Opinion
Civ. No. 99-769 (DRD).
February 26, 2001
Joseph A. Fortunato, Esq., Upper Montclair, New Jersey, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Julien X. Neals, Esq., Chasen Leyner Bariso Lamparello, P.C., Secaucus, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendants City of Paterson.
Richard Fried, Esq., Paterson, New Jersey, Attorney for Sgt. William Mott.
Patrick J. Caserta, Esq., Kessler Caserta, Paterson, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendant Officer John Gonzales.
Kevin Sisco, Esq., c/o Raymond A. Reddin, Esq., West Paterson, New Jersey, Attorney for Officer Christopher Hatzis.
O P I N I O N
Plaintiff Paul Stafford filed this lawsuit against the City of Paterson, Police Officers John Gonzales, Christopher Hatzis (pleaded as Hatris), Sergeant William Mott and John Doe defendants arising out of events leading up to his arrest, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1986, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was denied his rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and to be free from the use of excessive force. Defendants move for summary judgment, alleging that plaintiff's claims are barred by, inter alia, collateral estoppel and res judicata. For the reasons set forth herein, defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
FACTS
For purposes of this summary judgment motion, all facts and inferences will be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth. of Pa. N.J., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994). On February 20, 1997, plaintiff attended a gathering at Mariah Palace in Paterson. After fights ensued, police officers responded to Mariah Palace to break up the fights and disperse the crowd. As plaintiff exited the building through a fire door he immediately encountered Officers Gonzales and Hatzis and began to run. (Stafford Depo. at 17-18.) One of the officers hit plaintiff in the eye with a baton and told the other officer to grab plaintiff. (Stafford Depo. at 18.) Plaintiff yelled for the officers to get off of him and struggled with them. (Stafford Depo. at 19.) Plaintiff was then hit in the back of the head. (Stafford Depo. at 20.) Plaintiff fell to his knees and was hit again. (Stafford Depo. at 20.) Plaintiff testified that he lost consciousness. (Stafford Depo. at 21.) When he regained consciousness, plaintiff attempted to defend himself. (Stafford Depo. at 22.) As he tried to get up, a number of police officers held him down and attempted to place handcuffs on him. (Stafford Depo. at 22.) During the course of the struggle, one officer dispensed pepper spray. (Stafford Depo. at 22.) Plaintiff and other officers were affected by the pepper spray. (Stafford Depo. at 22.) Plaintiff testified that he never threw punches at the officers. (Stafford Depo. at 25.)
Plaintiff alleges that while being transported to the police station, Officers Gonzales and Hatzis repeatedly beat him. (Stafford Depo. at 26, 28.) Upon arriving at the police station, the officers were told that plaintiff could not be processed in his condition and had to be brought to the hospital. (Stafford Depo. at 29.) Plaintiff was eventually transported to St. Joseph's Hospital and was treated for lacerations to the back of his head and his right eye. Officer Gonzales sustained injuries to his nose and mouth.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against unknown officers with the Internal Affairs Department of the Paterson Police Department. Plaintiff did not seek to have criminal charges filed against any of the defendants.
Plaintiff was charged with violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 (terroristic threats), 2C:29-2 (two counts of preventing lawful arrest), and 2C:12-1B5A (three counts of aggravated assault). Plaintiff was found guilty of aggravated assault, resisting arrest and eluding police and is currently serving an eight-year term of incarceration in state prison.
Internal Affairs conducted an investigation, interviewed numerous witnesses (attempts to interview plaintiff were unsuccessful), and issued a report.
DISCUSSION
1. City of Paterson.
Defendant City of Paterson contends that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because plaintiff has failed to prove municipal liability.
A cause of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish (1) that the conduct complained of constituted state action or action committed while acting under color of state law and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
In order to establish liability against a municipality in a police brutality case brought under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the municipality's officers inflicted cognizable injury; (2) the officers acted pursuant to a municipal custom or policy not to adequately train or supervise; (3) there is a direct causal link between the municipal policy of custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation; and (4) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police came into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 389 (1989); Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999).
A government policy exists when a "`deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives' by city policy makers." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. Therefore, the policy must be articulated in an ordinance, rule, edict or other official statement or proclamation. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990). However, a custom exists when, although not authorized by law, a practice becomes so "permanent and well- settled" that it virtually constitutes law. Id.
In order for liability to attach to a municipality, its training or supervision must be such that "in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of the current training] so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policy makers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Hence, it will not suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct." Id. at 391. A failure to train, discipline or control can only form the basis for Section 1983 municipal liability if the plaintiff can show both contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents and circumstances under which the supervisor's actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate. Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997).
In this case, plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence indicating that the incident was caused by a policy or custom of inadequate police training or supervision on the part of the City of Paterson. Moreover, plaintiff has not produced evidence that such a policy or custom existed, nor that such a policy or custom evidenced deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality. Because plaintiff has not presented evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for plaintiff, summary judgment will be granted with respect to the City of Paterson.
2. Individual Officers.
A. Claim and Issue Preclusion
The individual officers contend that summary judgment should be granted because the constitutional violations alleged by plaintiff were or could have been raised in the underlying criminal proceeding and therefore are barred by the doctrines of claims and issue preclusion.
Claim and issue preclusion serve similar purposes. Both prevent litigation of issues that should have been or were actually decided in a prior suit so as to promote judicial economy, predictability and freedom from harassment for litigants. Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 889 F.2d 41, 44 (3d Cir. 1989). Claim preclusion will bar a suit if the subsequent action involves substantially similar or identical causes of action, issues, parties and relief as were involved in the first cause of action. See Wheeler v. Nieves, 762 F. Supp. 617, 624 (D.N.J. 1991). Claim preclusion applies only when a claim is based on the same cause of action that was previously litigated. See Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1980). The distinction between a criminal prosecution for terroristic threats, preventing lawful arrest, and aggravated assault and a civil rights action claiming unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force renders claim preclusion inapplicable in this case. See id.; Sibert v. Phelan, 901 F. Supp. 183, 186 (D.N.J. 1995). Therefore, defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion grounds is denied.
