Opinion
No. CV 03-0821810S
July 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 19, 2004 after a hearing thereon on the court denied said motion. The court did so on the status of the case at that time which was styled as a malpractice case.
The plaintiff had filed a certificate of good faith which implicated the need for expert testimony regarding the standard of care. The court considered that the disclosure of an expert, if so filed by the plaintiff could be part of the case.
Subsequent to the decision on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff withdrew its certificate of good faith claiming that it did so to ensure that the case was not considered a malpractice claim. Thereafter, the defendant filed a Motion to Reargue and/or for Reconsideration dated June 9, 2004. A hearing was held on said motion on July 26, 2004. The defendant claims that even though the certificate of good faith has been withdrawn, expert testimony is required to establish a prima facie case against the defendant under the facts alleged and since expert testimony will not be presented, it is entitled to summary judgment. Expert testimony will not be presented because the time for disclosing experts has passed and the plaintiff asserts that this is now not a malpractice case, but one of ordinary negligence.
The plaintiff's complaint alleges that on or about December 23, 2000, Mr. Stankiewicz was admitted to the Institute of Living for treatment of psychological disorders and while a patient was caused to slip and fall. The plaintiff claims that Mr. Stankiewicz's injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant in that it failed to adequately monitor Mr. Stankiewicz and failed to adequately watch him. In alleging that Mr. Stankiewicz was caused to slip and fall to the ground, the complaint is silent as to the nature and circumstances of this occurrence.
The defendant cites the case of Trimel v. Lawrence and Memorial CT Page 9515-at Hospital Rehabilitation Center et al., 61 Conn.App. 353. The plaintiff in Trimel, had been confined to a wheelchair and was receiving physical therapy which included transfers to and from the wheelchair. During a transfer session and in the presence of a physical therapist, the plaintiff fell sustaining injuries. The Appellate Court in upholding the decision of the trial court in granting the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, held that the plaintiff's claim was one of medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence.
The court in Trimel stated the following:
The classification of a negligence claim as either medical malpractice or ordinary negligence requires a court to review closely the circumstances under which the alleged negligence occurred. "[P]rofessional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 226, 682 A.2d 106 (1996). Furthermore, malpractice "presupposes some improper conduct in the treatment or operative skill [or] . . . the failure to exercise requisite medical skill . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Camposano v. Claiborn, 2 Conn. Cir.Ct. 135, 136-37, 196 A.2d 129 (1963). From those definitions, we conclude that the relevant considerations in determining whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice are whether (1) the defendants are sued in their capacities as medical professionals, (2) the alleged negligence is of a specialized medical nature that arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship and (3) the alleged negligence is substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment and involved the exercise of medical judgment. See Spatafora v. St John's Episcopal Hospital, 209 App.Div.2d 608, 609, 619 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1994).
The facts of this case reveal that the defendants are medical professionals and that the plaintiff was at their clinic for treatment, specifically her therapy session. Her session was to begin on the exercise mat, which required her to transfer from the wheelchair to the mat. The question is whether allowing the plaintiff to transfer unassisted on the day in question, after she had learned to perform transfers without assistance, involved the exercise of medical judgment. That question is a close one.
In this case, the plaintiff's complaint does not indicate the circumstances surrounding Mr. Stankiewicz's slip and fall. Based on the CT Page 9515-au status of the file, the court cannot find that the claims were substantially related to medical diagnosis and treatment which would involve the exercise of medical judgment. Therefore, the defendant is not entitled to Summary Judgment.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Reargue and/or Reconsider is denied.
Stengel, J. CT Page 9515-av