Opinion
No. 1 CA-SA 13-0083
05-07-2013
STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. WILLIAM G. MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE JEANNE GARCIA, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, JOSEPH MATTHEW BENNETT, Real Party in Interest.
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney by Arthur Hazelton, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Petitioner Tamika Cheatham Attorney for Real Party in Interest
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication -
Rule 111, Rules of the
Arizona Supreme Court)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CR 2011-157395-001
The Honorable Jeanne Garcia, Judge
JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney
by Arthur Hazelton, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Petitioner
Phoenix Tamika Cheatham
Attorney for Real Party in Interest
Phoenix HALL, Judge ¶1 The State seeks special action relief from the superior court's order granting Real Party in Interest Joseph Matthew Bennett's (defendant) motion in limine to preclude evidence regarding a previous charge of which he was acquitted. Because we conclude the evidence is not barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 On November 16, 2011, defendant was charged by indictment with one count of burglary in the second degree, a class three felony, one count of attempt to commit trafficking in stolen property in the second degree, a class four felony, and one count of theft, a class two felony. Defendant's co-defendant on the burglary charge, William Chappell, pled guilty to theft pursuant to a plea agreement and, as part of his plea, agreed to testify on behalf of the State at defendant's trial. ¶3 At trial, Chappell testified that, on November 7, 2011, he and defendant parked a truck in an alley behind the victims' home and broke into the victims' house through a rear bedroom window. Chappell and defendant then grabbed some empty suitcases and filled them with valuables, including jewelry, electronics, and firearms. When the men finished gathering the victims' property, they moved the bags and suitcases over the fence and left in the truck. ¶4 Upon leaving the victims' residence, Chappell and defendant picked up two of defendant's friends and drove to a motel to sort through the stolen property and determine how it could be sold. After helping sort the property for a few hours, Chappell left the motel and contacted the police to report the burglary because he felt "awful" about what he had done. Chappell informed the police that he and defendant burglarized the victims' home. ¶5 Following Chappell's confession, police officers descended upon the motel and found electronics, jewelry, and other property belonging to the victims in Room 220. While the officers secured Room 220 and took the man and woman occupying the room into custody, defendant "nervous[ly]" emerged from Room 219 and peered into Room 220. Officer John Santiago instructed defendant to return to his room, which he did. After securing Room 220, Officer Santiago went to a patrol vehicle to view defendant's driver license photograph, because he had not been found in Room 220 as reported by Chappell. Upon viewing the photograph, Officer Santiago immediately recognized defendant as the peering Room 219 occupant and the officer returned to Room 219 and placed defendant under arrest. The woman occupying Room 219 informed the officer that defendant had attempted to sell her jewelry. ¶6 After the case was submitted to the jury, defendant moved for a mistrial based on the State's failure to disclose that one of the State's witnesses had a prior felony conviction. The superior court deferred ruling on defendant's motion until after the jury returned its verdicts. The jury found defendant not guilty of burglary and guilty of both attempt to traffic in stolen property and theft. The superior court accepted the jury's verdicts and granted defendant's motion for mistrial as to the trafficking and theft counts. ¶7 On the first day of the subsequent jury trial, the parties discussed with the court the joint statement of the case that would be presented to the jury. Defense counsel requested that all language relating to the burglary be removed from the statement. The prosecutor objected to removing the burglary references, arguing that they were necessary to "tell[] them the story." The prosecutor also argued that, because he was not going to argue that the defendant "unlawfully entered without the permission of the victim," he could present evidence that the defendant stole property inside the victims' home, notwithstanding the burglary acquittal in the previous trial. ¶8 The next day, defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from introducing evidence inculpating defendant of stealing property from within the victims' home. After hearing argument on the motion, the superior court took the matter under advisement. The following day, the court entered its ruling granting defendant's motion to preclude all evidence that he unlawfully entered the victims' home or stole property from within the victims' home. The superior court stated, in relevant part:
[C]ollateral estoppel principles apply here, as the jury in the first trial heard direct evidence of [defendant] being on the residence; that's an element of burglary and that issue - any evidence that [defendant] was on the residential property is precluded.¶9 The State then filed this special action challenging the superior court's order and requesting a stay of the jury trial. We granted the State's stay request. We accept jurisdiction of this special action because the State has no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a).
