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State, Fraternal Order of Police, v. Tegreene

Supreme Court of Ohio
May 30, 1979
58 Ohio St. 2d 235 (Ohio 1979)

Opinion

No. 78-485

Decided May 30, 1979.

Mandamus — Complaint dismissed, when — Prior judgment res judicata — Labor unions — Dues checkoff.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.

In Cleveland v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 8 (No. 970957, August 30, 1977), unreported, the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County ordered an election between the Fraternal Order of Police, Cleveland Lodge No. 8, appellant herein, and the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association (CPPA) to determine an exclusive bargaining agent for Cleveland police patrolmen. It also ordered that the continuation of the dues checkoff for the participants in the election shall be a subject for bargaining between the city and the exclusive bargaining representative for patrolmen, i. e., the winning union, subject to the provisions of R.C. 9.41. That order was not appealed.

The CPPA won the election and was designated the exclusive bargaining agent. Pursuant to a request by the CPPA, the city agreed to discontinue the dues checkoff for appellant. When the city's Director of Finance, Joseph Tegreene, appellee herein, refused to resume the dues checkoff, appellant and its president filed this action in mandamus in the Court of Appeals seeking an order requiring him to do so. Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the judgment in Cleveland v. Fraternal Order of Police, supra, is res judicata to appellants' request for extraordinary relief. The Court of Appeals granted appellee's motion.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Messrs. Climaco, Goldberg, Boukalik Seminatore, Mr. John R. Climaco, Mr. Shimon Kaplan and Mr. Paul S. Lefkowitz, for appellants.

Mr. Jack M. Schulman, Ms. Karen B. Newborn and Mr. Norman S. Buckvar, for appellee.


Mandamus will not lie to order a city's Director of Finance to resume the dues checkoff for a city employees' labor union which has lost an exclusive bargaining agent election unless the director has a clear legal duty to do so. See State, ex rel. Pressley, v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141. By its order that the continuation of the dues checkoff for election participants is a subject for bargaining with the winning union, the lower court in Cleveland v. Fraternal Order of Police, supra, decided that the city did not have a legal duty to deduct these dues. Although the instant action was brought against the Director of Finance, his legal duty is the same as the city's since he is the city official responsible for the deduction of dues.

As this court stated in Hicks v. De la Cruz (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 71, at page 74: "The modern view of res judicata embraces the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which basically states that if an issue of fact or law actually is litigated and determined to be a valid and final judgment, such determination being essential to that judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. A party precluded under this principle from relitigating an issue with an opposing party likewise is precluded from doing so with another person unless he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the first action, or unless other circumstances justify according him an opportunity to relitigate the issue."

Appellants contend further that State, ex rel. Gherges, v. Cleveland (No. 31320, March 16, 1972), unreported, decided by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, established a mandatory duty upon the Director of Finance to deduct union dues from the wages of a city employee who requests it, and that this was decided prior to the time that Cleveland v. Fraternal Order of Police, supra, decided the issue, and is res judicata to the instant action.

This argument is without merit. When two prior judgments conflict, the last in point of time operates as res judicata to a third, later action. See Restatement of Judgments 164, Section 42.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CELEBREZZE, C.J., HERBERT, W. BROWN, P. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER and HOLMES, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

State, Fraternal Order of Police, v. Tegreene

Supreme Court of Ohio
May 30, 1979
58 Ohio St. 2d 235 (Ohio 1979)
Case details for

State, Fraternal Order of Police, v. Tegreene

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE, EX REL. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, CLEVELAND LODGE NO. 8, ET…

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: May 30, 1979

Citations

58 Ohio St. 2d 235 (Ohio 1979)
389 N.E.2d 851

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