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State ex Rel. v. Vogel

Supreme Court of Ohio
Jul 1, 1959
169 Ohio St. 368 (Ohio 1959)

Opinion

No. 35872

Decided July 1, 1959.

Municipal corporations — Money received from motor-vehicle fuel and license taxes — Purposes for which expended — Electricity for lighting urban portions of limited-access highways.

Lighting systems for urban portions of "limited access highways" (as defined in Section 5535.02, Revised Code) are appurtenances thereto; money received by municipalities from the state and derived from motor-vehicle fuel and license taxes may be used to maintain such systems; and the furnishing of electricity for their operation is an essential part of their maintenance.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County.

This is an action in mandamus which was instituted in the Court of Appeals for Summit County following the refusal of respondent, the Director of Finance of the city of Akron, to comply with the order of relator, the Director of Public Service of Akron, that respondent pay a bill forwarded to him by relator out of a fund kept and maintained by respondent, which fund is known as the "Highway Maintenance Fund" and in which is deposited all money received by the city of Akron from the state of Ohio as the city's share of the state motor-vehicle fuel and license taxes.

The bill forwarded is for electricity furnished by a private electric company during the month of April 1958 for the purpose of lighting that portion of a limited-access highway which is located within the city of Akron, is known as the Akron Expressway and was constructed by the state of Ohio, through its Director of Highways, with the consent and co-operation of the city of Akron and with the co-operation of the United States government. The control of the expressway has been surrendered by the state of Ohio to the city of Akron.

Respondent's demurrer admits the statement in relator's petition that he "refused and still continues to refuse to pay the said bill out of said fund on the sole ground that such payment is not specifically authorized by the terms of Sections 4501.04 (A), 5735.23 and 5735.25, Revised Code; that at all times the defendant [respondent] has had on hand in the said fund sufficient money to pay the said bill."

The Court of Appeals for Summit County overruled the demurrer and allowed a writ of mandamus ordering respondent to pay the account for expressway lighting service from funds in the Highway Maintenance Fund derived from the Ohio motor-vehicle fuel and license taxes and distributed to the city of Akron pursuant to Sections 4501.04 (A), 5735.23 and 5735.25 and related sections, Revised Code.

The cause is before this court on appeal as of right from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Mr. Harry N. Van Berg and Mr. John H. Zerbe, for appellee.

Mr. Rufus L. Thompson, for appellant.


The sole issue which is dispositive of this cause is whether money received by a municipal corporation from the state and derived from the state motor-vehicle fuel and license taxes may be used to pay for the lighting of urban portions of limited-access highways.

Section 5a, Article XII of the Constitution of Ohio, states:

"No moneys derived from fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways, or to fuels used for propelling such vehicles, shall be expended for other than * * * payment of highway obligations, costs for construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of public highways and bridges and other statutory highway purposes * * *." (Emphasis added.)

The sections of the Revised Code mentioned by the litigants herein deal with the disbursement and use to be made of revenues derived from the gasoline and license taxes, and all allow such money to be used to maintain public roads and highways, the phraseology of each being similar to that used in Section 5735.23, as follows:

"The amount received by each municipal corporation shall be used to construct, reconstruct, repave, widen, maintain, repair, clear and clean public highways, roads and streets * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Although the General Assembly has not specifically defined the term, "highway," for the purpose of the sections under consideration, it has so defined that term with respect to other provisions regarding highways which may be constructed and maintained with money from the fuel and license taxes.

Section 5501.01, Revised Code, reads as follows:

"`Road' or `highway,' when used in Chapters 5501, 5503, 5505, 5511, 5513, 5515, 5517, 5519, 5521, 5523, 5525, 5527, 5529, 5531 and 5533 of the Revised Code includes bridges, viaducts, grade separations, appurtenances, and approaches on or to such road or highway." (Emphasis added.)

The chapters of the Revised Code to which the definition is specifically made applicable are entitled, "Department of Highways" (5501), "State Highway Patrol" (5503), "[State Highway Patrol] Pension Fund" (5505), "State Highway System" (5511), "Materials — Purchase; Sale; Exchange" (5513), "State Highways — Use; Obstruction" (5515), "Proposed Projects — Maintenance; Repair" (5517), "Appropriation of Property" (5519), "Municipal and County Co-operation" (5521), "Grade Crossings" (5523), "Construction Contracts" (5525), "State Highway Construction Fund" (5527), "Roadside Improvements" (5529), "Federal Co-operation" (5531), and "Memorial Highways" (5533).