Issue preclusion precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been determined adversely to the party against whom the estoppel is asserted.Wheeler, 762 F.2d at 625. The standard for determining whether litigation of a question in a civil suit is barred by a prior criminal trial is whether the question was "distinctly put in issue and directly determined" in the criminal prosecution. Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir. 1970). The burden of establishing identity of the issues rests with the party asserting the estoppel. Hernandez, 624 F.2d at 937. In the case of a guilty verdict after a criminal trial, issues that were essential to the verdict must be regarded as having been determined by the judgment. Kauffman, 420 F.2d at 1274. In order for a court to reach such a conclusion, a court should examine the trial record (including the pleadings, evidence submitted, jury instructions, and any opinions), unless it appears from the face of the complaint that it is barred by issues decided in the prior adjudication. Id. Reasonable doubt concerning what was decided by a prior judgment should be resolved against applying claim preclusion. Id.
In the two Third Circuit Court of Appeals opinions concerning the preclusive effect of criminal convictions on subsequent civil rights actions, Kaufman, 420 F.2d 1270, and Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) (neither of which were cited by the parties), the court expressed the necessity of reviewing the record of the criminal proceedings in order to determine whether application of preclusion is appropriate. Kaufman, 420 F.2d at 1274; Basista, 340 F.2d at 81-82.Basista is particularly instructive here because that case, not unlike this one, involved a civil rights action claiming unlawful arrest and detention following a criminal conviction of assault and battery on police officers. The court concluded that because it had not been furnished an adequate record of the criminal proceedings, and in particular did not have a copy of the trial transcript, it was impossible to determine the basis for which the plaintiff was convicted. Id. at 82.
Similarly, in this case defendants have not provided any part of the record from the criminal proceedings. Without reviewing that record, the basis for the conviction cannot be determined. (Cf. Sibert, 901 F. Supp. at 187 (finding, after review of the record, that plaintiff affirmatively put into issue in his criminal trial the essential facts of the civil rights action); Wheeler, 762 F. Supp. at 626-27 (finding that where credibility of testifying officer was challenged and rejected on appeal from criminal conviction, plaintiff could not relitigate that issue in civil rights action)). Therefore, issue preclusion in inappropriate.
It is highly unlikely that the entirety of plaintiff's contentions would be governed by the doctrine of issue preclusion. He alleges assaults upon his person after he was subdued and placed in the police car under restraints. It is difficult to conceive how that conduct could become an issue in a prosecution for terroristic threats, preventing lawful arrest and aggravated assault, all of which would have taken place before his arrest and transportation in a police car. Even if it is argued that by virtue of the fact that he was convicted plaintiff's arrest was supported by probable cause, because the record has not been supplied there is no basis to conclude that the jury found that the officers did not use excessive force in effectuating the arrest.
B. Issues of Fact.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other words, "summary judgment may be granted if the movant shows that there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party." Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1988). All facts and inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth. of Pa. N.J., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994).
Substantive law controls the inquiry into which facts are "material."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could decide the issue in the nonmovant's favor. Id. Thus, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of production. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. This requires the moving party to establish either that there is no genuine issue of fact and that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law, or to demonstrate that the nonmoving party has not shown the requisite facts relating to an essential element of an issue on which it bears the burden. Id. at 322-23. Once the party moving for summary judgment has carried its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who in order to avoid summary judgment must demonstrate facts supporting each element for which it bears the burden and it must establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact that would justify a trial. Miller, 843 F.2d at 143.
However, at the summary judgment stage courts neither weigh the evidence nor make credibility determinations; those tasks are within the realm of the fact-finder. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Therefore, to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment need not produce evidence so strong that it mandates a decision in its favor. Rather, the party opposing summary judgment must present "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find" for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. 252. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient." Id.
If a moving party satisfies its initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
Defendants assert that summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiff has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support his own "self-serving" statements. Plaintiff alleges that he was battered during the course of his arrest. The Supreme Court has articulated an "objectively reasonable" standard for gauging whether force used in the course of an arrest was excessive and thus unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). That allegation gives rise to a claim of unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, and therefore it must be determined whether the force used by the police in subduing and arresting plaintiff was objectively reasonable. Id. at 396. Application of that standard requires careful attention to the totality of the circumstances of each case, "including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."Id.
In the present case, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it appears that, at least initially, no crime was committed, plaintiff was attempting to defend himself, and he was actively resisting arrest.
On these facts there is no basis for qualified immunity. It is inconceivable that "reasonable officers in [their] position at the relevant time could have believed . . . that their conduct would be lawful." Good v. Dauphin Social Serv . , 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989).
Additionally, the parties dispute whether plaintiff punched one of the officers, which goes to the question whether he posed an immediate threat to the officers. Compare Neals Cert. Exs. 1, 5 and 6 with Neals Cert. Ex. 4 and Stafford Depo. at 25. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that he was struck without provocation by Officer Gonzales and that he was restrained and repeatedly beaten while being transported to the police station. Defendants deny those allegations. These disputes create genuine issues of material fact that make it impossible to determine whether the officers used force against plaintiff during his arrest, and if so, what measure of force was used and whether it was objectively reasonable. Therefore, summary judgment with respect to the officers is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment is granted with respect to the City of Paterson and is denied with respect to the individual defendants. An appropriate order will be entered.
__________________________________ DICKINSON R. DEBEVOISE, U.S.S.D.J.
DATED: February, 2001