Summary
upholding trial court's denial of necessity instruction where defendant failed to present evidence that the risk to the public caused by his reckless driving was outweighed by the potential harm to him if he pulled over for the police officer whom the defendant believed might harm him: "This case does not present a situation where [the defendant] refused to stop while otherwise continuing to drive in a reasonable manner."
Summary of this case from Gentleman v. StateOpinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9046.
August 16, 2006.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Randy M. Olsen, Judge. Trial Court No. 4FA-03-3577 CR.
Marcia E. Holland, Assistant Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Quinlan G. Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
John A. Scukanec, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
A jury convicted John R. Stanfill Jr. of failing to stop at the direction of a police officer, driving while license suspended, and reckless driving. Stanfill argues the superior court improperly declined to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. Stanfill also claims there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain his conviction for driving on a suspended license and that the court improperly admitted evidence about the status of his license.
AS 28.35.182(a), AS 28.15.291(a), AS 28.35.040, respectively.
We conclude that the superior court properly denied Stanfill's request for a necessity instruction. We further conclude that there was sufficient evidence admitted to sustain Stanfill's conviction for driving on a suspended license. Finally, we conclude that the superior court improperly admitted hearsay evidence relating to Stanfill's license suspension but that this error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm Stanfill's convictions.
Background facts and proceedings
On September 13, 2003, Stanfill was riding his motorcycle in Fairbanks. Fairbanks Police Officer Scott Adams first contacted Stanfill at an intersection where Stanfill was waiting for the light to change. The motorcycle did not trip the traffic control signal, so the light remained red. Officer Adams, who was accompanied by a television reporter on assignment, pulled up alongside Stanfill and told Stanfill he could proceed into the intersection.
Adams followed behind Stanfill and called in the motorcycle's license plate number for a registration check. The officer was told the registration was not current. (Because a license plate cover partially obscured the first number, Adams called in the wrong number. Stanfill's motorcycle was properly registered.) Adams turned on his patrol car's overhead lights.
Instead of stopping, Stanfill accelerated. Adams turned on his siren and pursued Stanfill, reaching speeds of over 80 mph. The television reporter began videotaping the pursuit. While traveling at those high speeds, Stanfill went through a red light where other traffic was present. Stanfill did not slow enough for a right hand turn and went into the ditch, but he was able to get back on the road. The pursuit, which covered several miles, ended when Stanfill drove off the pavement onto a dirt path, hit some railroad tracks, and crashed. Stanfill sustained injuries, including a broken ankle.
Officer Adams remained with Stanfill until paramedics arrived on the scene. During that time, another officer called in Stanfill's name and was informed by the dispatch that Stanfill's license was suspended. Officer Adams testified at trial that he overheard this information coming over the radio. Stanfill objected that this information was hearsay, but Superior Court Judge Randy M. Olsen ruled that Officer Adams's testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception for business records.
A few hours later, Officer Adams interviewed Stanfill in the hospital. During the interview, which was taped, Stanfill admitted that his license was suspended.
Before trial, Stanfill gave written notice of his intent to assert the affirmative defense of necessity with respect to the failure-to-stop charge. Before opening statements, Stanfill submitted proposed jury instructions asserting necessity for both the failure-to-stop charge and the reckless driving charge.
Stanfill testified at trial that he attempted to flee from Officer Adams because he was afraid of police harassment due to an incident that had occurred the previous morning. Stanfill said that he had been sleeping in a house that was raided by officers serving a warrant on one of the occupants of the house. The officers initially hand-cuffed Stanfill but then later told him he could leave. Stanfill asked if he could take his motorcycle with him, but the officers told him he would have to come back later.
Stanfill testified that, when he returned later in the afternoon, he was confronted by two Alaska State Troopers, one of whom accused Stanfill of sneaking up on him. Stanfill said that the trooper warned Stanfill that he would be shot if he did it again. Stanfill identified the trooper who threatened him as Trooper Teague Widmier. Stanfill denied sneaking up on the troopers and testified that he had not caused them any trouble.
