Summary
In Starr v. State, 134 Ga. App. 149, 150, 213 S.E.2d 531, 532 (1975), the court found that additional corroboration was required and, without corroboration, such an instruction was not required.
Summary of this case from State v. HinkleOpinion
50157.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 1975.
DECIDED MARCH 4, 1975.
Voluntary manslaughter. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Etheridge.
K. Reid Berglund, John Thomas Chason, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Carole E. Wall, Joseph J. Drolet, Wallace Speed, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Defendant was indicted for murder and aggravated assault. She was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to serve 20 years. Motion for new trial was denied, and defendant appeals. Held:
1. When a homicide is neither justifiable nor malicious, it is manslaughter, and if intentional, it is voluntary manslaughter. Davis v. State, 68 Ga. App. 296 (2) ( 22 S.E.2d 762); Spradlin v. State, 90 Ga. App. 97, 103 ( 82 S.E.2d 238); Gainey v. State, 132 Ga. App. 870 (1) ( 209 S.E.2d 689). There was no evidence here of unintentional killing, or of pointing a pistol at the deceased and accidentally killing him, as was the case in Corbin v. State, 211 Ga. 400 (1) ( 86 S.E.2d 221). See also Drake v. State, 221 Ga. 347, 348 (2) ( 144 S.E.2d 519). The court did not err in failing to charge on involuntary manslaughter. Thomas v. State, 86 Ga. App. 15 (2), 17 ( 70 S.E.2d 539); Smith v. State, 218 Ga. 216 (4), 224 ( 126 S.E.2d 789); Parker v. State, 218 Ga. 654 (3) ( 129 S.E.2d 850).
2. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on insanity as a defense under Code Ann. §§ 26-702, 26-703. She made no written request for such a charge but contends the evidence required the court to so charge.
The evidence showed that she was subject to epileptic seizures, but there was no testimony that she was having an epileptic seizure at the time of shooting the deceased. Her brother was introduced as a witness in her behalf, but while he at first testified she had an epileptic seizure on the day of the killing, he based this testimony on her kicking, falling out, crying, and highly emotional state after the shooting. There was no testimony to the effect that she had a seizure before or at the time of the killing. Defendant herself stated that she did not remember what happened, but this is not sufficient to require a charge on insanity. Massey v. State, 222 Ga. 143, 147 ( 149 S.E.2d 118).
It was shown that defendant had a history of epilepsy, but such persons are responsible for their acts and conduct unless reason is dethroned because of a fit or seizure of epilepsy at the time of such conduct.
Even an insane person is responsible for his conduct during lucid intervals. See Quattlebaum v. State, 119 Ga. 433 (6) ( 46 S.E. 677). A person subject to epilepsy is presumably lucid at all times except during an attack or seizure of the disease. The evidence here did not require a charge on insanity, and absent a request therefor, no error was committed in failing to so charge.
3. Defendant fails to argue the general grounds by brief, although error is enumerated thereon. These grounds are deemed abandoned. See Schmid v. State, 226 Ga. 70 ( 172 S.E.2d 616), and cases cited therein; Rodriguez v. Newby, 131 Ga. App. 651 (5) ( 206 S.E.2d 585); Martin v. State, 132 Ga. App. 658 ( 209 S.E.2d 103). But, in all events, the evidence was ample to support the verdict. Bryant v. State, 230 Ga. 578 ( 198 S.E.2d 299); Griffin v. State, 230 Ga. 449 (1), 450, 451 ( 197 S.E.2d 723); Geter v. State, 231 Ga. 615 ( 203 S.E.2d 195); Franklin v. State, 230 Ga. 291 (2), 293 ( 196 S.E.2d 845).
Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Stolz, J., concur.