Opinion
Case No. 6:20-cv-360-PGB-LRH
2021-05-20
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Anna Bevilacqua SPANGLER and Richard Dale Spangler, Defendants.
Maureen Martinez, Carri S. Leininger, Williams, Leininger, & Cosby, P.A., North Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff. Gregory D. Swartwood, Nation Law Firm, Longwood, FL, for Defendants.
Maureen Martinez, Carri S. Leininger, Williams, Leininger, & Cosby, P.A., North Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff.
Gregory D. Swartwood, Nation Law Firm, Longwood, FL, for Defendants.
ORDER
PAUL G. BYRON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This cause is before the Court without oral argument on the following motions and related filings:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27 ("Defendants’ Motion ")), Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 28), and Defendants’ reply thereto (Doc. 36); and
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35 ("Plaintiff's Motion ")), Defendants’ response in opposition (Doc. 37), and Plaintiff's reply thereto (Doc. 40).
Upon consideration and review of the record as cited by the parties in their respective briefs, Plaintiff's Motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants’ Motion is due to be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a July 11, 2019 collision between Defendant Anna Spangler's 2015 Nissan Altima and Edward Allen Leveque's (the "Deceased ") uninsured 2015 Razor Pocket Mod electric scooter (the "Scooter "). (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 7, 11). The collision occurred on the inside north-bound lane of U.S. Highway 1, which has a posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. (Id. ¶¶ 8–10).
Defendant Anna Spangler submitted a claim for stacking uninsured motor vehicle ("UM ") coverage to Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company under her effective automobile insurance policy (the "Policy "). (Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 6, 22). Plaintiff denied her claim because the Scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" under the Policy. (Id. ¶ 23).
The Policy's Named Insured is Defendant Richard Spangler. (Doc. 27-2; Doc. 29, ¶¶ 1, 5). The Policy covers the Named Insured's spouse if the spouse resides primarily with the Named Insured. (Doc. 1-1, p. 6; Doc. 29, ¶ 3). Thus, the Policy covers Defendant Anna Spangler, Defendant Richard Spangler's spouse who resides primarily with him. (Doc. 29, ¶ 6).
Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated this action for declaratory relief against Defendants on February 28, 2020. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff requests this Court to declare: (1) that the Scooter is not a "motor vehicle" under the Policy and that the UM coverage section of the Policy applies to injuries caused by owners and operators of a "motor vehicle," as defined by the Policy; and (2) that the Scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" under the Policy and that UM coverage is unavailable. (Id. ). Both parties now move for summary judgment, and the matter is ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the movant must show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must "view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant." Davila v. Gladden , 777 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Carter v. City of Melbourne , 731 F.3d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). "An issue of fact is ‘material’ if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case. An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Harrison v. Culliver , 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). "A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Brooks v. Cnty. Comm'n of Jefferson Cnty. , 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Walker v. Darby , 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) ).
As a preliminary matter, federal courts construe insurance contracts according to substantive state law. See Sphinx Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, Pa. , 412 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In Florida, "the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed governs the rights and liabilities of the parties in determining an issue of insurance coverage." State Farm Mut. Ins. v. Roach , 945 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006) (citation omitted); see LaTorre v. Conn. Mut. Life. Ins. , 38 F.3d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, Florida law controls here. (See Doc. 1).
The Policy provides UM coverage under the following conditions: " We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle ." (Doc. 1-1, p. 25) (emphasis in original). The narrow question presented here is whether the Scooter constitutes an "uninsured motor vehicle."
Two sections of the Policy are important to this inquiry. First, the definitions section "define[s] certain words and phrases ... for use throughout" the Policy. (Id. at p. 4). The definitions section also states that the Policy prints defined words and phrases in boldface italics and clarifies that "Each coverage includes additional definitions only for use with that coverage." (Id. ). It then defines the phrase "motor vehicle" for use throughout the Policy:
Motor Vehicle means a vehicle with four or more wheels that:
1. is self-propelled and is of a type:
a. designed for; and
b. required to be licensed for use on Florida highways; or
2. is a trailer or semitrailer designed for use with a vehicle described in 1. above.
(Id. ) (emphasis in original). Notably, the definitions section does not define the phrase "uninsured motor vehicle." (Id. at pp. 4–5).