Fair game is any evidence that he was in a truck with the stolen property and at the hotel with the stolen property.
DISCUSSION
¶10 The State contends that the superior court erred by excluding evidence that defendant stole property from within the victims' home. Although we generally review a superior court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, we review de novo whether the collateral estoppel doctrine bars the admission of evidence. State v. Bartolini, 214 Ariz. 561, 564, ¶ 10, 155 P.3d 1085, 1088 (App. 2007). ¶11 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment "embodies two vitally important interests." Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 117 (2009). The first interest "is the deeply ingrained principle that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense[.]" Id. (internal quotations omitted). "This first interest protects against 'prosecutorial overreaching' through successive prosecutions." Joya v. United States, 53 A.3d 309, 315 (D.C. 2012). "The second interest is the preservation of the finality of judgments." Yeager, 577 U.S. at 118 (internal quotation omitted). "That is, the Double Jeopardy Clause forecloses 'relitigati[on] [of] any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior trial.'" Joya, 53 A.3d at 315 (quoting Yeager, 557 U.S. at 119). Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, "an issue of ultimate fact" that has "been determined by a valid and final judgment . . . cannot again be litigated between the same parties." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). ¶12 When collateral estoppel is asserted, the burden is on the "defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding." Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990). "Unless the record of the prior proceeding affirmatively demonstrate[s] that an issue involved in the second trial was definitely determined in the former trial, the possibility that it may have been does not prevent relitigation of that issue." Joya, 53 A.3d at 316 (internal quotation omitted). "To decipher what a jury has necessarily decided, we [] examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." Yeager, 557 at 119-20 (internal quotations omitted). ¶13 The collateral estoppel doctrine "is not favored and is applied sparingly" in criminal cases. State v. Rodriguez, 198 Ariz. 139, 141, ¶ 6, 7 P.3d 148, 150 (App. 2000). "[R]elevant and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence" is not rendered inadmissible "simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted." Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348. ¶14 In this case, during the State's closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor informed the jurors that there was no factual dispute that the victims' home was burglarized and their property stolen. Accordingly, the prosecutor repeatedly presented the jury with "only [] one issue" to determine, whether defendant "was a participant in th[o]se crimes." For purposes of our analysis, we therefore assume that defendant's acquittal on the burglary charge established that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether he was present when the victims' home was burglarized and their property stolen. ¶15 Collateral estoppel does not preclude the admission of evidence of the burglary in the second trial, however, because the State does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully in or on" the victims' home "with the intent to commit any theft or felony therein." Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 13-1507(A) (2010). Rather, on the remaining counts, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant controlled the victims' property with the intent to deprive them of that property (theft - A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1) (2010)) and that he recklessly attempted to traffic the victims' stolen property (trafficking - A.R.S. § 13-2307(A) (2010)). Thus, the prior burglary acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case. ¶16 This conclusion is consistent with our ruling in Bartolini, in which the defendant was acquitted of per se driving under the influence (.08 or higher) and convicted of driving while impaired at the first trial, and therefore only tried for driving while impaired at the second trial following the superior court's grant of her motion for new trial. We held that the evidence that the defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was .08 or higher was admissible at the second trial, notwithstanding that the defendant had been acquitted of driving with a BAC .08 or higher. 214 Ariz. at 564, ¶ 9, 155 P.3d at 1088. "[B]ecause the issue of impairment is not the same as the issue of per se DUI," we reasoned the defendant's prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the second trial. Id. ¶17Furthermore, as explained by the United States Supreme Court in Dowling, "an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof." 493 U.S. at 349. Here, evidence of the burglary is relevant and probative "if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor," and such evidence is not rendered inadmissible "simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for which [] defendant has been acquitted." Id. at 348. Therefore, the superior court erred by ruling that the State was collaterally stopped from introducing any evidence relating to the burglary.
CONCLUSION
¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we grant relief and vacate the superior court's decision precluding the State from introducing evidence of the burglary at trial. The stay previously issued in this matter is vacated.
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PHILIP HALL, Judge
CONCURRING: ________________________
MARGARET H. DOWNIE, Presiding Judge
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MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge