Opinion
No. 88-202
Submitted February 8, 1989 —
Decided April 19, 1989.
Prohibition — Public employment — Writ will not issue to prevent State Personnel Board of Review from exercising jurisdiction, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 87AP-1077.
Appellant, the Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners ("county"), filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County seeking to prevent appellee, the State Personnel Board of Review ("SPBR"), from hearing the appeals of certain county employees who were laid off on June 27, 1987. In its complaint, the county asserted that the SPBR had no jurisdiction to consider the employees' appeals because grievance procedures under a final and binding grievance arbitration agreement were in effect under R.C. 4117.10(A). The county further alleged that SPBR action was imminent because an SPBR administrative law judge ("ALJ") had denied the county's motion to dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction finding that the agreement was not in effect on June 27, 1987 because it had expired earlier, and that negotiations had reached an impasse. The county also alleged that it had no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law because only an employee has a statutory right to appeal an adverse SPBR order in a layoff case under R.C. 124.328.
R.C. 4117.10(A) provides in part:
"An agreement between a public employer and an exclusive representative entered into pursuant to Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public employment covered by the agreement. If the agreement provides for a final and binding arbitration of grievances, public employers, employees, and employee organizations are subject solely to that grievance procedure and the state personnel board of review or civil service commissions have no jurisdiction to receive and determine any appeals relating to matters that were the subject of a final and binding grievance procedure. * * *"
The SPBR filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, essentially for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It conceded that the SPBR's review authority depended on whether the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures were final, binding, and effective. The SPBR claimed, however, that it had not yet resolved the question of its jurisdiction. It observed that the ALJ's ruling had not yet been approved or disapproved. Thus, the SPBR argued that prohibition will not lie to prevent a tribunal from determing its own jurisdiction, unless it clearly appears that such jurisdiction is lacking, which the SPBR alleged is not the case here.
The court of appeals granted the SPBR's motion to dismiss, by applying the test in O'Brien v. University Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O. 2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753. The appellate court, after construing the complaint's allegations most favorably to the county, found that the county could not prove facts entitling it to relief since the SPBR had power to pass upon its own jurisdiction and had not yet done so. According to the court, this made the county's request for a writ of prohibition premature.
The cause is now before this court as a matter of right.
Thompson, Hine, Flory, William C. Moul, William R. Case, Keith A. Ashmus, John T. Corrigan, prosecuting attorney, Kevin Purcell and Richard A. Wise, for appellant.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Theodore Scott, Jr., for appellee.
A writ of prohibition will not issue unless relator establishes that the court or officer against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and it will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists. State, ex rel. Yates, v. Court of Appeals for Montgomery Cty. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 33, 512 N.E.2d 343, 346; Bobb v. Marchant (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 14 OBR 1, 2, 469 N.E.2d 847, 849; State, ex rel. Flower, v. Rocker (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 160, 162, 6 O.O. 3d 375, 376, 370 N.E.2d 479, 480.
Here, the county alleged that the SPBR was about to exercise unlawful quasi-judicial authority and that this would cause the county irreparable harm. However, because the SPBR may ultimately find that it has no jurisdiction, the county cannot show that it will be injured if a writ of prohibition is denied. Indeed, if the SPBR finds jurisdiction to be absent and dismisses the pertinent cases, the county would not want even to consider an appeal. In this sense, the county's complaint was "premature," and we find that the court of appeals properly dismissed it on this basis.
Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to decide whether the county will have no adequate remedy at law if the SPBR decides the question of jurisdiction adversely to it. The county asks us to assume how the SPBR will resolve the issue. However, in State, ex rel. B.F. Goodrich, v. Griffin (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 59, 13 O.O. 3d 55, 391 N.E.2d 1018, we refused to make a similar assumption prior to a common pleas court's ruling on facts relating to its jurisdiction. We find Griffin sufficient authority for us to refuse to make the assumption needed to reach the county's claim here.
For these reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.