Opinion
No. 89-588
Submitted June 5, 1990 —
Decided September 12, 1990.
Constitutional law — Thirteenth Amendment — Involuntary servitude — Prohibition — Writ granted to prohibit court from requiring indigent defendants to work a certain number of hours for the county to pay for the cost of appointed counsel, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Crawford County, No. 3-88-20.
Appellee, Joseph Carriger, was charged with an offense in the Crawford County Municipal Court. He requested and was assigned appointed counsel. Appellant, Judge John F. Bender, required defendants for whom counsel were appointed to work a certain number of hours for the county to pay for the cost of appointed counsel. Appellee's appointed counsel requested the judge to cease this practice, but the judge refused. Appellee then filed an action for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. That court found the practice unconstitutional and issued the writ.
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Thomas G. Nicholson, for appellee.
Russell B. Wiseman, prosecuting attorney, for appellants.
We agree with and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
For a writ of prohibition to issue the relator must establish that (1) the court or officer against whom the writ is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial authority, (2) the authority is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State, ex rel. Tollis, v. Court of Appeals (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 145, 147, 532 N.E.2d 727, 729.
First, we find that appellant was about to exercise judicial authority. No statute or rule of court authorized the judge to require indigent criminal defendants to work to pay for their appointed counsel. Therefore, appellant must have assumed that the practice was grounded in judicial authority. He argued in the court of appeals that appeal of a contempt citation would be an adequate legal remedy. Contempt infers judicial authority.
Second, we find that there is no inherent judicial authority that validates the practice. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld recoupment of appointed-counsel fees from convicted defendants if they were afforded the same rights available to other judgment debtors. Fuller v. Oregon (1974), 417 U.S. 40. However, appellee was not convicted at the time he was ordered to perform labor. Moreover, Fuller did not apply to involuntary labor.
The Thirteen Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 6, Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibit involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime. However, appellant's practice of requiring labor to pay for appointed counsel was not invoked as punishment. We note that the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has declared that the Thirteenth Amendment bars imposing such involuntary labor even for convicted defendants because it constitutes involuntary servitude for purposes other than punishment. Opinion of the Justices (1981), 121 N.H. 531, 431 A.2d 144. We concur in this opinion. Requiring indigent defendants to work for government to pay for appointed counsel constitutes involuntary servitude for a debt, not punishment for crime. See United States v. Reynolds (1914), 235 U.S. 133.
Third, we find that appellee has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Although we have held that appeal of a contempt citation is an adequate legal remedy, Manrow v. Court of Common Pleas of Lucas Cty. (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 37, 20 OBR 285, 485 N.E.2d 713, we hold that this decision does not apply here because appellant is "without jurisdiction whatsoever" to require involuntary servitude as payment for appointed counsel. This makes the adequacy of appeal irrelevant. See State, ex rel. Adams, v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 59 O.O. 2d 387, 285 N.E.2d 22.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.