Summary
In Standard, it would appear that compensation was based on a consideration of a combination of both "right to control" and "nature of the work" factors.
Summary of this case from White v. Gulf Oil Corp.Opinion
No. 75-657
Decided June 3, 1976. Rehearing denied June 24, 1976. Certiorari denied July 26, 1976.
In workmen's compensation claim by employee of service station leased to dealer by oil company, Industrial Commission found oil company to be claimant's statutory employer, and oil company sought review.
Order Affirmed
1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION — Oil Company — Lessor of Service Station — Owner of Gasoline — Statutory Employer — Employee of Service Station. Where oil company owned gasoline and underground tanks at service station it leased to dealer, where it did not relinquish this ownership to lessee until the gas was pumped out of the storage tanks, and where this lease method was the only way the oil company distributed its products, that oil company was a statutory employer of employee of the service station for purposes of workmen's compensation.
Review of Order from the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado
Montgomery, Little, Young, Ogilvie, Campbell McGrew, P.C., Robert R. Montgomery, for petitioner.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, Louis L. Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
Standard Oil Company seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Commission adopting the finding of the referee that Standard Oil is the constructive statutory employer of claimant, L. J. Hawkins, within the meaning of § 8-48-101, C.R.S. 1973. When Hawkins' claim for workmen's compensation arose, he worked at a service station leased by Standard Oil to one Liggins, its dealer. On review, Standard Oil asserts that the evidence does not support the referee's finding, since it was shown that Liggins was operating his own independent business, and thus, Standard was a lessor within the meaning of § 8-48-103, C.R.S. 1973. We disagree, and therefore affirm.
Standard Oil concedes that, but for the provisions of § 8-48-103, C.R.S. 1973, this case falls squarely within the rule set forth in Continental Oil Co. v. Sirhall, 122 Colo. 332, 222 P.2d 612, that a lessor is liable as a statutory employer under § 8-48-101, C.R.S. 1973, when it is shown that the lessor operates, engages in or conducts his business by leasing his property. Standard Oil asserts, however, that the addition of § 8-48-103 to the act evidences the intention of the legislature to change the rule in Continental Oil. We do not agree.
A statute must be construed as a whole, giving effect to every part of it. See Blue River Defense Committee v. Town of Silverthorne, 33 Colo. App. 10, 516 P.2d 452. Section 8-48-103 provides that those lessors who rent property which is used for the purpose of conducting the business of the lessee are exempt from the liability imposed by § 8-48-101. We must construe the statute in the light of previous judicial decisions, see Industrial Commission v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 410 P.2d 181, in which § 8-48-101(1) has been construed to apply to businesses conducted through the activities of another under a contractual relationship. See Faith Realty Development Co. v. Industrial Commission, 170 Colo. 215, 460 P.2d 228; San Isabel Electric Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramer, 31 Colo. App. 134, 500 P.2d 821. The test, both before and after the enactment of § 8-48-103, is whether the subcontracted work is part of the regular business of the lessor. See Pioneer Construction Co. v. Davis, 152 Colo. 121, 381 P.2d 22; San Isabel Electric Ass'n, Inc., v. Bramer, supra.
[1] Here, the record shows that Standard Oil owns the gasoline and the underground tanks and does not relinquish this ownership to the lessee until the gas is pumped out of the storage tanks. Moreover, the lease method of marketing is the only method by which Standard Oil distributes its gasoline, and there are no Standard Oil stations operated by Standard Oil personnel in the Denver area. Under these circumstances, the conclusion that Standard Oil is the statutory employer is supported by competent evidence and will not be disturbed. See Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 30 Colo. App. 224, 491 P.2d 106, Tatum-Reese Development Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 30 Colo. App. 149, 490 P.2d 94.
Order affirmed.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE VAN CISE concur.