Opinion
No. 87-1990
Submitted September 20, 1988 —
Decided November 23, 1988.
Workers' compensation — Denial of temporary total disability compensation — Order of commission remanded for clarification and statement of specific basis for its decision.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 86AP-584.
On June 19, 1980, appellant, Sina Ingold, was injured during the course of and arising out of her employment with appellee, Ormet Corporation (hereinafter "Ormet"). Appellant's claim for compensation was allowed for "[c]ontusion — low back and buttocks." She began to receive temporary total disability compensation on June 27, 1980.
On January 29, 1982, Ormet filed a motion to terminate appellant's entitlement to temporary total disability compensation. Following the original hearing on the motion and subsequent administrative appeals it was finally determined by appellee Industrial Commission (hereinafter "the commission") that temporary total disability compensation be paid through October 9, 1982, and no further. This order, written by two staff hearing officers of the commission, also referred the file for an examination of appellant by a medical specialist on the issue of temporary total disability compensation.
On November 15, 1982, Dr. Edgar L. Barrett, appellant's treating physician, reached the conclusion that: "Her diagnosis is lumbosacral disc disease and chronic low back strain. I would judge that she has a twenty percent permanent partial disability rating." Appellant underwent numerous medical exams on the commission's behalf. On July 6, 1983, she was examined by Dr. Timothy J. Fallon, who stated the following in his report:
"Based then on my examination it would be my feeling that she is not under a TTI [temporary total impairment]. I do think she could return to her work without any restrictions. Any impairment that she has is of a permanent nature at this point and [ sic] time and would be established to be some 5%."
On September 1, 1983, Dr. Richard S. Glass examined appellant and addressed thermographic discrepancies between the right and left leg.
On September 2, 1983, a district hearing officer denied temporary total disability compensation from October 10, 1982 through September 2, 1983, based on the reports of Dr. Barrett, Dr. Fallon and Dr. Glass. Temporary partial compensation was ordered to be paid at twenty percent medical impairment for that same time period. That order was affirmed by the regional board of review on November 17, 1983. Additionally, the claim was referred to the district hearing officer for hearing on the extent of disability "after CAT Scan results are filed." On January 11, 1984, a CAT scan report by Dr. Ronald Stupar found appellant's "lumbar spine" to be within normal limits.
On February 16, 1984, appellant was examined by Dr. Chengappa, Ormet's plant physician, who found that, "[s]ince this patient has continued to have symptoms even at present, I feel she is not ready to return to work at this time." Subsequently, Dr. Barrett issued a "To whom it may concern" letter which consisted of a one-paragraph statement as follows:
"The above-named patient was last seen by me on 2/29/84. Her general condition was stationary. She had not yet had any phsiotherpay [ sic] which I do feel that she requires, prior to returning to work. She has not been released to return to work as yet and a return to work date will be assessed after a course of physiotherapy."
On March 21, 1984, appellant filed a motion requesting temporary total disability compensation based on the report of Dr. Chengappa and a note dictated by Dr. Barrett. She was then examined by commission doctor William Stewart who found appellant temporarily unable to return to her previous type of employment.
On July 5, 1984, a district hearing officer denied appellant's motion for temporary total disability compensation, stating:
"No temporary total compensation payable at this time. Per Regional Board order dated 11/17/83 regarding the issue of Extent of Disability, it is the finding of this District Hearing Officer that claimant's Cat Scan is normal per Dr. Barrett's report. Therefore, no temporary total compensation payable."
This order was modified on appeal to the regional board of review, which extended temporary partial compensation to August 30, 1984. The denial of temporary total disability compensation was not disturbed. On further appeal, the commission's staff hearing officers extended the partial compensation to January 28, 1985. The staff hearing officers also referred the appellant for another medical examination with a hearing before a district hearing officer to follow the question of further compensation. In all other respects, the decision of the regional board of review was affirmed.
Appellant was then examined by Dr. Robert Caveney at the request of the commission. In a detailed report, he found that appellant had reached maximum improvement and was capable of returning to her former position of employment. On August 2, 1985, the district hearing officer found that appellant was not temporarily and totally disabled. This finding was based primarily on the report of Dr. Caveney. That order was affirmed throughout the administrative appeal process.
On June 18, 1986, appellant filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals seeking a writ to compel the commission to pay temporary total disability compensation for the period from February 16, 1984 through August 2, 1985. The referee to whom the matter was assigned concluded that there was "some evidence" to support the finding of the commission and recommended that the writ be denied. The court of appeals adopted the report of the referee and denied the writ.
