect. The psychiatrist could say only that the children were unhappy and preferred to be with their father, but significantly when he was asked whether he felt that the four children should stay with their father he answered "In the first place, I find it very difficult to comment on where the children should go because I don't know both home environments and I don't know them in detail." Similarly, in answer to the question as to whether the King children were neglected one of the social workers said:
"I feel that we do not have enough information, we have not interviewed Mrs. King, we have only seen the children in their own home on one occasion, we were not complete with our report, I do not feel that we have enough information to be able to give any kind of recommendation as to whether we feel these children are neglected or not."
Thus, while these social workers declined to make a recommendation on the basis of the fact that they did not feel they had enough information, the trial judge made his determination without any more information than the social workers had at their disposal. The trial court did not obtain information from any agency in New York where the children were domiciled in spite of the fact that a proffered letter from the Department of Social Services of the State of New York over the signature of a senior case worker of that agency reported that the home of the children was adequate and that his investigation disclosed no evidence of neglect on the part of these children.
There was also much testimony by the children concerning Mrs. King's living in concubinage with two different men and because the majority opinion highlights this testimony it is appropriate to note that Mr. King has living in his home a young woman whose husband sued her for divorce upon the ground of adultery with King and whom King testified he intended to marry. The children testified that they liked this woman and even referred to her as their mother. Since the trial judge awarded custody to King despite these circumstances I must assume that he afforded no weight to the evidence of Mrs. King's loose conduct with her suitors.
The only conclusions supported by the testimony are that, 1) these children at the time of the trial and in the State of Louisiana were unhappy and 2) they preferred to live with their father because of conditions which exist in New York. But if these children were neglected that neglect necessarily occurred in New York and the record contains little if any evidence on this essential point. Had the case been tried in New York, a court could have availed itself of all pertinent information and a sound determination could have been made.
Before Mrs. King suffered her children to be taken away from her by Mr. King's deceit and trickery she had proceeded in an orderly fashion in the New York court and had obtained a valid, legal and subsisting court order awarding her custody. She then found herself in the position of having to travel to Louisiana, at her own expense, to convince a judge of a foreign jurisdiction that she was not neglecting her children. She did the best she could with her own testimony and that of her mother. They both denied the accusations of the children. But she was relegated to proceeding without the benefit of live testimony of friends, neighbors, relatives, physicians or even legitimate agencies of the State of New York who could have made an impartial investigation of the children's circumstances at first hand and reported on it to the court. Under these circumstances it was most difficult for Mrs. King to obtain justice, whereas all parties could have done so had the matter been tried in New York where it belonged. In my opinion, the trial judge committed prejudicial error when he declined to relinquish jurisdiction after the evidence was presented.
Putting the stamp of approval on Mr. King's behavior can only produce chaos in the orderly administration of justice. Given a couple who are bitterly antagonistic toward each other as the Kings have been and given the financial means of the one without custody to be able to fly the children around the country, he can flaunt the jurisdiction of the court where he first litigated the question of custody and try his case in another jurisdiction in the hope that he might convince the court that he now be awarded custody of his children. Had Mr. King lost his case he might very well have searched for still another jurisdiction which might have afforded him relief. I respectfully submit that my colleagues in the majority have chosen to ignore fundamental principles of comity and the giving of full faith and credit to the judgments and orders of our sister states which are designed to prevent chaos and confusion from undermining the administration of justice. The first and paramount consideration for us is the welfare of the children, but unless there is a showing that the children are in dire need of the protection of our state and our courts we should also be interested in maintaining orderly procedure and respect for the law and the decrees of courts. In the instant case, my colleagues have approved Mr. King's scheme to flaunt the laws of the State of New York and to disregard the orders of the New York court without any showing on his part that the welfare of his children justified such action.
I respectfully dissent.