Opinion
HHDCV176078496S
10-12-2018
State of Connecticut, COMMISSIONER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES v. Erin M. MULCAHY, Administratrix of the Estate of Michael J. Hughes
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
CESAR A. NOBLE, JUDGE.
The submittal of this case on facts to which the parties have stipulated requires the court to decide whether a waiver of a state lien against the estate of a decedent remains valid even when the assets of the estate are found to be greater than that contemplated at the time of waiver. Controlling case law compels the conclusion that the waiver remains effective to bar the enforcement of the right and judgment therefore enters in favor of the defendant.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this decision. The plaintiff, the Commissioner of Administrative Services of the State of Connecticut (DAS) brought the present two-count complaint against Erin M. Mulcahy, Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Hughes, pursuant to General Statutes § § 17b-95 to recover medical assistant payments made to Michael Hughes (Hughes) in the amount of $22,776.36 (first count) and pursuant to General Statutes § § 18-85a and 18-85c (second count) for costs of incarceration in the amount of $24,521.00 (second count). In her answer to the complaint the defendant raised waiver as a special defense.
In her individual capacity Erin Mulcahy will be referred to as "Mulcahy." In her capacity as administratrix she will be referred to as the "defendant."
Section 17b-95 provides in pertinent part that "upon the death of any person who has at any time been a beneficiary of aid under the state ... medical assistance program ... the state shall have a claim against such ... person’s estate for all amounts paid on behalf ... such person ..."
Section 18-85a provides in pertinent part that the "state shall have a claim against each inmate for the costs of such inmate’s incarceration ... for which the state has not been reimbursed."
Section 18-85c provides the state with a claim against the estate of any person obligated to pay for incarcerations costs pursuant to § 18-85a.
The defendant originally filed five special defenses as to the first count and three special defenses as to the second count. The defendant withdrew all but two defenses as to each count. The remaining counts were waiver and a claim that the action is barred because the commissioner failed to commence suit within the time limitations imposed by General Statutes § § 45a-363 and 45a-364. Because the court finds that the commissioner waived the state’s lien it does not address the limitations defense.
The parties thereafter agreed to submit their claims to the court on the following facts as agreed to by stipulation. On January 8, 2002, Hughes entered into a "Stipulation" to resolve a workers’ compensation claim which resulted in the execution of an annuity contract that named him as the annuitant. The annuity provided that Hughes was to receive monthly payments of $482.46 for life with 360 months guaranteed. At various times between February 24, 2004 and January 27, 2015 DAS provided public assistance to Hughes the form of medical assistance payments in the amount of $22,776.35. Hughes was incarcerated intermittently between October 15, 2003 and September 11, 2010 with associated costs in the amount of $24,521. These amounts have not been reimbursed.
Hughes died on November 30, 2014. On or about December 23, 2014 an Affidavit in Lieu of Probate was filed with the Saybrook Probate District by Mulcahy who identified assets of the estate, largely consisting of two vehicles and a mobile home, which were valued at $21,840. The expenses and claims against the estate, not including administration expenses, were in the amount of $13,065.90. DAS stated at oral argument that it "waived its claim to the decedent’s estate" based on the small nature of its assets. DAS’ brief provides that "[i]n light of both the nature and value of the assets, and in reliance on the representations contained in the Affidavit, DAS did in fact waive its claim based on the assets as listed on the Affidavit in Lieu of Administration." DAS’ Memorandum of Law, April 27, 2018, Entry No. 116, pp. 3-4. The Affidavit in Lieu of Probate and Will/Administration bears a DAS stamped waiver which provides "DAS Waives Estate" that is duly signed and dated January 19, 2015.
General Statutes § 45a-2736 permits the settlement of estates that, inter alia, are valued at less than forty thousand dollars, through the mechanism of an Affidavit in Lieu of Probate, in place of a petition for admission of a will to probate or letters of administration.
Thereafter, the defendant learned that Hughes was the beneficiary of the annuity contract. On June 15, 2015 she filed a Petition of Administration of Hughes’ estate which listed the annuity as assets of the estate. The value of the annuity precluded the use of the Affidavit in Lieu of Probate. On September 8, 2015, within the time permitted by law for the presentation of claims against the Estate of Michael Hughes, DAS presented claims pursuant to § § 17b-95, 18-85a and 18-85c for its medical assistance payments and incarcerations costs. The estate and the DAS exchanged letters on May 13, 2016, June 30, 2016 and May 10, 2017. The court finds that the correspondence of May 10, 2017 from the estate to DAS was, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-360, the date of rejection by the estate of DAS’ claims. The present action was commenced on May 17, 2017.
Section 45a-363 prohibits the commencement of suit against an estate until a claim has been rejected and mandates commencement of suit within varying enumerated time frames.
The defendant seeks to bar the enforcement by DAS of both statutory claims by the application of the doctrine of waiver. DAS objects on the grounds that its "January 2015 waiver was based on the erroneous information reported in the superceded Affidavit in Lieu of Administration, i.e., that the estate included only aged used vehicles and tools with a total estimated value of $21,840.00 ... At the time of its January 2015 waiver, the Plaintiff [DAS] had no knowledge of the existence of the annuity with its estimated value of $120,000.00." DAS’ Memorandum of Law, April 27, 2018, Entry No. 116, pp. 4-5.
Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. SKF USA, Inc., 318 Conn. 737, 748, 123 A.3d 417 (2015). "It is generally recognized that, if a person in possession of any right waives that right, he will be precluded thereafter from asserting it or from claiming anything by reason of it. That is, once a right is waived it is gone forever, and it cannot be reclaimed or recaptured, and the waiver cannot be retracted, recalled, or expunged, even in the absence of any consideration therefore or of any change of position by the party in whose favor the waiver operates." Matthews v. Nagy Bros. Construction Co., 88 Conn.App. 787, 791, 871 A.2d 1067 (2005).
The objection to the waiver is that the value of the estate was different from that contemplated by DAS at the time of the waiver. Significantly, there is no claim by DAS of "fraud or other infirmity" in the filing of the Affidavit in Lieu of Probate by the defendant. See Barnes v. Church, 118 Conn. 521, 525, 173 A. 226 (1934). This is fatal to DAS’s objection because "[o]nce a known right is waived, the waiver cannot be withdrawn even if subsequent events prove the right waived to have been more valuable than had been anticipated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Plan & Zoning Commission of Town of Bloomfield, 165 Conn. 533, 540, 338 A.2d 490 (1973), quoting Jenkins v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 152 Conn. 249, 258-59, 205 A.2d 780 (1964). Thus, the January 2015 waiver is effective to bar a subsequent assertion of DAS’ right to its claims even though the value of the estate was later determined to be greater than believed to be the case.
Because DAS waived its right to enforce its medical assistant payment claim and to seek recovery for incarceration costs, judgment enters in favor of the defendant, Erin M. Mulcahy, Administratrix of the Estate of Michael J. Hughes.
Because the present case does not involve a qualified or conditional waiver this court does not have the occasion to address the viability of such a mechanism to preserve DAS’s right to enforce its claims. See Tamm v. Gangitano, Superior Court, Docket No. CV990175640S (2001 WL 254265) (March 2, 2001, Hickey, J.) (agreement to withdraw pending foreclosure action upon mortgagor’s adherence to payment schedule constituted only a conditional waiver of the plaintiff’s foreclosure action.)