According to Stanfill, this interaction caused him to fear that he would be harmed by Officer Adams if he stopped. Two police cars were pursuing Stanfill. Stanfill knew Officer Adams was in one of the cars, but he did not know who was in the other car, which was unmarked. Stanfill testified that Trooper Widmier could have been in the other car.
During cross-examination, Stanfill testified that he knew his license was not valid at the time of the interaction with Officer Adams. When asked whether he knew that his license was suspended, Stanfill replied: "I never had a license. So I don't know how it got suspended, but yeah." Stanfill then testified that he had previously been convicted for "driving without a license."
After the State presented its case, Stanfill moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of driving with a suspended license. Judge Olsen denied the motion.
At the conclusion of evidence, Stanfill again proposed a "necessity" jury instruction. Judge Olsen did not allow the instruction because he found that Stanfill had not demonstrated that the risk of harm he sought to avoid was objectively greater than the risk of harm he created.
Should the jury have been instructed on the affirmative defense of necessity?
The necessity defense was codified by the legislature in AS 11.81.320(a). The legislature provided that the necessity defense is available "to the extent permitted by common law." In Cleveland v. Anchorage, the Alaska Supreme Court described the necessity defense as having three elements: (1) the defendant's violation of the law must have been done to prevent a significant evil; (2) there must have been no adequate alternative method to prevent this evil; and (3) the harm caused by the defendant's violation of the law must not have been disproportionate to the foreseeable harm that the defendant was trying to avoid. The court explained that the defense is available:
631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981).
Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1078.
if the accused reasonably believed at the time of acting that the first and second elements were present, even if that belief was mistaken; but the accused's belief will not suffice for the third element. An objective determination must be made as to whether the defendant's value judgment was correct, given the facts as he reasonably perceived them.
Id.
Judge Olsen found that Stanfill failed to meet the third element. Judge Olsen concluded that Stanfill's subjective belief that the officers would harm him was outweighed by the importance of stopping for peace officers.
Balancing the harm caused by Stanfill's failure to stop, the potential risk to members of the public, the risk to the police, and the risk to Stanfill, against the potential harm to Stanfill if he pulled over for the police car and Stanfill's expressed subjective fear that he would be harmed by Trooper Widmier and possibly others, we agree with Judge Olsen that the balance falls on the side of denying the instruction.
Stanfill accelerated when Officer Adams activated his emergency lights. He exceeded 80 miles per hour in a several mile chase, running a red light at high speed, driving off the road into a ditch before regaining control, and driving down a short path before crashing on railroad tracks and breaking his ankle. This case does not present a situation where Stanfill refused to stop while otherwise continuing to drive in a reasonable manner. Instead, as reflected by his reckless driving conviction, Stanfill drove his motorcycle in a manner that created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. We agree with Judge Olsen that the record does not demonstrate that Stanfill satisfied the third element.
Should the court have granted a judgment of acquittal for driving on a suspended license?
Stanfill was convicted of driving with a suspended license in violation of AS 28.15.291(a)(1). During trial, Stanfill moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the State did not prove all elements of the offense. Judge Olsen denied the motion.
Although AS 28.15.291(a)(1) does not contain an express mens rea element, in Jeffcoat v. State, we interpreted the statute to require proof that the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his license was suspended.
639 P.2d 308 (Alaska App. 1982).
Jeffcoat, 639 P.2d at 313 n. 4. See also Alexander v. State, 712 P.2d 416, 419 (Alaska App. 1986).
Stanfill argues that the testimony of Officer Adams, his own admissions at trial, and the evidence of Stanfill's previous convictions relating to driving on a suspended license, were insufficient to support a finding that his license was suspended on the day in question. But the jury also heard testimony from Trooper Widmier about the incident the day before, which Stanfill relied on to support his necessity defense. Widmier testified that he checked the status of Stanfill's license before Stanfill left and found that Stanfill did not have a valid license. He informed Stanfill that Stanfill could not drive his motorcycle away because of his license status. Stanfill pushed the motorcycle away while yelling at Widmier in "explicit words and terms."
The suspended license charge was not in serious dispute from the beginning of trial. In his opening statement, Stanfill's attorney announced that he expected the jury to convict Stanfill of that charge.
