Opinion
3:21-cv-05860-MJP-JRC
04-19-2022
SLOAN P. STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. MASON COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.
NOTED: May 6, 2022
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
J. Richard Creatura, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Dkt. 13) and proposed complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. 16) and on referral from the District Court. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Mason County Jail and proceeds pro se.
The Court previously screened plaintiff's proposed complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A and warned plaintiff that it failed to state a viable claim. Plaintiff has amended his proposed complaint, but it continues to suffer from the same or similar deficiencies that led the Court to enter the show cause order. Having offered plaintiff the ability to amend his complaint and received a complaint suffering from the same deficiencies, the Court finds that further opportunities to amend would be futile and recommends dismissal of this matter.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this matter in November 2021. Dkt. 1. The Court previously informed plaintiff that his complaint was deficient and that the Court would decline to rule on his IFP motion until plaintiff presented the Court with a viable complaint. Dkt. 14, at 1-2. Specifically, the Court informed plaintiff that (1) naming Mason County Jail (rather than Mason County) was inappropriate, (2) he had not plausibly alleged liability by the County under Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), (3) he had not plausibly alleged any actions by defendant Hanson, (4) his allegations that the jail required him to use a safety pencil or go to the library to use a pen could not amount to a violation of his right to access the courts, (5) his allegations that he was not allowed to use dental floss could not amount to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as articulated, and (6) his allegations that he did not have television or newspaper could not amount to violations of his constitutional rights, as articulated. See generally Dkt. 14.
Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint in response to the Court's Order. Dkt. 16. He now names Mason County as a defendant and alleges similar claims as in his first proposed complaint, although he also appears to include claims related to lack of sheets and caffeinated coffee. Dkt. 16, at 14. He has also filed a supplement to his amended proposed complaint, which the Court also considers in the analysis below because plaintiff appears to have intended it as a supplement incorporated into his amended proposed complaint. Dkt. 17.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
II. Access to the Courts
In his prior complaint, plaintiff alleged that requiring him to either use a safety pencil or to go to the jail law library to use a pen violated his right to access the courts. See Dkt. 1-2, at 6. The Court explained that because plaintiff showed neither deprivation of the capability of bringing an action nor an actual injury, he had not alleged a viable claim of lack of access to the courts:
The right of access to the courts ensures a “reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts,” although it does not create a freestanding right to prison law libraries or legal assistance. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The right of access to the courts “guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability-the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Id. at 356. It is this “capability, rather than the capability of turning pages in a law library, that is the touchstone” of the right of access to the courts. Id. at 356-57. Because the right of access to the courts is not an “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. at 351.
Moreover, plaintiff must show that he suffered an “actual injury” that was caused by defendants' actions to prevail on a claim of violation of the right to access the courts. See id. at 354-55. That is, plaintiff “must show that official acts or omissions ‘hindered his efforts to pursue a [non-frivolous] legal claim.'” Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (alteration in original)).
Here, plaintiff's allegations fall short of a colorable claim of denial of access of the courts. He alleges only that he believes his legal work must be done in ink (but acknowledges that he has not been held to such a rule) and that he prefers to use a pen. Dkt. 1-2, at 6. He fails to allege that jail staff's actions have plausibly hindered efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Plaintiff's allegations are inadequate to create a viable claim of denial of the right to access the courts.Dkt. 14, at 4-5.
Plaintiff's amendments to his claim do not render it viable. His allegations fall short of showing that he is being deprived of the capability of bringing legal actions or that he is suffering actual injury. He acknowledges that he is allowed to use a flexible pencil but asserts that the pencils are inadequate because they do not produce a dark ink. Dkt. 16, at 5-6. He also acknowledges that he may use a flexible pen “in the visitor's booths at night” upon request but takes issue with the jail prohibiting regular pens. Dkt. 16, at 7-8. He does not specifically point to any nonfrivolous legal claim that he can plausibly allege has been hindered. In a supplemental document, he argues that it is unconstitutional to prohibit prisoners from having pens, but he does not allege that he is being deprived of writing implements. See Dkt. 17, at 7.
Plaintiff also cites the test from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), but application of Turner is not necessary unless plaintiff establishes an actual injury to his right to access the courts, which plaintiff has failed to do. See, e.g., Rhinehart v. Cambra, No. C 97-4272 VRW (PR), 1999 WL 281104, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1999). The need to request extensions of deadlines is not, standing alone, an actual injury. See, e.g., Hysell v. Pliler, No. 04-0355, 2007 WL 2559022, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2007) (denying motion for preliminary injunction based on lack of access to courts because the plaintiff had “not alleged that he has been prevented from meeting a deadline,” had “obtained an extension of the earliest deadline in this case,” and because “the court [was] willing to entertain requests for reasonable extensions of time”), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 3245311 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2007).