Although the chapters to which the above definition is made specifically applicable do not include Chapter 5535, entitled "Types of Highways," a "limited access highway" is defined therein (Section 5535.02) as follows:

" A limited access highway' or `freeway' is a road, highway, or street, especially designed for through traffic, over which abutters have no easement or right of access by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such highway. Access may be allowed only at highway intersections designated by the Director of Highways, Board of County Commissioners, or municipal authorities on roads within their jurisdiction, so as to eliminate cross traffic of vehicles." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, since the money with which we are concerned may be used for "maintenance * * * of public highways" (Section 5a, Article XII of the Constitution, Section 5735.23, supra, and Section 5527.02, Revised Code), such highways are built generally pursuant to the provisions of the chapters mentioned in the quoted definition thereof (Section 5501.01, supra), and a "limited access highway" is but a public road or "highway * * * especially designed for through traffic," it follows that "limited access highways" are "highways" such as are defined in Section 5501.01 and are maintainable as such. Included in the definition of "highway" is the term, "appurtenances," and we conclude that "appurtenances" to "limited access highways" may be maintained with the funds in question, just as are appurtenances to other types of "highways."

We must now consider whether a lighting system for the urban portion of a limited-access highway, which, as admitted by a demurrer, may not be used by pedestrians or bicycle riders and may be used only by the operators of motor vehicles, is an "appurtenance" to a "public highway."

The only possible justification for the "limited access" features of modern highways (including the urban portions thereof) is to allow vehicular traffic to consistently maintain a fairly high rate of speed, with the dangers attendant to the entrance onto and exit from such highways of other traffic reduced to a minimum, that is, to make possible their handling of a greater volume of traffic with more safety. It is for safety reasons generally that the "road" or "highway" of today may include such features as banked curves, lines permitting or forbidding passing, lines marking the center and edges of the road, mowed and shrubbed parkways between opposing traffic lanes, lights, which are not "traffic lights or signals," at particularly dangerous intersections, and many other incidental and appurtenant features which contribute to safety in the operation of motor vehicles on such highways.

Without belaboring the point further, it seems clear to this court that, when the purpose of the "limited access highway" is considered together with the fact of the increased congestion which occurs on the urban portions thereof, the conclusion is inescapable that, as a further safety factor, lighting systems for such urban portions are appurtenances thereto and a part of such highways and for that reason are maintainable with funds derived from the fuel and license taxes.

The Court of Appeals considered whether "maintaining" such a lighting system includes the furnishing of electricity to activate it, and we are in wholehearted accord with its finding that it does. It is self-evident to this court that it is the light actually dispersed by such a lighting system which justifies its existence, rather than the mere presence of instrumentalities whereby such light may be dispersed. To maintain a lighting system in the furtherance of the safe movement of motor-vehicle traffic at night obviously means to maintain the flow of electricity which activates the instrumentalities of dispersal: and to allow usage of fuel and license tax money therefor in situations such as that under consideration is in the furtherance of one of the statutory purpose for the fuel tax set out in Section 5735.05, Revised Code, i.e., "to distribute equitably among those persons using the privilege of driving motor vehicles upon such highways and streets the cost of maintaining and repairing the same."

It is to be noted that the street lighting considered here is not to be compared or confused in any manner with the lighting by a municipality of its streets as contemplated by Section 727.07, Revised Code. The lighting contemplated there is primarily designated for the benefit of pedestrians and abutting or adjacent real property, as evidenced by the source of funds to provide therefor set out in Section 727.01, and has nothing whatever to do with the lighting of urban portions of "limited access highways" which are "especially designed for through traffic."

As the findings we have made herein preclude any further hesitation on the part of respondent to comply with the demand of relator that repsondent pay the bill in question out of the "Highway Maintenance Fund," the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, TAFT, BELL and HERBERT, JJ., concur.

PECK, J., not participating.


Summaries of

State ex Rel. v. Vogel

Supreme Court of Ohio
Jul 1, 1959
169 Ohio St. 368 (Ohio 1959)
Case details for

State ex Rel. v. Vogel

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE, EX REL. WALTER, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SERVICE, APPELLEE v. VOGEL…

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Jul 1, 1959

Citations

169 Ohio St. 368 (Ohio 1959)
159 N.E.2d 892

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