Second, the UM coverage section contains two additional definitions for use with UM coverage. (Id. at pp. 24–25). One of these additional definitions is "uninsured motor vehicle":
Uninsured Motor Vehicle means a land motor vehicle and a trailer attached to such land motor vehicle:
1. the ownership, maintenance, and use of which is:
a. neither insured, nor self-insured, nor bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the accident; or
b. insured, self-insured, or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the accident; but
(1) the limits are less than required by the financial responsibility act of the state of Florida;
(2) the limits of liability of the insurance, self-insurance, or bond are less than the damages for bodily injury sustained by the insured ; or
(3) the entity providing the financial responsibility:
(a) denies that it provides liability coverage for compensatory damages that result from the accident; or
(b) is or becomes insolvent; or
2. the owner or driver:
a. of which could not reasonably have been identified;
b. remains unknown; and
c. that causes bodily injury to the insured .
Uninsured Motor Vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle or trailer:
...
3. designed for use primarily off public roads except while on public roads ...
(Id. ) (emphasis in original).
The Policy includes an Amendatory Endorsement. (Doc. 1-2). The Amendatory Endorsement changes the UM coverage section's additional definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" by eliminating the second exclusion, but it retains the "designed for use primarily off public roads except while on public roads" exclusion identified above. (Id. at p. 6).
The parties disagree as to: (1) which Policy section controls the meaning of "uninsured motor vehicle"; and (2) the correct application of UM statutory and case law to the "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition. The Court addresses these disagreements in turn and ultimately concludes that the Scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" and that UM coverage is unavailable. See AIX Specialty Ins. v. Ashland 2 Partners, LLC , 383 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2019) ("Under Florida law, the interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law to be decided by the court.").
A. The Definition of "Motor Vehicle"
Plaintiff argues that the "motor vehicle" definition is part of the "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition. Therefore, Plaintiff reasons that the Scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" because it is not a "motor vehicle." (Doc. 35, pp. 9–12). Defendants concede that the Scooter is not a "motor vehicle," but they contend that the "motor vehicle" definition is immaterial to the "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition. (Doc. 27, pp. 8–10). The Court agrees with Defendants.
The "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition defines the term as "a land motor vehicle." (Doc. 1-1, p. 24). Importantly, the Policy prints defined words and phrases in boldface italics. (Id. at p. 4). In other words, the "motor vehicle" definition only attaches when that specific phrase is in boldface italics—it does not apply automatically whenever the words "motor" and "vehicle" appear together. Cf. Landmark Am. Ins. v. Pin-Pon Corp. , 155 So. 3d 432, 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. , 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003) ) (stating that courts must construe insurance contracts "in accordance with the plain language of the policy").
For example, the No-Fault coverage section bolds and italicizes the phrase "motor vehicle" within its additional definition of "insured":
Insured means:
1. named insureds and relatives :
a. while occupying a motor vehicle ;
b. struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle ...
(Id. at p. 14) (emphasis in original). Thus, the No-Fault coverage section's "insured" additional definition explicitly incorporates the "motor vehicle" definition into its meaning. By contrast, the UM coverage section's "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition uses the term "land motor vehicle" in regular font. Thus, the "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition does not incorporate the "motor vehicle" definition into its meaning, and "land motor vehicle" is simply an undefined term. Cf. id. (quoting Auto-Owners Ins. v. Anderson , 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000) ) ("[I]n construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.’ "). The Court cannot delete the word "land," bold and italicize the words "motor" and "vehicle," and essentially rewrite the "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition. See Zucker for BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. , 856 F.3d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. , 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) ) (stating that court cannot "rewrite contracts" or "add meaning that is not present"); Straub v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. , No. 5:16-cv-342, 2017 WL 202847, at * 2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2017) (refusing to bold, italicize, and add words "to show they should be given the defined meaning").
Likewise, the fact that the boldfaced, italicized defined term "uninsured motor vehicle" itself encompasses the phrase "motor vehicle" is inapposite. Again, the "motor vehicle" definition does not apply whenever the words "motor" and "vehicle" appear together in the Policy. And even though these words happen to be in boldface italics, the Court cannot minimize the addition of the word "uninsured" as a mere "description" of "motor vehicle." (See Doc. 35, p. 12).
Moreover, interpretation of the defined term in this manner is clearly contrary to the Policy's language and structure. For instance, the definitions section defines the word "car" as "a land motor vehicle with four or more wheels, designed for use primarily on public roads." (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). The same section also defines "newly acquired car": " Newly Acquired Car means a car newly owned by you ." (Id. at p. 5) (emphasis in original). The "newly acquired car" definition explicitly incorporates the definition of "car" into its meaning—but not because the word "car" is within the boldfaced, italicized defined term "newly acquired car." Rather, the definition —not the defined term itself—uses the word "car" in boldface italics, thereby connecting the two.
