Opinion
No. 944, Civil Action, 1954.
March 23, 1955.
LAYTON, J., sitting.
John T. Gallagher for Plaintiff.
Stephen E. Hamilton, Jr., for Defendant.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Granted.
Plaintiff, Rockey, instituted a damage action against Norman B. Stapleford in the Magistrate's Court of the Honorable Samuel J. Hatton. Service was made upon Stapleford by leaving a copy of the summons at his usual place of abode in the presence of a white adult person.
In accordance with the provisions of 10 Del. C. § 9542.
Stapleford did not appear and a default judgment against him was entered on August 6, 1954. On September 8, Stapleford's attorney moved to reopen the judgment, and on October 21, 1954, Magistrate Hatton granted the motion and vacated the judgment.
Stapleford had been in Florida. In fact, he claims to have been a Florida resident but I decline to examine into a purported defense so wholly collateral to this proceeding.
Plaintiff-relator brings mandamus to compel the Magistrate to restore the status quo of the judgment.
In the following jurisdictions, Appellate Courts have held that a magistrate has no power to reopen or vacate a default judgment rendered by him after the expiration of the period of time within which motions to reopen or vacate are permitted by statute. Jeffries v. Newblock, 56 Okl. 320, 155 P. 1150; State ex rel. Surgeon v. Jones, 106 W. Va. 561, 146 S.E. 372; Pratt v. Roberts, 53 Me. 399, and Hunt v. Kennedy Coal Corp., 140 Va. 17, 124 S.E. 189. In each of the jurisdictions above mentioned, Magistrates' Courts are established by Constitution.
Pratt v. Roberts, just mentioned, is precise authority for the proposition that a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy in a case such as this.
In behalf of the defendant, Magistrate, it is argued that he has inherent power over his own judgments, and, within the limits of sound discretion, the power to reopen or vacate a default judgment such as this. This argument is predicated upon the claim that, in Delaware, Magistrates' Courts are Constitutional Courts and Courts of general jurisdiction. To the contrary, while Article IV, § I of the Del. C. Ann. Constitution of of the State establishes Magistrates' Courts, yet the powers and jurisdiction of such Courts are wholly statutory. Moreover, I find no authority for the claim that, in this State, Magistrates' Courts are Courts of general jurisdiction. To the contrary, Townsend v. Harmon, 5 W.W. Harr. 562, 171 A. 178, classifies them as courts of limited jurisdiction, and Farrell v. Maryland Credit Finance Corporation, 2 W.W. Harr. 569, 127 A. 879, and Howell v. Eastburn, 9 W.W. Harr. 588, 2 A.2d 899, refer to the jurisdiction of such Courts as entirely statutory.
It is my view of the law that in this State, the Magistrates' Courts, while created by Constitution, nevertheless are restricted in their jurisdiction. Accordingly, a Magistrate has no powers other than those conferred on him by statute and no power to vacate a default judgment after the expiration of the 15 days period prescribed by 10 Del. C. § 9542.
The writ of mandamus will issue as prayed.