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noting that "[i]f a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system"
Summary of this case from Naythons v. StradleyOpinion
No. 14983
January 17, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON APPLICATION FOR WAIVER OF FEES, DATED JANUARY 16, 2007
Mr. St. Germain has filed an application for waiver of fees and costs in order to file an appeal on this docket number. For the reasons set forth in the memorandum of decision dated January 10, 2007, and attached hereto, this court is not satisfied that Mr. St. Germain has a constitutional or statutory right to appeal without payment of fees, cost and expenses in a summary process case nor has Mr. St. Germain provided any authority to support his application. See Practice Book § 63-6. Therefore, the application is denied. Further, this court again has reviewed Judge Foley's prior decisions denying fee waiver for Mr. St. Germain, and reviewed all of the files, fee waiver applications before the court and the documents submitted by Mr. St. Germain in support of his application. This court finds no substantial change in circumstances that would call Judge Foley's decision into question. Therefore, for the reasons stated by Judge Foley and this court's independent review, this court finds that Mr. St. Germain is not entitled to the waiver of fees in this case. No further hearing is necessary under the particular circumstances of this case. See attached Memorandum of Decision in DN 14983. The court is aware that in Mr. St. Germain's criminal cases, this court did grant Mr. St. Germain's application for public defender representation. In those cases he faces felony counts and possible incarceration and has a constitutional and statutory right to counsel. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-297(f). The standard there is whether he has the financial ability to secure competent legal counsel. Id.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a summary process action brought by the plaintiff, Camilla Ross, against the defendant, Edwin St. Germain, seeking to evict him from the property of 276 Washington Street, Norwich, Connecticut. As discussed more fully, infra, it is clear to this court that Ms. Ross is entitled to possession and judgment in this case.
To avoid confusion, because of the number of other cases filed by Mr. St. Germain, the court will refer to the parties by their proper names rather than as the plaintiff or the defendant.
Sadly, it is also clear to this court that Ms. Ross' property rights have been abused by the relentless dilatory pleadings and tactics of the defendant. Our judicial system and its resources have suffered as well.
The basic facts of this case are simple and straight forward: the court finds that Ms. Ross is the owner of 276 Washington Street and that the defendant has admitted this fact on numerous occasions. The court also finds that Ms. Ross served a valid notice to quit upon the defendant on February 6, 2006 and proved her case to the court. The court finds that the "special defenses" and "counterclaims" raised by the defendant are completely without merit. In a normal summary process case, Ms. Ross would have obtained her judgment as a matter of course and gained forthwith the judgment of possession to which she is entitled. Mr. St. Germain, however, has made this anything but a normal summary process case.
No less than three other judges of this jurisdiction, either explicitly or implicitly, also have found Mr. St. Germain's actions to be without merit and dilatory. See the attached transcript of St. Germain v. LaBrie, et al, DN 14820, Schimelman, J., December 21, 2005 (Mr. St. Germain may not bring a summary process action regarding this property; "Mr. St. Germain is not the record titleholder . . . and had no authority . . . to sublet these particular premises to anyone . . ."); see also Judge Schimelman's April 3, 2006 Memorandum of Decision on Motion to Reargue (motion denied because St. Germain lacks standing) [ 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 144]; see the attached Memorandum of Decision, May 17, 2006, DN 14983, Foley, J., ("The pleadings in this case have been copious and voluminous. Mr. St. Germain's dilatory pleadings are a monumental tribute to delay in resolving this case); see the attached Memorandum of Decision, January 19, 2006, DN K21N CR 05 0096539, DN K21 CR 05 0095930, Foley, J., (The court finds [Mr. St. Germain's] testimony not credible and, when truthful, intentionally misleading . . . his pleadings, while novel, are tedious, voluminous and of dubious legal import." . . . if Mr. St. Germain is impecunious, it is self-imposed and will not be recognized as a basis for fee waivers); see attached order of August 22, 2006, Randolph, J., (attempt to limit the filing of motions in this case); see the attached Court Order of August 28, 2006, Randolph, J., (Court found no presumption that the property belongs to St. Germain and St. Germain may not have a motion for use and occupancy).
A court has the power to take judicial notice of relevant files involving the same party pending in other court cases. See State v. Carey, 228 Conn. 487, 497 (1994); State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 648 (1987); Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 605 (1957); DeLuca v. Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 9-10 (1919).
Further, apparently Mr. St. Germain has admitted that he also has angered a Federal Bankruptcy judge in cases that he has pending there. See the attached Memorandum of Decision, January 19, 2006 DN K21N CR05 0096539, DN K21 CR 05 0095930, Foley, J.