III. Dental Hygiene
In his prior complaint, plaintiff alleged that lack of dental floss at the jail violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Dkt. 1-2, at 12. The Court assumed without deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment (rather than the Eighth) applied to plaintiff's claim and explained that he had not alleged a viable claim:
“Pretrial detainees are entitled to ‘adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.'” Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). To state a claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement against an individual defendant, a pretrial detainee must allege facts that show:
(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).
Whether the conditions and conduct rise to the level of a constitutional violation is an objective assessment that turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. However, “a de minimis level of imposition” is insufficient. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.21 (1979).
Courts have generally held that the deprivation of dental floss is not a serious enough harm to create a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim. E.g., Andrich v. Arpaio, No. CV1602111PHXDJHJZB, 2016 WL 11631346, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2016); Firor v. Hardinger, No. CV JFM-15-2875, 2016 WL 4491715, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2016) (“The deprivation of dental floss, is simply not so repugnant to the conscience or incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that it satisfies the seriousness prong of a deliberate indifference claim.”) (internal citation omitted); Gomez v. Westchester County, No. 12-CV-6869, 2015 WL1054902, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2015) (detainee's allegation regarding his
inability to obtain dental floss did not establish a sufficiently serious medical need), aff'd, 649 Fed.Appx. 93 (2d Cir. 2016).
Having reviewed plaintiff's allegations, the Court finds that he has not pleaded such a serious harm from the lack of dental floss at the jail as to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment.Dkt. 14, at 5-6.
Plaintiff continues to allege that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment for the jail to forbid him from using dental floss. Dkt. 16, at 10. He states that on a prior occasion (before his current confinement in the jail) he suffered a cavity that caused him to require a tooth extraction and that he fears the same scenario will occur again. Dkt. 16, at 10. These allegations do not render his claims viable under the authority provided in the order to show cause and cited above. Plaintiff cites cases about deprivation of toothpaste, but courts have distinguished between the deprivation of toothpaste and of dental floss in this area. See Pigues v. Solano Cty. Jail, No. 2:15-CV-1005 KJN P, 2015 WL 2358647, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2015) (distinguishing between dental floss and toothpaste cases). Plaintiff's arguments fail to show that this claim has merit or is cognizable in a Section 1983 action. See Dkt. 17, at 12-13.
IV. Television
In his prior complaint, plaintiff alleged that lack of television and newspapers in the jail violated his rights to freedom to obtain information and to be free from cruel punishment. Dkt. 1-2, at 13. The Court explained
Prisoners have a First Amendment right to receive published materials, including news materials, subject to reasonable limitations. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). “But that right does not create an affirmative duty on prisons to provide news publications [or television news broadcasts] to inmates.” Collins v. Burl, No. 2:11-CV-40-DPM-BD, 2011 WL 2457532, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 17, 2011) (ruling that prisoner's claim failed as a matter of law where defendants did not themselves provide prisoner with published “material or access to television news”).
Further, there is no constitutional right to watch television in prison. James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992) (denial of television does
not constitute a cognizable civil rights claim); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (same); Gladson v. Rice, 862 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Montana v. Commissioners Court, 659 F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The claims relating to the usage of radio and television were properly dismissed as frivolous. These claims do not pertain to federal constitutional rights.”); Manley v. Fordice, 945 F.Supp. 132, 136-37 (D. Miss. 1996) (“[T]here is simply no right to television while incarcerated.... [S]uch items are luxuries, and any allowance of them in prisons is merely an altruistic act on the part of the Department of Corrections.”); see also Rawls v. Sundquist, 929 F.Supp. 284, 291 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), aff'd, 113 F.3d 1235 (6th Cir. 1997) (no equal protection violation where death row inmates were denied satellite television because the denial “is within the wide-ranging discretion granted to prison administrators and does not impinge the Inmate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights”).
Therefore, plaintiff cannot bring a plausible claim for a constitutional violation on the basis that the jail does not provide prisoners with television or newspapers.Dkt. 14, at 6-7.
Notwithstanding this authority, plaintiff continues to argue that it is unconstitutional for the jail not to provide television and that the jail should allow prisoners to purchase televisions. See Dkt. 16, at 13. He does not appear to reallege his claims regarding newspapers. Plaintiff cites to Turner, but there is no occasion for the Court to engage in a Turner analysis when the right at issue is not protected under the First Amendment. See Dkt. 17, at 13.
