Opinion
No. CV 09-4028045
October 7, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS, MTN. #121
The plaintiff's claim in this matter arises out of the alleged tortious interference by the defendant with the contract between the plaintiff and one of its dealers, Anthony Palmer. The defendant is the Executive Director of the Gasoline and Automotive Service Dealers of America, the industry or trade association for Anthony Palmer and others. By way of counterclaim, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff violated Connecticut's Petroleum Franchise Act, located at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133e through 133n. He further alleges a CUTPA violation and abuse of process. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the Counterclaim challenging the defendant's standing to bring any claims under the Petroleum Franchise Act, thereby implicating this court's subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is Granted in part, and Denied in part.
Standard of Review
A Motion to Dismiss is the appropriate vehicle by which to assert that the court lacks jurisdiction, to include subject matter jurisdiction. P.B. § 10-30; Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 624 (1983); Sadloski v. Manchester, 235 Conn. 637, 645-46 n. 13 (1995). "The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction whenever and however raised." Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn 183, 199 n. 13 (1996). However, "in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 335 (2004).
A claimant's lack of standing implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court's analysis will necessarily focus not on the merits of the defendant's counterclaim, but rather whether the defendant is the proper party to bring such a claim. CT Page 19288 Wellswood Columbia LLC. v Hebron, 295 Conn. 802, 809-10 (2010); 418 Meadow Street Assoc. LLC v. Clean Air Partners, LLC., 123 Conn.App. 416 (2010).
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." Sadloski v. Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 84 (1993).
"It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamental requirement of jurisdiction." Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc. 292 Conn. 86 (2009). "`There are two general types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory; either type will establish standing, and each has its own unique features. "Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pond View, LLC v. Planning Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143, 156, 953 A.2d 1 (2008)." Id. at 92. Thus, where a cause of action is created by statute that did not otherwise exist at common law, standing to pursue such a cause of action is determined by looking to the statute itself. See, Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86 (2009) (Court examined the Workers' Compensation Act to determine standing to contest apportionment of liability as between employee and third party tortfeaser); Isaac v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 3 Conn.App. 598 (1985) (Court analyzes CGS § 52-555, the wrongful death statute to determine standing).
Discussion
With these principles in mind, the court turns to CGS § 42-133j through 133n, the statutes at issue here. These statutes provide a comprehensive statutory scheme which regulates the conduct of both franchisor and franchisee in the conduct of their respective businesses. It provides various protections for franchisees and imposes certain prohibitions upon franchisors. It also creates a statutory cause of action in the event of a violation of its provisions. In his counterclaim, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff violated § 42-133l(f), which prohibits a franchisor from "directly or indirectly" prohibiting the right of free association among franchisees for any lawful purpose.
The court found no case law which discussed "standing" under these statutes.
CGS § 42-133n is titled "Remedies. Effect of judgment, Limitations of actions." and provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any franchisee may bring an action for violation of Sections 42-133l or 42-133m in the Superior Court to recover damages sustained by reason of such violation, . . . Such franchisee, if successful, shall be entitled to costs, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys fees.
Thus, the statute confers standing upon a "franchisee" only. A "franchisee" is defined, "for purposes of 42-133j to 42-133n" at § 42-133k(5) as follows:
a retailer or distributor, as the case may be, who is authorized or permitted, under a franchise, to use a trademark in connection with the sale, consignment or distribution of motor fuel.
(Emphasis added).
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-2z requires that in ascertaining the meaning of a statute, the court must first look to the text of the statute. If the text is unambiguous, it shall be assigned its plain meaning. See, Edwards v. Commissioner of Corrections, 105 Conn.App. 124 (2008).
The directive of the statute includes that it be read in the context of related statutes. Here, the defendant argues that the prohibition against "indirect" interference with free association among dealers, confers standing upon him as there could be no other logical explanation for the use of the word "indirect." He argues that the prohibition would be unenforceable if he did not have standing. He is wrong. The franchisee, in this case, Mr. Palmer, could assert his rights under the act for the alleged "indirect" interference.
The Court finds that the statute which establishes the cause of action and which confers standing upon a "franchisee" to be plain and unambiguous. The defendant here is simply an individual, suing in his individual capacity, who works for a trade association comprised of, among others, franchisees. The defendant is not a franchisee nor does he claim to be a franchisee. He therefore lacks standing to bring this statutory cause of action. The motion to dismiss Count One of the Counterclaim is GRANTED.
The motion to dismiss Counts Two and Three is DENIED. While the defendant relies upon the same allegations, his standing to assert either a CUTPA claim or a common law claim of abuse of process are not similarly implicated.
SO ORDERED.