Opinion
No. 205260
March 3, 1999.
March 12, 1999 at 9:15 a.m.
Patrick, Johnson King, P.C. (by Patrick A. King and David G. Stobb), for the plaintiff.
James R. Stegman, P.C. (by James R. Stegman), for the defendant.
Before: NEFF, P.J., and KELLY and HOOD, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this insurance case. We reverse and remand.
I
This case stems from an accident which occurred when Ibrahim Mroue, while operating a rented truck, struck real and personal property owned by Mroue's business. The accident caused $61,879.81 worth of damage which plaintiff paid to Mroue. Upon payment, plaintiff became subrogated to the rights of Mroue against defendant, the insurer of the truck. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the automobile insurance policy the rental company had on the truck should provide indemnification to plaintiff for the amount it paid to Mroue for the damage to the real property.
Plaintiff also named Old Republic Minnehoma Insurance Company and Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. as defendants. Both were later dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition asserting that pursuant to § 3123(1)(b) of the No-Fault Act, MCL 500.3123(1)(b); MSA 24.13123(1)(b), Mroue was precluded from coverage because Mroue owned the property that was damaged, he was the named person under the property protection insurance coverage through defendant, and he was the operator of the vehicle which caused the damage. Defendant further argued that because Mroue could not recover from defendant, neither could plaintiff, as Mroue's subrogee.
In response, plaintiff argued that Mroue was not "named" in defendant's policy and that, therefore, the no-fault property protection benefits exclusion contained in § 3123(1)(b) did not apply. Plaintiff also argued that even if More was the named insured in defendant's policy, the statutory exclusion does not apply in a commercial setting.
At a hearing held on defendant's motion, the trial court found that Mroue was the named insured of the policy with defendant, and that § 3123 was not limited to situations involving residential property. The court concluded that because Mroue could not collect under defendant's no-fault insurance policy, plaintiff also could not collect. The court thus granted defendant's motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff now appeals.
II
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition. Hawkins v. Mercy Health Services, 230 Mich. App. 315, 324' 583 N.W.2d 725 (1998). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider all documentary evidence available to us in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party in order to determine whether there is a genuine issue with respect to any material fact. Id.
In the present case, plaintiff was Mroue's insurer and paid Mroue for the damage to his property. Plaintiff filed suit as subrogee of Mroue. As subrogee, plaintiff has no greater rights against defendant than Mroue. Commercial Union Ins Co v. Medical Protective Co, 426 Mich. 109, 117: 393 N.W.2d 479 (1986). Accordingly, we must determine Mroue's rights under the no-fault act.
A
A no-fault insurer is required to pay property protection insurance benefits for damage to tangible personal property. MCL 500.3121; MSA 24.13121; Heard v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 414 Mich. 139, 150; 324 N.W.2d 1 (1982). However, there are certain statutory exceptions to a no-fault insurer's liability to pay property protection benefits. Turner v. Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 28-29; 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995). At issue here is the second exception, which provides as follows:
(1) Damage to the following kinds of property is excluded from property protection insurance benefits:
* * * *
(b) Property owned by a person named in a property protection insurance policy, the person's spouse or a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the person named, the person's spouse, or the relative was the owner, registrant, or operator of a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose. [MCL 500.3123; MSA 24.13123.]
Plaintiff argues that § 3123(1)(b) does not preclude plaintiff from recovering no-fault property protection insurance benefits because Mroue was not a person named in defendant's policy. We agree.
B
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the purpose and intent of the Legislature. Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich. 201, 212; 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993). In ascertaining the purpose and intent of the Legislature, courts must first look to the language of the statute itself, because the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. Indenbaum v. Michigan Bd of Medicine, 213 Mich. App. 263, 270; 539 N.W.2d 574 (1995). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. Id.. In addition, the entire no-fault act "must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole." Michigan Mutual Ins Co v. Farm Bureau Ins Group, 183 Mich. App. 626, 632; 455 N.W.2d 352 (1990). Id.
In at least three previous cases, this Court has held that the phrase "the person named in the policy" is synonymous with the term "named insured." See Cvengros v. Farm Bureau Insurance, 216 Mich. App. 261; 548 N.W.2d 698 (1996), Transamerica Ins Corp of America v. Hastings Mutual Ins Co, 185 Mich. App. 249; 460 N.W.2d 291 (1990), and Dairyland Ins Co v. Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich. App. 675; 333 N.W.2d 322 (1983). We find that this interpretation of the phrase "person named in a policy" for purposes of MCL 500.3123(1)(b); MSA 24.13123(1)(b) will not conflict with other portions of the statute which contain the same phrase, and will be construed consistently throughout the act. See Michigan Mutual Ins Co, supra at 632; Wright, supra at 245.
C
Turning to the facts before us, we note that the rental agreement between Mroue and Andrew Chair Rental, the "dispatching dealer," designates Mroue as the driver. Defendant's addendum to Ryder's policy clearly indicates that Mroue was not a "named insured." To the contrary, the addendum clearly indicates that the renter, Mroue, rents from the named insured. Accordingly, we hold that Mroue was not a named insured and, as a result, he was not a "person named in the policy." Cvengros, supra, 216 Mich. App. 264; Transamerica Ins Corp of America, supra, 185 Mich. App. 254; Dairyland, supra, 123 Mich. App. 686. Because plaintiff is not precluded from recovery under § 3123(1)(b), the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary disposition.
III
Because of the disposition of this issue, it is unnecessary for this Court to address plaintiff's remaining issue.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.