In sum, it is evident that the defined term "uninsured motor vehicle" is a cohesive unit with a distinct meaning, and the Court cannot and will not modify the Policy create a connection that does not exist. Thus, the Court finds that it is clear from the plain language of the Policy that the "motor vehicle" definition in the definitions section is irrelevant to the "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition in the UM coverage section. Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion's request for a declaration that the UM coverage section of the Policy applies to injuries caused by owners and operators of a "motor vehicle," as defined by the Policy, and that the Scooter does not constitute a "motor vehicle" under the Policy.
Even if the Policy is unclear, "Ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy." Auto-Owners Ins. , 756 So. 2d at 34.
B. "Land Motor Vehicle"
"Generally, courts will strive to interpret an automobile insurance policy based on the definitions contained within the policy. However, if the definition provided in one section of the policy is not applicable to the coverage at issue in another section, courts may be compelled to search elsewhere for a sensible and appropriate definition." Grant v. State Farm Fire & Cas. , 638 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. 1994). In the instant case, the "motor vehicle" definition provided in the definitions section is not applicable to the "uninsured motor vehicle" additional definition in the UM coverage section for the reasons provided above. Moreover, the additional definition states that an "uninsured motor vehicle" is a "land motor vehicle," which the Policy does not define. Accordingly, the Court must search elsewhere for "a sensible and appropriate definition." See id.
"Where a contract of insurance is entered into on a matter surrounded by statutory limitations and requirements, the parties are presumed to have entered into [the contract] with reference to the statute, and the statutory provisions become a part of the contract." Geico Gen. Ins. v. Schwinn , No. 8:04CV1485, 2006 WL 1529092, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2006) (quoting Standard Marine Ins. v. Allyn , 333 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) ). Florida law requires insurers to offer UM coverage in an amount equal to the policyholder's automobile liability insurance. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 627.727 ). If the policyholder accepts this offer and pays the additional UM premium, then she receives "a limited form of coverage" that protects her from injuries "by providing a source of financial responsibility for the uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor." Id.
"UM coverage was intended to enable an insured to receive the same recovery that would have been available had the tortfeasor been covered by an automobile liability policy that complied with the Financial Responsibility Law." Amica Mut. Ins. v. Willis , 235 So. 3d 1041, 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Salas v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 272 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1972) ; Mullis v. State Farm Auto. Ins. , 252 So. 2d 229, 236 (Fla. 1971) ). The Financial Responsibility Law "identifies the minimum liability insurance requirements applying to exercise of the privilege of driving on Florida's public streets and highways." Geico , 2006 WL 1529092, at *3. It defines "motor vehicle" as a "self-propelled vehicle that is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway." FLA. STAT. § 324.021(1) ; see Grant , 638 So. 2d at 937–38 (deeming the Financial Responsibility Law's definition of "motor vehicle" as the "sensible and appropriate definition" for purposes of UM coverage).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot rely on the Financial Responsibility Law because it did not cite to it in the Complaint, and, therefore, Defendants lacked proper notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Doc. 36, pp. 6–8; Doc. 37, pp. 12–13). Defendants cite Manning v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, Inc. in support of their argument. No. 8:13-cv-3060, 2015 WL 477364 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2015).
In Manning , the plaintiff's complaint and other submissions throughout the litigation only addressed the defendant's allegedly invalid tip pool under the Fair Labor and Standards Act. Id. at *1, 4. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine dispute that its cashiers were "tipped employees," thus rendering its tip pool valid as a matter of law. Id. at *1. The plaintiff responded to the defendant's motion for summary judgment with a new theory of liability: the defendant unlawfully deducted tips. Id. at *4. This Court dismissed the new claim, finding that the plaintiff's attempt to raise it at the summary judgment stage was tantamount to an attempt to amend the complaint. Id.
By contrast, Plaintiff's Complaint requests declaratory judgment that the Scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle." (Doc. 1). Plaintiff's Motion, as well as its other submissions throughout this action, does not vacillate from its initial position: the Scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" under the Policy and Florida law. (Docs. 1, 28, 35). Although the Complaint does not reference the Financial Responsibility Law, Plaintiff's later filings do not raise a new theory of liability. See id. at *4.
Moreover, the Complaint states that "The Electric Scooter that was being operated by the Deceased at the time of the Accident was not designed for or required to be licensed for use on Florida Highways ," mirroring the Financial Responsibility Law's and the Policy's definitions of "motor vehicle." (Doc. 1, ¶ 36) (emphasis added). Even though the Complaint's assertion references the Policy's definition of "motor vehicle," the inclusion of this language indicates that Defendants were not blindsided by Plaintiff's argument. (Id. ¶¶ 36–38).
