Opinion
Page __
__ Cal.App.2d __ 242 P.2d 936 STAFFORD v. REALTY BOND SERVICE CORP. et al. REALTY BOND SERVICE CORP. v. STAFFORD et al. Civ. 18342, 18343. California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division April 10, 1952.Hearing Granted June 5, 1952.
Rehearing Denied April 21, 1952.
Guy N. Stafford, in pro. per.
John F. Bender and Gizella M. Allen, Los Angeles, for respondent.
HANSON, Justice pro tem.
The primary question for decision is whether the lien of a certificate of sale of a city lot sold for a delinquent assessment in 1930 was or was not extinguished on January 1, 1947, by reason of Civil Code, sec. 2911.
The regular property taxes levied against the lot in 1927 became delinquent and as a consequence the property was sold to the State and deed therefor was duly executed in 1933. In February, 1930, the City, proceeding under the Street Opening Act of 1903 (now codified as Chapter 14, Division 6, Part 1 of the Streets and Highways Code), levied an assessment against the lot. The assessment not being paid the City sold the property on December 15, 1930, and issued the appropriate certificate of sale. On October 13, 1944, the State conveyed by deed its tax title to one Lorna Stafford, who in turn by grant deed conveyed the property on May 9, 1946, to the appellant Stafford. Respondent as the holder of the certificate of title mentioned took no steps to convert into a deed the lien it possessed upon the property until 1949 when [242 P.2d 937] it procured a deed on June 20, 1949, from the Board of Public Works based on the certificate. However, prior to that time, i. e., on April 20, 1949, the appellant as plaintiff instituted an action to quiet his title naming respondent as defendant. On June 30, 1949, respondent as plaintiff instituted a separate suit against appellant as defendant in which it alleged that appellant and respondent were cotenants of the lot and prayed a partition thereof.
The trial court entered judgments in each case for the respondent as prayed by it. The two cases are, however, submitted to us on a single set of briefs.
In 1945 the legislature amended Civil Code, sec. 2911, so as to provide (with an exception not here material) that 'any lien heretofore existing or which may hereafter exist upon real property to secure the payment of a public improvement assessment shall be presumed to have been extinguished * * * on January 1, 1947 * * *. The presumptions mentioned * * * shall be conclusive in favor of a bona fide purchaser for value of said property after such dates.'
In Scheas v. Robertson, 38 Cal.2d 119, 238 P.2d 982, 987, the court said: 'Within the meaning of the 1945 amendment to section 2911 of the Civil Code, a 'bona fide purchaser is one who takes in good faith and for value and in reliance upon the presumptions afforded by [that] section'. Rombotis v. Fink, supra, 89 Cal.App.2d 378, 392, 201 P.2d 588, 596. 'A purchaser for value is presumed prima facie to be an innocent purchaser in good faith.' Fly v. Cline, 49 Cal.App. 414, 423, 193 P. 615, 619. It is evident from the record that defendants were purchasers for value. Plaintiff argues that the title report disclosed that plaintiff's bond had been issued and was unpaid of record. But the fact that defendants had actual or constructive notice of the recorded status of plaintiff's bond does not establish that they were not bona fide purchasers within the meaning of the 1945 amendment to section 2911. To so construe that section would make the concluding sentence thereof inoperative--'The presumptions mentioned in this paragraph shall be conclusive in favor of a bona fide purchaser for value of said property after such dates'--and completely frustrate the purpose of the Legislature in enacting the 1945 legislation to remedy widespread, serious economic condition in land titles throughout the state. See Rombotis v. Fink, supra, 89 Cal.App.2d 378, 390, 201 P.2d 588.'
In 1948, Presiding Justice White, speaking for the court in Rombotis v. Fink, 89 Cal.App.2d 378, 384, 201 P.2d 588, 591 said: 'These enactments reflect a clear purpose to provide a definite statute of limitations as to all liens arising under special assessments. They constitute a 'revision of the entire subject', * * *. It is plain from its comprehensive enactments that the Legislature intended to and did provide a definite statute of limitations and a definite period of time upon the expiration of which street improvement liens would be not only unenforceable by foreclosure but also would be presumed to have been extinguished; * * *.' (Emphasis added.)
Code of Civil Procedure sections 801.1 and 801.11, contrary to the contention of respondent, are not applicable to the facts of this case because these sections did not become law until October 1, 1949--several months after respondent instituted its action for partition. Hence, the controlling statute is Civil Code, sec. 2911. By that section the lien of respondent was ipso facto extinguished on January 1, 1947. Accordingly, it was not revived in favor of respondent by the enactment of Section 801.1 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure, as those sections were not in effect, as stated, when the action was instituted. Whether those sections of the statute may constitutionally be applied as to rights vested by Civil Code, sec. 2911, between January 1, 1947, and October 1, 1949, we are not called upon to determine and so express no opinion on the point.
The final contention by respondent that the case before us is controlled by the rule announced in Elbert, Ltd., v. Nolan, 32 Cal.2d 610, 197 P.2d 537, is without merit. As was said by the court in Scheas v. Robertson, 38 Cal.2d 119, 238 P.2d 982, 'the rule of Elbert, Ltd., v. Nolan is not controlling [242 P.2d 938] in cases involving facts arising subsequently to the limitation date of January 1, 1947. Accordingly, where the 1945 legislation applies, it will operate to prevent the bondholder from enforcing his lien in any manner, whether the remedy pursued be an action for partition or foreclosure. To hold otherwise, and thus permit the bondholder's lien to be enforced through one remedy but not the other, would manifestly frustrate the purpose of the 1945 legislation which was designed to preclude in any manner the enforcement of stale claims outstanding against property after the expiration of a reasonable time.'
The judgments are reversed.
WHITE, P. J., and DRAPEAU, J., concur.