Appellant refers to these dates because February 16, 1984 was the date that Dr. Chengappa determined that she was not ready to return to work and August 2, 1985 is the date that the district hearing officer determined that she was not temporarily and totally disabled. Appellant does not dispute that determination.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Larrimer Larrimer and Craig Aalyson, for appellant.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour Pease, Russell P. Herrold, Jr. and Anne C. Griffin, for appellee Ormet Corporation.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Merl H. Wayman, for appellee Industrial Commission.
The primary issue presented in this action is whether the commission abused its discretion in affirming the district hearing officer's decision to deny appellant temporary total disability compensation for the time period in question. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand this action to the commission for clarification.
Appellant contends that the standard of review to be employed by a reviewing court in determining whether the commission abused its discretion should be whether there is some reliable, substantial and probative evidence to support the commission's finding to the extent that reasonable minds could come to different conclusions upon the evidence submitted. We decline to adopt this standard. It is well-established that "[o]ur review is limited to a determination of whether there is some evidence to support the decision of the commission." State, ex rel. Frigidaire Division, General Motors Corp., v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 105, 106, 518 N.E.2d 1194, 1196.
We have formulated this standard of review by recognizing that "* * * [t]he determination of disputed facts and the weighing of evidence are exclusively within the jurisdiction and authority of the Industrial Commission." (Citations omitted.) Id. We have also concluded that "* * * this court will not search the record for some evidence to support a decision by the commission. * * * Thus, we are limited to searching the face of the commission's order for some evidence to support its decision" Id. at 106-107, 518 N.E.2d at 1196.
As we begin our analysis of the cause sub judice, it is important to note that appellant does not dispute the district hearing officer's decision of August 2, 1985, which found that appellant was not temporarily and totally disabled. Appellant seeks payment of temporary total disability compensation for the period from February 16, 1984 through August 2, 1985.
Thus, the relevant decision to be considered in our review is the district hearing officer's order of July 5, 1984, which denied appellant's motion for temporary total disability compensation. This determinative order was not disturbed throughout the administrative appeal process, although some modification was made with regard to an award of temporary partial compensation.
Again, the relevant portion of the order of July 5, 1984, states:
"No temporary total compensation payable at this time. Per Regional Board order dated 11/17/83 regarding the issue of Extent of Disability, it is the finding of this District Hearing Officer that claimant's Cat Scan is normal per Dr. Barrett's report. Therefore, no temporary total compensation payable."
No further explanation is given in the district hearing officer's order. Likewise, there is no mention of this issue in the subsequent decisions of the regional board or the commission.
In paragraph one of the syllabus of State, ex rel. Frigidaire Division, supra, we followed State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 6 OBR 531, 453 N.E.2d 721, and held:
"An order of the Industrial Commission must briefly explain the reasoning of the commission in granting or denying the benefits requested by the claimant, and must specifically state which evidence, in particular, the commission relied upon in reaching its decision."
The district hearing officer's order of July 5, 1984 simply states that no temporary total compensation is payable. It does not specifically state that appellant was not temporarily and totally disabled. Moreover, it does not specifically state why temporary total disability compensation is not payable. It merely refers to the regional board's order of November 17, 1983 and the fact that appellant's CAT scan was normal "per Dr. Barrett's report."
In their attempt to persuade this court whether "some evidence" exists or not, the parties deal at length with the report of Dr. Fallon dated July 6, 1983. That report was referred to in the order of September 2, 1983, which found that appellant was not temporarily and totally disabled. Such order was subsequently affirmed by the regional board in its order of November 17, 1983. However, Dr. Fallon's report is not cited by the district hearing officer in the order of July 5, 1984. The "normal" CAT scan was all that was referred to in the district hearing officer's determination that no temporary total disability compensation was payable. Considered alone, a normal CAT scan reading is far from determinative as to whether a claimant is temporarily and totally disabled.
However, it is arguable that the district hearing officer's reference to the regional board's order of November 17, 1983, bears some significance. Nevertheless, if the district hearing officer and the commission had actually meant to rely on such earlier findings and medical reports to reach a conclusion that appellant was not temporarily and totally disabled, then they should have so stated. This court will not search the record to "piece together" various findings of the commission in order to find support for an order that lacks specificity.
"An order of the Industrial Commission which is not sufficiently specific for the Supreme Court to review without searching the record will be remanded to the commission for clarification." State, ex rel. Frigidaire Division, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. We find that clarification of this order is necessary in order for us to determine whether the commission abused its discretion. See State, ex rel. Mitchell, supra.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to the commission for an amended order stating the specific basis for its decision.
We also reiterate our view that parties may request that a limited writ of mandamus be issued compelling the commission to conform its order to the requirements of State, ex rel. Mitchell, supra. See State, ex rel. Frigidaire Division, supra, at 108, 518 N.E.2d at 1197, fn. 5.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
H. BROWN, J., not participating.