Furthermore, given the relevant UM case law, it is no surprise that the statute's definition of "motor vehicle" would be used in this context. In fact, Defendants’ Motion—filed almost two months before Plaintiff's Motion—expressly addresses the Financial Responsibility Law. (Doc. 27, pp. 15–16 n.25). Therefore, it is doubtful that they lacked proper notice of the statute, and they certainly did not lack notice of the claim.
Defendants also cite to Scottsdale Ins. v. Kuntz , No. 2:19-cv-00113, 2020 WL 7074554 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2020) for the proposition that the Court should use the ordinary meaning of "land motor vehicle" instead of the statutory definition. (Doc. 37, p. 9 n.5). Kuntz involved a Commercial Garage Coverage Insurance Policy, and therefore it is not directly applicable to the case at hand. Id. at *3. Moreover, applying the ordinary meaning would require the Court to ignore the Florida Supreme Court's case law applying the Financial Responsibility Law's definition of "motor vehicle" in the UM coverage context.
Turning to the Financial Responsibility Law, Plaintiff asserts that the Scooter does not comport with the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" because it is not designed and required to be licensed for use on public highways under any circumstances. (Doc. 35, pp. 15–17). Defendants counter that the Scooter is a "motor vehicle" because it is designed for use primarily off public roads and because it is uncontested that the Scooter was operating on a public road at the time of the collision, relying primarily on Carguillo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. , 529 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988) in support of their position. (Doc. 27, pp. 15–16 n.25). The Court disagrees with Defendants. The Scooter is not a vehicle "that is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway." See FLA. STAT . § 324.021(1). It has 2-12-volt batteries, a 24-volt motor, and a top speed of just 15 miles per hour. It does not have a tail lamp, a taillight, a tail bulb, a brake light, turn signals, mirrors, or a Vehicle Identification Number assigned by the manufacturer. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 16–17, 20; Doc. 35-1, p. 3, ¶¶ 17–21; Doc. 35-5). Its Owner's Manual provides the following safety warnings:
The recommended minimum rider age is 13 and older.
...
Always check and obey any local laws or regulations, which may affect the locations where the Pocket Mode may be used. Keep safely away from cars and motor vehicle traffic at all times, and only use where allowed and with caution.
...
Do not ride at night or when visibility is impaired.
(Doc. 35-1, p. 5) (emphasis in original). It also has two warning decals, two of which are relevant here: the first decal, located directly underneath the charging port and the on-off switch, states, "TRAFFIC CAN BE FATAL DO NOT RIDE ON STREETS OR AROUND CARS"; and the second decal, located on the front fairing cover, states, "Never use near motor vehicles." (Id. at pp. 7, 17, 20).
Additionally, the Scooter does not have a license plate issued by or a registration with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, and the Florida Highway Patrol's report of the collision ("Traffic Crash Report ") details the property damage to the Scooter in the "NON VEHICLE PROPERTY DAMAGE" section and describes the Deceased as a "Non Motorist." (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 18–19; Doc. 35-2, p. 3). By contrast, the Traffic Crash Report categorizes the Nissan Altima as a "VEHICLE" and Defendant Anna Spangler as a "Driver." (Doc. 35-2, pp. 1–2). Likewise, the Florida Highway Patrol Traffic Homicide Investigative Report identifies the Deceased as a "PEDESTRIAN" and Defendant Anna Spangler as "DRIVER." (Doc. 35-3, pp. 4–5).
Furthermore, the Court's conclusion is consistent with Carguillo . In that case, the insured's son died in a collision on a dirt bike trail with an uninsured Suzuki motorcycle that was designed for use mainly off public roads. Carguillo , 529 So. 2d at 277. The insurance policy provided that "An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle ... designed for use mainly off public roads except while on public roads." Id. The insurer denied UM coverage because the Suzuki was designed mainly for use off public roads and because the accident occurred off public roads. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court held that a vehicle designed primarily for off-road use can be excluded from UM coverage because it is not a "motor vehicle" within the definition of the Financial Responsibility Law. Id. at 278. In reaching this decision, the Carguillo court reasoned that the UM statute "provides an insured motorist with at least the same amount of protection as would have been provided if the tortfeasor had complied with the [Financial Responsibility Law]." Id. (citing FLA. STAT . § 627.727 ). Because the Suzuki was a primarily off-road vehicle operating off-road at the time of the accident, its exclusion from UM coverage did not violate Florida's established public policy of entitling an injured insured to the damages she would have been able to recover if the offending motorist had maintained a liability insurance policy:
In this case, the owner of the Suzuki motorcycle was not required to maintain liability insurance on the cycle because it is not a motor vehicle under
Section 324.021(1). Thus, the policy provision at hand does not reduce the UM coverage below the level of protection that would have been provided if the owner of the Suzuki had complied with the financial responsibility law. While an insurer may provide more coverage than is statutorily required, there is no requirement that an insured be protected to a greater extent than that statutorily mandated.
