Opinion
C.A.No.: CPU4-16-002360
10-10-2016
STANLEY PROPERTIES, LLC, Plaintiff below/Appellee, v. LAQUINTA STANFORD, Defendant below/Appellant.
Stanley Properties, LLC PO Box 267 Odessa, DE 19730 LaQuinta Stanford 1309 Cedar Street Wilmington, DE 19805 Pro Se Defendant
Stanley Properties, LLC
PO Box 267
Odessa, DE 19730 LaQuinta Stanford
1309 Cedar Street
Wilmington, DE 19805
Pro Se Defendant ORDER
On October 7, 2016, Appellant appeared before this Court for her pro-se Motion to Stay (the "Motion") without filing a supersedeas bond. An attorney for Appellee failed to appear, although the Court received a letter from an agent of Appellee who opposed the Motion and advised this Court to call the agent if the Court had any questions. The Delaware Superior Court has ruled that the supersedeas bond requirement of CCP Civil R. 62(c) is not discretionary. Therefore, this Court cannot dispose of the bond requirement in that setting, however, at least, post a secured bond in the amount of the judgment below.
Appellee filed a Certificate of Representation for an Artificial Entity in the Justice of the Peace Court asserting that Stanley Properties is a Delaware Limited Liability Company. Thus, Appellee's letter, dated October 6, 2016, is a nullity as corporations must be represented by a member of the Delaware bar when appearing before this Court.
See Gates v. Texaco, Inc., 2008 WL 1952162, at *1 (Del. Super. May 2, 2008).
Additionally, Motions to Stay are governed by a four-pronged preliminary injunction test set forth by Evans v. Buchanan, as applied by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kirpat, Inc. v. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission. Under the four-prong test, a proper evaluation of a motion to stay requires the Court to:
See Kirpat, Inc. v. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, 741 A.2d 356, 357 (Del. 1998) (citing Evans v. Buchanan, 435 F.Supp. 832, 841-42 (D. Del. 1997)).
(1) Make a preliminary assessment of likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) assess whether the petitioner will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is not granted; (3) assess whether any other interested party will suffer
substantial harm if the stay is granted; and (4) determine whether the public interest will be harmed if the stay is granted.The first prong—determining the likelihood of success on appeal—is not dispositive. During the hearing, Appellant introduced an Order from the Justice of the Peace Court which stated that the court would "stay the wage garnishment." However, Appellant indicated during the hearing that her wages are still being garnished by the Justice of the Peace Court. In Justice of the Peace Court Emily A. Ferrell's Opinion, that Court acknowledged that the Court below sent defendant the judgment order to the incorrect address.
Id.
Mountaire Farms, Inc. v. Pitts, 2001 WL 789650, at *1 (Del. Super. June 8, 2001).
See, Order, Sept. 14, 2016, Justice of the Peace Court 13 (Honorable Emily A. Ferrell). --------
Upon consideration of: the pleadings, the argument presented by Appellant at the hearing, and for the reasons set forth by the Court on the record at the hearing, judgment is hereby entered directing the Justice of the Peace court to vacate any pending garnishments and LaQuinta Stanford is directed to post within ten (10) calendar days a Surety Bond in the amount of the judgment below, $2,073.39 Secured Bond with approved surety in order for this Court to stay execution on the judgment from the Justice of the Peace Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of October, 2016.
/s/_________
John K. Welch, Judge cc: Judge Emily A. Ferrell, Justice of the Peace Court No. 13
Ms. Tamu White, Chief Civil Clerk