Opinion
Nos. 89-14154-PR, 89-14162-PR, and 89-12542-PR.
Decided July 17, 1991.
Lee Fisher, Attorney General, Nancy J. Miller, Deputy Chief Counsel, Andrew I. Sutter, Cherry L. Poteet and Nancy Johnston, Assistant Attorneys General, for plaintiffs.
Carlile, Patchen Murphy, Denis J. Murphy, Dennis J. Concilla and Hakim B. Adjoua; R. Douglas Wrightsel and John P. Gartland; and Tom Wilson, for defendant Tele-Communications, Inc.
Tom Wilson, for defendant John W. McGill.
Robert E. Wilson, for defendant Larry J. Brown in case Nos. 89-14154-PR and 89-12542-PR.
Robert L. Washburn, for defendant Scott Binder.
Harry W. Schmuck, for defendant Donald McConnell in case No. 89-12542-PR.
William McGinty, for defendant Thomas J. Smith in case No. 89-14162-PR.
John Gartland, for defendant Ronald Nabakowski in case No. 89-14162-PR.
Robert McEaneney, defendant, pro se.
On February 15, 1991, defendants, Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI") and its president, John W. McGill, filed a motion for summary judgment in this cause.
Civ.R. 56(C) sets forth that:
"* * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. * * *" See, also, Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 66 O.O.2d 311, 309 N.E.2d 924; Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267.
This rule of civil procedure was intended for the promotion of judicial economy through elimination of needless trials in circumstances where there are no genuine issues of material fact. As implied by the rule, the conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact is presented for consideration follows from the determination, based upon a review of the limited materials which Civ.R. 56(C) permits to be considered, that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion. Although the non-moving party is entitled to have the submitted materials construed in whatever light most favors him, nevertheless, he cannot merely rest upon the pleadings when the motion has been made, but must endeavor to demonstrate to the court that genuine issues for trial truly exist. Rayburn v. J.C. Penney Outlet Store (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 463, 3 OBR 544, 445 N.E.2d 1167; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 8 O.O.3d 73, 375 N.E.2d 46.
Ordinarily, the language of this rule presents a high threshold for the movant to overcome. Whenever it would appear from the admissible materials that there exist conflicting accounts of those facts necessary for resolution of the action, or an issue therein, then the determination will hinge upon the credibility and weight of the evidence. Of necessity, such evaluations can occur only in the context of trial on the merits of the controversy. Consequently, a motion for summary judgment is granted with trepidation where the core disputes are factual ones. On the other hand, the granting of such motion is less difficult when the underlying issue is purely a legal one.
Having carefully scrutinized the materials submitted by the parties in light of the foregoing standard and, based upon the reasoning and law set forth in this court's decision in case No. 89-08219-PR (1990), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 405, 601 N.E.2d 234, incorporated herein by reference, it is concluded that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on their counterclaim. Accordingly, partial summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as to the following issues:
1. As a matter of law and fact, the agreements at issue are leases, and title to the equipment at issue yet resides in defendant TCI;
2. There was no rate of interest and consequently usury does not lie;
3. The leases do not violate Section 22, Article II of the Ohio Constitution or R.C. 131.33.
Summary judgment is hereby DENIED as to the remaining issues.
So ordered.
RUSSELL LEACH, J., retired, of the Franklin County Municipal Court, sitting by assignment.