V. New Claims: Sheets and Decaffeinated Coffee
Finally, plaintiff has included new claims in his proposed amended complaint, alleging that it is unconstitutional not to provide him with sheets for bedding and to provide only decaffeinated coffee. Dkt. 16, at 14. These claims are frivolous, and the Court finds that they could not be saved by amendment.
As noted above, plaintiff has the right to be free from punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent that he alleges he is a pretrial detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). In assessing conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees, the Court considers whether the conditions amount to punishment, causing harm or disability significantly exceeding or independent of the inherent discomforts of confinement, or whether they merely result from some legitimate governmental purpose. See Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710, 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court evaluates a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim under an objective deliberate indifference standard. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying objective standard to medical care claims and describing similar treatment afforded medical care and other conditions of confinement claims). A pretrial detainee must demonstrate a defendant's acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable, and identify objective facts indicating the “challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that [objective].” Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473-74.
An institution must provide prisoners and pretrial detainees “adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds in Marley v. United States, 548 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 2008). However, prisons or jails are not required by the constitution to be comfortable. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Plaintiff does not allege that he is deprived of bedding but instead claims that prisoners are not allowed to have sheets and are forced to use two itchy blankets, instead, when they sleep on a mat. Dkt. 16, at 16. Case law does not support a viable Fourteenth Amendment claims based on these allegations. See Wood v. Young, No. C18-983-MJP-BAT, 2019 WL 4889621, at *16 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 2019) (allegations of an uncomfortable bed insufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim), report and recommendation adopted, No. C18-983 MJP, 2019 WL 4187640 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 4, 2019); Tarpley v. Jefferson Cty. Comm'rs, No. 2:09-CV-00199, 2010 WL 5135980, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2010) (pretrial detainees' allegations of discomfort due to lack of sheets did not amount to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:09-CV-00199, 2011 WL 463101 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2011). Cf. Thompson v. City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a pretrial detainee's “uncontroverted allegation that he was provided with neither a bed nor even a mattress unquestionably constitutes a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim”), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & Cty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Plaintiff's claim about decaffeinated coffee is also patently frivolous.
There is, moreover, an absence of plausible objective allegations plead indicating the denial of caffeinated coffee or bed sheets (or, for that matter, the other conditions of confinement) lacked a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective or was excessive in relation to that objective. Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473-74. “[M]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 546. Accord Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Legitimate, non-punitive government interests include ensuring a detainee's presence at trial, maintaining jail security, and effective management of a detention facility.”). Corrections administrators “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. In considering an institution's policy or practice, the Court asks: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between a regulation and a legitimate government interest; (2) whether alternative means of exercising a right remain open to prisoners; (3) whether accommodating the asserted constitutional right would significantly impact guards and other prisoners; and (4) whether ready alternatives are absent (bearing on the reasonableness of the regulation). Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008).
Here, plaintiff's own allegations bely his claims that the conditions he was subjected to were punitive rather than incidents of his restraint and the jail's interest in maintaining security. His pens were taken because of concern they could be used as a weapon; safety pens must be used under supervision to avoid damage to cells; dental floss is disallowed for security purposes; televisions were removed because they caused fighting over which channel to watch; coffee is not caffeinated because some prisoners “drank too much coffee and got too wired”; and bed sheets “have been associated with suicide.” See generally Dkt. 16. Upon review, and despite his legal conclusion that these restrictions are “punishments,” plaintiff's allegations amount to disagreement with jail officials over the best methods to ensure jail security rather than any plausible allegation that jail officials are punishing pretrial detainees.
Plaintiff's amended proposed complaint fails to state a claim on its face and relies on frivolous allegations that cannot amount to Fourteenth Amendment violations.
VI. Leave to Amend Would Be Futile
Where a pro se litigant's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court generally grants the opportunity to amend the complaint. Lucas v. Dep't of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the Court may deny leave to amend if “it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect.” Id. Here, plaintiff would have to abandon the claims asserted and allege an entirely new cause of action based on an entirely new set of facts in order to proceed with this case. This is more than the rule of liberally granting leave to amend requires. Moreover, plaintiff has been unable to successfully amend his claims already, even with the benefit of the Court's order to show cause.
CONCLUSION
The proposed amended complaint should be dismissed without prejudice, and the IFP motion should be denied as moot. Dkt. 13. The case should be closed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of de novo review by the district judge, See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on May 6, 2022, as noted in the caption.