Opinion
No. 89-2201
Submitted December 18, 1990 —
Decided April 3, 1991.
Courts — Mandamus to compel board of commissioners to appropriate additional funds — Burden on party that opposes the allocation to show the requested funding is unreasonable and unnecessary — Writ allowed, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 89-L-14-076.
This case involves yet another dispute between a county and a court regarding the sufficiency of an appropriation of funds by the county for the court's continued operation.
In 1989, appellant, Lake County Board of Commissioners, appropriated funds for the operation of the Lake County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division ("juvenile court"). Juvenile Court Judge Richard A. Hoose, appellee, determined that the amount of money appropriated by appellant was insufficient to meet the court's 1989 operating needs. As such, appellee issued a journal entry ordering appellant to appropriate an additional amount of money for the operation of the juvenile court. Appellee cited substandard salaries as a justification for the ordered appropriation. Specifically, appellee stated that his employees were paid less than other Lake County employees with similar job positions and, as a result, the juvenile court was losing skilled personnel which, in turn, affected the court's operations.
Judge Hoose no longer holds this position. The position is currently held by Judge William W. Weaver.
Thereafter, appellant filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Lake County alleging that appellee's ordered appropriation was unreasonable and unnecessary. Appellant sought a writ of mandamus ordering appellee to "* * * ensure his Court has reasonable and necessary funding, and no more * * *." Appellant also alleged that appellee had ordered the Lake County Auditor to raise the bi-weekly paychecks of certain juvenile court employees in such amounts as would prematurely exhaust the juvenile court's appropriated funds. Appellant claimed that such action by appellee would divest the court of appeals of any meaningful opportunity to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the ordered appropriation. Therefore, appellant also sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit appellee from enforcing his order until a meaningful review of the issues could be conducted by the court of appeals.
Appellee answered appellant's complaint and counterclaimed for a writ of mandamus directing appellant to appropriate funds in compliance with appellee's journal entry. Subsequently, appellee amended his answer and counterclaim to seek an additional order directing appellant to provide the juvenile court with funding for the payment of "overtime" compensation earned by juvenile court employees during 1989.
Appellee's amended pleading is denoted as "Amended Counterclaim." Appellee was really amending his original "Answer and Counterclaim." See Civ. R. 15(A).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals found that the additional appropriation ordered by appellee was reasonable and necessary for the continued operation of the juvenile court. Accordingly, the court of appeals granted appellee's request for a writ of mandamus and ordered appellant to fund the juvenile court in accordance with appellee's journal entry. The court of appeals denied appellant's request for a writ of mandamus and dismissed the request of appellant for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals also ordered appellant to provide funding for the payment of overtime and "extra-time" compensation in amounts stipulated to by the parties.
Appellant appealed. Contained in the record is a notice of cross-appeal filed by appellee in the court of appeals but never filed in this cause.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Steven C. LaTourette, prosecuting attorney, Michael P. Brown, William L. Sheroke and Dale R. Kondas, for appellant.
Ulrich Cantor and Abraham Cantor, for appellee.
A court of common pleas in this state has the inherent authority to require funding which is reasonable and necessary to the administration of the court's business. State, ex rel. Rudes, v. Rofkar (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 69, 71-72, 15 OBR 163, 165, 472 N.E.2d 354, 356. This court has held, time and again, that it is incumbent upon the legislative authority to provide funds which are reasonable and necessary to operate a court which requests such funding. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Giuliani, v. Perk (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 235, 43 O.O. 2d 366, 237 N.E.2d 397, and State, ex rel. Arbaugh, v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 5, 14 OBR 311, 470 N.E.2d 880. Therefore, a board of county commissioners must provide the funds requested by a court of common pleas unless the board can show that the requested funding is unreasonable and unnecessary. State, ex rel. Britt, v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. Commrs. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 1, 2, 18 OBR 1, 2, 480 N.E.2d 77, 78. The burden of proof is clearly upon the party who opposes the requested funding. Id. In effect, it is presumed that a court's request for funding is reasonable and necessary for the proper administration of the court. The purpose of this "presumption" is to maintain and preserve a judicial system and judiciary that are independent and autonomous.
In the case at bar, the court of appeals determined that appellant failed to meet its burden of establishing that the appropriation ordered by appellee was unreasonable and unnecessary. We find no compelling reason to disturb that determination. Accordingly, we conclude, as did the court of appeals, that appellee is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering appellant to fund the juvenile court in accordance with appellee's journal entry. Given this determination, it follows that appellant is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Appellant also contends that the court of appeals erred in dismissing appellant's request for a writ of prohibition. We disagree. In effect, appellant sought to prohibit appellee from operating the juvenile court under the salary schedule contained in appellee's journal entry. However, it was appellee's function to direct the operations of his court. To have provided appellant with the relief it sought would have permitted appellant to control the operation of the court even though appellee was conducting the court's business in a lawful manner.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in all respects.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.