Opinion
2016–07854 Index No. 2572/10
03-28-2018
Richard STANCATI, et al., appellants, v. Janet GUNZBURG, respondent.
Dell & Dean, PLLC (Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Scott T. Horn and Arshia Hourizadeh], of counsel), for appellants. Sette & Apoznanski (Russo & Tambasco, Melville, N.Y. [Susan J. Mitola and Gerard Ferrara], of counsel), for respondent.
Dell & Dean, PLLC (Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Scott T. Horn and Arshia Hourizadeh], of counsel), for appellants.
Sette & Apoznanski (Russo & Tambasco, Melville, N.Y. [Susan J. Mitola and Gerard Ferrara], of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Julianne T. Capetola, J.), entered July 1, 2016. The judgment, upon the denial of the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of evidence, a jury verdict in favor of the defendant on the issue of liability, and the denial of the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict, is in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 may be granted only when the trial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, there is "no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party" ( Tapia v. Dattco, Inc., 32 A.D3d 842, 844, 821 N.Y.S.2d 124 ; see Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346 ). In considering such a motion, "the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant" ( Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d at 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346 ; see Cicola v. County of Suffolk, 120 A.D.3d 1379, 1381, 993 N.Y.S.2d 131 ).
Moreover, a jury verdict should not be set aside pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) as against the weight of the evidence unless the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ; Ferreira v. Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 81 A.D.3d 587, 588, 915 N.Y.S.2d 631 ; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184 ). "It is for the jury to make determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses, and great deference in this regard is accorded to the jury, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses" ( Lopreiato v. Scotti, 101 A.D.3d 829, 830, 954 N.Y.S.2d 895 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Verizon N.Y., Inc. v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 100 A.D.3d 983, 954 N.Y.S.2d 641 ).
Here, contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, it cannot be said that there was no valid line of reasoning or permissible inferences which could support the jury verdict in the defendant's favor, or that the jury could not have reached its verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence. Additionally, the issues of negligence and proximate cause were not "so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause" ( Rubin v. Pecoraro, 141 A.D.2d 525, 527, 529 N.Y.S.2d 142 ; see Zhagui v. Gilbo, 63 A.D.3d 919, 883 N.Y.S.2d 222 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motions pursuant to CPLR 4401 and 4404(a).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiffs' remaining contentions.
RIVERA, J.P., ROMAN, DUFFY and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.