Defense attorney: With respect to the [charge of] driving with a suspended license, my client did not have a license. I would expect you to convict him of that. I expect him to tell you, when he takes the stand, that he didn't have a valid license and that he knew he didn't have a valid license. . . . And at the conclusion of the trial, I would ask you — well, I would think you would find him guilty of driving with a suspended license, since he's going to admit that to you.
At the conclusion of the case, when Stanfill's attorney was arguing the case to the jury, he repeated his expectations.
Defense attorney: And, you know, I don't know whether you're going to find him guilty or, although I think you have to find him guilty of driving with a suspended license. I can't argue against that. . . .
Now I'm going to sit down now. I'm asking you to find him not guilty of reckless driving and of fleeing and eluding but to convict him of driving with a suspended license.
Other than Stanfill's admissions that his license was suspended, the State's primary direct evidence that Stanfill's license was suspended when he fled from Officer Adams was Officer Adams's testimony that he overheard a dispatcher say over the radio that Stanfill's license was suspended.
The court also took judicial notice that Stanfill had a conviction for driving without a valid license and a conviction for driving on a suspended license. And Stanfill's flight from the police is circumstantial evidence that Stanfill's license was suspended. Furthermore, when Stanfill testified, he confirmed that his license was suspended.
Viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that fair-minded jurors exercising reasonable judgment could conclude that the State had proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Stanfill's hearsay objection
See Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981); Deal v. State, 657 P.2d 404, 405 (Alaska App. 1983).
Stanfill argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the court improperly admitted hearsay evidence. During the trial, over Stanfill's objection, Judge Olsen admitted evidence that the dispatcher advised Officer Adams that Stanfill's license was suspended. Judge Olsen ruled that this evidence was admissible as a business record.
Although Judge Olsen initially let this testimony in under the business records exception, he later found that the testimony was inadmissible. We agree. The record is silent on the foundation for this evidence as a business record.
But we conclude that the admission of the hearsay testimony was harmless because other evidence supports Stanfill's conviction. The record is clear that there was ample evidence of the mens rea element of driving with a suspended license because Officer Adams testified that Stanfill admitted that his license was suspended. Other evidence also showed that Stanfill's license was suspended.
Stanfill argues, in his reply brief, that the evidence did not satisfy the corpus delicti rule. Even though we need not address an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief, the rule is satisfied in this case. The corpus delicti rule ensures that there is "substantial independent evidence" that "tends to establish the trustworthiness" of a defendant's admission or confession. To satisfy the rule, the prosecution is not required to independently prove all of the elements of the crime. Instead, it need only introduce "substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement." The State presented evidence that Stanfill's license had been suspended in the past. And Stanfill's flight from the police is circumstantial evidence that Stanfill's license was suspended.
See Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 803 P.2d 406, 411 (Alaska 1990); Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98, 100 (Alaska App. 1998).
Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 447 (Alaska 1972).
Id.
After examining the record, we conclude that the admission of the hearsay evidence was harmless, especially in the context of Stanfill's trial strategy to concede that he was guilty of driving on a suspended license. Conclusion
See Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109, 115 (Alaska 1999) ("A non-constitutional error is harmless if it did not `appreciably affect the jury's verdict.'") (quoting Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-32 (Alaska 1969)).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
I agree with the Court's decision in this case. I write separately to explain my views on two of the issues presented.
With regard to the question of whether Stanfill was entitled to a jury instruction on necessity, I agree that he had no such defense to the charge of reckless driving. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Stanfill, he had reason to believe that one of the law enforcement officers had some kind of grudge against him and might mistreat him. But assuming that Stanfill had the right to take some action to protect himself from this perceived danger of assault, he was not entitled to act in a way that recklessly endangered other people.
Even when a person might be privileged to use force against another, or might be privileged to perform other acts in defense of self that would normally be illegal, this privilege must be exercised in a prudent manner, with due care for the safety of bystanders. This point is explained in Rollin M. Perkins Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law (3rd edition 1982):
For example, B might [be] making a murderous assault upon A under such circumstances that A was privileged to kill B in the lawful defense of [his] life. . . . If, under those circumstances, A should shoot at B in the proper and prudent exercise of his privilege of self-defense, and should happen unexpectedly . . . to cause the death of C, [then] A would be free from criminal guilt.
