Opinion
No. CV 06-4025559-S
May 27, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of P.A. No. 05-230 § 2 on the ground that it creates a public emolument designed solely for the benefit of an individual. On January 25, 2008, the plaintiff, St. Paul Traveler's Ins. Co., filed this motion for summary judgment against the defendant, Sylvia Kuehl, and intervening defendants, Koskoff, Koskoff and Beider, P.C. on all four counts of its complaint dated August 31, 2006. On September 12, 2008, the defendants Koskoff, Koskoff and Beider, P.C. filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction which was denied on February 19, 2009, by this court.
I
Plaintiff argues that the court should grant summary judgment on three grounds, (1) The legislation allowing the widow, Ms. Kuehl to apply for Workers' Compensation survivor's benefits is unconstitutional because it is a public emolument; (2) P.A. 05-230, § 2 is unconstitutional because it impairs the parties' contractual rights in this Workers' Compensation claim because it is retroactive in application: finally, (3) P.A. 05-230, § 2 violates the separation of powers doctrine because it retroactively annuls a prior final judgment by the Supreme Court in violation of the Connecticut Constitution, Art 2. Appended to its supporting memorandum of the following documents filed by the plaintiff describe the factual background for this motion:
(1) Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, Inc., 265 Conn. 525, 829 A.2d 818 (2003) (The defendant Kuehl appealed the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Commissioner's denial through the court system, resulting in a final affirmation of the commissioner's denial);
(2) Kuehl v. Rosalind Koskoff and Koskoff, Koskoff Beider, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 99 0171076 (March 19, 2007, Adams, J.) [43 Conn. L. Rptr. 98];
(3) a certified affidavit by Vincent Afasano, the Workers' Compensation adjuster for the St. Paul Travelers handling the claim of Sylvia Kuehl versus Z-Loda Systems Engineering, Inc. (Testifying that Kuehl received a settlement of $1 million as executrix of Gunter Kuehl's estate);
(4) a certified affidavit by Alan M. Solomon, an attorney for the plaintiff (testifying that there was no specific agreement of settlement between Kuehl and KKB such that if any piece of legislation was passed, the claim in civil court would be immediately withdrawn);
(5) a certified affirmation from Richard Bieder, an attorney with KKB (testifying that he offered on behalf of KKB to make efforts to legislatively change the law to benefit Ms. Kuehl and others similarly affected by the Supreme Court's decision that notice did have to be filed by the widow dependent in order to preserve her claim for Workers' Compensation benefits, and, that Ms. Kuehl agreed that she would promptly withdraw her action against defendants, KKB and Rosalind Koskoff, as soon as the legislation was passed);
(6) a transcript of the proceedings before the Honorable William B. Lewis, on March 19, 2007;
(7) Public Act No. 05-230 § 2; and
(8) Legislative History-House committee notes on P.A. 05-230.
II
The defendant counters, in opposition to this motion, that the plaintiff has failed to show that (1) P.A. 05-230 § 2 violates Article 1 of the state constitution; (2) the act violates the contract clause or due process clauses of the state or federal constitutions; the act violates the separation of powers doctrine. The only supporting document appended to the defendant's opposition memoranda was a copy of the Connecticut Constitution to a supplemental memorandum submitted in response to the plaintiff's supporting supplemental memorandum.
III
The plaintiff argues that the public act is unconstitutional because it is so narrowly drawn that it is only for the benefit of a single individual, the defendant widow Kuehl, and it serves no public purpose.
CT Page 8813
[L]egislation seeking to remedy a procedural default for which the state is not responsible does not serve a public purpose and, accordingly, runs afoul of article first, § 1, of the state constitution . . . Thus, legislation cannot survive a constitutional challenge under article first, § 1, if it excuses a party's failure to comply with a statutory notice requirement simply because the noncompliance precludes consideration of the merits of the party's claim . . . Similarly, where a special act has allowed a person named therein to bring a suit based upon a statutory cause of action that would otherwise be barred for failure to comply with a time limit specified in the statute, we have ordinarily been unable to discern any public purpose sufficient to sustain the enactment. Kelly v. Univ. of Conn. Health Ctr., 290 Conn. 245, 258-59, 963 A.2d 1 (2009).
Plaintiff relies upon case law demonstrating that where a special act has allowed a person named therein to bring a suit based upon a statutory cause of action that would otherwise be time-barred for failure to comply with the statute, no public purpose has been discerned sufficient to sustain the enactment. Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, 176 Conn. 497, 503-07, 408 A.2d 254 (1979) (special act validating an appeal from a sewer assessment commenced after expiration of the time for taking such an appeal held unconstitutional); Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 107-09, 355 A.2d 1 (1974) (special act validating notice of sidewalk defect given to municipality after time allowed held unconstitutional).
In Kinney v. State, 285 Conn. 700, 941 A.2d 907 (2008) after a judge died from a heart attack, the judge's wife and administratrix, inter alia, filed a workers' compensation claim against the State alleging that his condition was causally related to work-induced stress. Our Supreme Court decided that the judge was not an employee for purposes of entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. The court found that the administratrix's action was untimely because she was forced to litigate her claim to benefits when the State appealed the workers' compensation award. Thereafter, the legislature enacted 1994 Conn. Spec. Acts 13, § 1, allowing the administratrix to file an untimely action against the State. However, the authorization in § 1 conveyed a right to only the administratrix. It did not change the notice provisions of C.G.S. § 4-148(a) and did not create relief from those requirements for others similarly aggrieved. There was no showing that the State had any action, involvement, or participation in the administratrix's failure to comply with the requirements in Chotkowski III. Consequently, because the act served no public purpose and was unconstitutional under Conn. Const. art. I, the State was entitled to summary judgment.
In the present case, it is clear that, P.A. 05-201 § 2, is also designed to benefit the widow Kuehl individually, even though it does not mention her by name. The class of persons benefitted are those "dependent of a deceased employee seeking compensation . . . arising out of the death of the deceased employee, whose date of injury was between June 1, 1991 and June 30, 1991, whose death was between November 1, 1992 and November 30, 1992 . . ." This is indeed a thinly constricted category.
IV
The plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to support its assertion that the public act in this case was narrowly drawn and passed to provide a benefit to only a single person, the widow Kuehl. Specifically, the plaintiff provided a certified affirmation from Richard Bieder, an attorney with KKB testifying that he offered on behalf of KKB to make efforts to legislatively change the law to benefit Ms. Kuehl and others similarly effected by the Supreme Court's decision that notice did have to be filed by the widow dependent in order to preserve her claim for Workers' Compensation benefits, and, that Ms. Kuehl agreed that she would promptly withdraw her action against defendants, KKB and Rosalind Koskoff, as soon as the legislation was passed. The class of persons benefitted by the law is so narrowly drawn so that it is highly unlikely that another individual would likewise benefit.
Cases cited by the defendant in opposition to this motion invoked public acts which benefitted classes of persons, not individuals. While each of these cases upheld the challenged law, none can be said to overrule Kinney, because all these cases cited preceded Kinney which was decided in 2008. Nothing offered by defendants was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.
The plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to support its motion for summary judgment and after the burden shifted to the defendant, the defendant has failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
The motion for summary judgment is granted.