Id.
It is true that the Policy contains a provision identical to the one at issue in Carguillo : an "uninsured motor vehicle" does not include "a land motor vehicle designed for use primarily off public roads except while on public roads." (Doc. 1-1, pp. 24–25). And it is true that the Florida Supreme Court factored the location of the accident into its decision and that, unlike Carguillo , the collision at issue in this case occurred on U.S. Highway 1, a public road.
But Carguillo concerned a Suzuki motorcycle, not a Razor Scooter. And the question presented in that case is different from the one presented here. In Carguillo , the issue was whether an insurer could exclude an off-roading "land motor vehicle" designed primarily for off-road use from UM coverage under the Financial Responsibility Law. See id. at 277. In other words, is a "land motor vehicle" designed primarily for off-road use still a "motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law—and therefore an "uninsured motor vehicle" for UM purposes—when it is off-road? Carguillo ruled that a "land motor vehicle" designed primarily for off-road use is not a "motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law to the extent that it operates off-road. Conversely, Carguillo indicated that a "land motor vehicle" designed primarily for off-road use is a "motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law to the extent that it operates on a public road. In fact, Defendants recognize that Carguillo implied that the Suzuki would have been a "land motor vehicle" under the insurance policy "if the accident had occurred on a public roadway." (Doc. 27, p. 12).
Here, however, the issue is whether the Scooter is a "land motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law at all. Defendants put the cart before the horse—the Court must determine whether the Scooter "is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway" before it can consider where the collision occurred. The Policy's locational language dictates when a "land motor vehicle" designed primarily for off-road use is an "uninsured motor vehicle" for UM coverage, but it has no bearing on whether the Scooter is a "land motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law. For the reasons previously stated, the Court determines that the Scooter is not "designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway" under the Financial Responsibility Law. That is, the Scooter can never be driven on main thoroughfares. Therefore, it is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" qualified for UM coverage.
This determination comports with Florida's established public policy. In this case, the Deceased does not have an obligation to maintain liability insurance on the Scooter because it is not a "motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law. Accordingly, the Court's decision does not reduce UM coverage below the level of protection that would have been provided if the Deceased had complied with the Financial Responsibility Law. See id. at 278.
Finally, Defendants admit that the Scooter is not "street legal," but they note that the Scooter nonetheless was operating on a public road at the time of the collision. (Doc. 37, p. 14 n.9). Defendants also presume that there are "land motor vehicles," such as tractors and sand rail cars, "designed primarily for off-road use" that are "not ‘street legal’ but on occasion may operate on a public roadway." (Id. at pp. 14–15). First, the fact that the Scooter was operating on a public road at the time of the collision does not mean that it was designed for highway use or required to be licensed for highway use in accordance with the Financial Responsibility Law. Second, as previously stated, the Scooter is not a "land motor vehicle" designed primarily for off-road use—it is not a "land motor vehicle" at all. To the extent that tractors and sand rail cars satisfy the definition of "motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law, they are "land motor vehicles," just like the Suzuki in Carguillo . Third, street legality has nothing to do with the instant inquiry, which is whether the Scooter meets the definition of "motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law. For example, if an automobile drives on a highway without a valid license, then the automobile is still a "motor vehicle" under the Financial Responsibility Law, even if it is not "street legal."
Thus, the Court awards summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff because the Policy's plain language, read in light of Florida's Financial Responsibility Law, shows that the Scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" and, consequently, UM coverage is unavailable.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) is DENIED ;
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART ;
3. Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment that the instant 2015 Razor Pocket Mod electric scooter is not a "motor vehicle" and that the UM coverage section of the Policy applies to injuries caused by owners and operators of a "motor vehicle," as defined by the Policy, is DENIED ;
4. Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment that the instant 2015 Razor Pocket Mod electric scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle" and that UM coverage is unavailable is GRANTED ;
5. The Court hereby DECLARES that the instant 2015 Razor Pocket Mod electric scooter is not an "uninsured motor vehicle," and, therefore, UM coverage is unavailable; and
6. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants and to thereafter close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on May 20, 2021.