. . .
[But this] hypothetical situation . . . supposes not only the privilege to direct deadly force against B in the defense of A's life, but also [ A's] proper and prudent exercise of this privilege. If . . . [ A] exercised this privilege so imprudently and improperly as to constitute a criminally-negligent disregard of the life of the innocent bystander, C, [then] the killing of C would be manslaughter.
Perkins Boyce, pp. 922-23.
In other words, even though a person is under attack and is properly defending themself, the person continues to owe a duty of care to bystanders. The same is true in Stanfill's case. Even though Stanfill may have had a privilege, under the doctrine of necessity, to refuse to come to an immediate stop when signaled to do so by Officer Adams, Stanfill had no privilege to drive at high speed through the streets of Fairbanks, recklessly ignoring traffic devices, and thereby placing innocent people in peril.
This answers the question of whether Stanfill was entitled to invoke the doctrine of necessity with respect to the charge of reckless driving. But what of the charge of failure to stop?
If Stanfill had merely refused to stop until he reached a place of relative safety — for instance, a gas station or grocery or similar public place where other people would be present to witness his encounter with the police and potentially aid him if he was mistreated — then I would side with Stanfill in this dispute. That is, I would conclude that Stanfill should have been allowed to argue the doctrine of necessity as a defense to the charge of failing to stop.
But Stanfill's efforts to elude the officers went far beyond that. Stanfill's actions gave no indication that he was only temporarily disregarding the order to stop, and that he intended to stop as soon as it was safe to do so. Rather, Stanfill's actions suggested that he never intended to stop. Stanfill therefore exceeded whatever privilege he had, under the doctrine of necessity, to temporarily disobey Officer Adams's directive to pull over.
I now turn to the question of whether the charge of driving with a suspended license should be dismissed because of the State's purported failure to satisfy the corpus delicti rule.
Stanfill took the stand at his trial and admitted that his license was suspended on the date in question. Stanfill's testimony on this point absolved the State of the need to introduce independent evidence that Stanfill's license was suspended.
This point, too, is explained in Perkins Boyce:
The corpus-delicti rule is that no criminal conviction can be based upon [a] defendant's extrajudicial confession or admission . . . unless there is other evidence tending to establish the corpus delicti.
. . .
[O]nly the extrajudicial confession is viewed with distrust. . . . In the absence of some rare statute to the contrary[,] nothing is required [to corroborate] a plea of guilty, or other judicial confession[. Rather,] the almost universal rule in this country is that a conviction cannot be supported by the uncorroborated out-of-court confession of the accused.
Perkins Boyce, pp. 142-43 (emphasis added).
This explanation of the law is supported by court decisions from around the country. See, e.g., Tinker v. State, ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2005), 2005 WL 2046357 at *14 (holding that the defendant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana was supported by his admission, in the "factual basis" portion of his plea agreement with federal authorities, that he had distributed approximately 64 pounds of marijuana); People v. Ditson, 369 P.2d 714, 731; 20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 182 (Cal. 1962) (It is "elementary and unquestioned that a defendant who chooses to testify is just as competent to establish the corpus delicti as any other witness."); Smith v. State, 538 S.E.2d 95, 97 (Ga.App. 2000) (a defendant's testimony at trial can be used to supply the corroboration needed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule); Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640, 645 n. 18 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) ("[I]n-court judicial confession[s] need not be corroborated."); Fancher v. State, 319 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex.Crim.App. 1958) ("[The rule requiring] corroboration of extrajudicial confessions does not apply to a . . . confession . . . made in the course of a judicial proceeding while testifying as a witness."); State v. Liles-Heide, 970 P.2d 349, 351 (Wash.App. 1999) (holding that the defendant's testimony at trial established the corpus delicti needed to support her conviction for driving under the influence).
Accordingly, Stanfill's corpus delicti argument is meritless.