This court concurs with the aforementioned findings. Aware that Mr. St. Germain has appeared pro se, this court, in addition to its other duties, has spent innumerable hours both before and after the hearing on the merits going over the countless "pleadings" filed by the defendant in an attempt to glean some valid and cognizable claim therein. The attempt was as profitless as it was arduous and the court is left with the deep and abiding belief that Mr. St. Germain has purposely engaged in a "scorched earth" or "Stalingrad defense:" see e.g., Anom v. Ofori-Tenkorang, 2005 Ct.Sup., 2973, PA 01-184721 (Tierney, J.) [ 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 800]; which is aimed at frustrating the proper course of justice. "Although our courts are consistently . . . solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants, the rules of practice cannot be ignored to the detriment of other parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oakland Heights Mobile Park, Inc. v. Simon, 36 Conn.App. 432, 436, 651 A.2d 281 (1994), on appeal after remand, 40 Conn.App. 30, 668 A.2d 737 (1995).
A copy of the clerk's docket sheet for this case is attached hereto.
"[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party . . . Although we allow pro so litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Gatling, 73 Conn.App. 574, 575, 808 A.2d 710 (2002).
In addition, Mr. St. Germain, in January 2006 initiated a forcible entry and detainer action against Ms. Ross and other named defendants; see DN CV06-4005420. On April 3, 2006, Judge Haley dismissed the action on the grounds that the same issues had been determined by Judge Schimelman. Such an obstructionist aim is also evinced by Mr. St. Germain's conduct during the hearing on the merits. Despite numerous warnings by the court to Mr. St. Germain to discontinue asking irrelevant lines of questioning, he would continue with questions in the same vein until the court was forced to stop the proceedings on several occasions and issue sterner warnings. "The trial court has inherent authority to control the proceedings before it to ensure that there [is] no prejudice or inordinate delay." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v. Waterfield, Superior Court, Judicial District of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 03 0071645 (April 13, 2006, Riley, J.), citing Merritt v. Fagan, 78 Conn.App. 590, 594, 828 A.2d 685, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 916, 833 A.2d 467 (2003). Further, despite numerous admissions by Mr. St. Germain that Ms. Ross is the owner of the property, on or about August 10, 2006, Mr. St. Germain, without right to do so, filed a lis pendens under this docket number and also under another action DN 15286, which further demonstrates an intent to abuse the judicial process. This court, by a separate memorandum of decision, has ordered that lis pendens dissolved, and in DN 15286, this court has granted Ms. Ross' motion to dismiss.
The court notes further, that on July 20, 2006, Mr. St. Germain filed yet another summary process action against Ms. Ross and the people that he allowed to live in the premises, which is DN 15286. A review of this "filing" reveals that it is in substance the same claims that were dismissed by Judge Schimelman on December 21, 2005. Ms. Ross' lawyer filed a motion to dismiss on July 31, 2006, claiming it should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, asserting that St. Germain still had no standing or right to bring the action. In addition, Ms. Ross asserted that St. Germain's claims were noncognizable in a summary process case because they contained claims for monetary damages and injunctive relief. A hearing was held on August 28, 2006, before Judge Randolph, which primarily concerned DN 15286. A copy of that hearing is attached hereto.
During the course of that hearing, Ms. Ross' attorney brought up her pending motion to dismiss and additional motions filed by Mr. St. Germain. Ms. Ross' attorney noted that he considered them incomprehensible, harassing in nature, and that it was causing additional expenses for Ms. Ross. After hearing from the two parties, including a request for a default judgment by Mr. St. Germain, which was denied, the court, Randolph, J., found that the trial in re DN 14983, Ross v. St. Germain, would be dispositive of the issues in DN 15286 and scheduled the trial in DN 14983.
Thereafter in DN 15286, Mr. St. Germain filed something called "action in the nature of mandamus" with the Appellate Court, which was denied by the Appellate Court. He then drafted something called a "Motion for Reconsideration in Support of Action in the Nature of Mandamus," which has not been filed with the Appellate Court because he has requested a $70.00 fee waiver and which this court denied. This court agrees with Ms. Ross that she is entitled to a dismissal of that action as a matter of law, based upon Mr. St. Germain's lack of standing, because his claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, and because his claims are not cognizable in a summary process case. Further, the issues in DN 15286, also are dismissed for mootness inasmuch as this court finds Ms. Ross is entitled to judgment in this docket number. See Memorandum of Decision, dated January 10, 2007.
This court is not satisfied that Mr. St. Germain has a constitutional or statutory right to appeal without payment of fees, cost and expenses in a summary process case. See Practice Book § 63-6. Therefore it is denied. Further, this court has reviewed Judge Foley's prior decisions denying fee waiver for Mr. St. Germain, and reviewed all of the files, fee waiver applications before the court and the documents submitted by Mr. St. Germain in support of his application. This court finds no substantial change in circumstances that would call Judge Foley's decision into question. Therefore, for the reasons stated by Judge Foley and this court's independent review, this court finds that Mr. St. Germain is not entitled to the waiver of fees in this case. No further hearing is necessary under the particular circumstances of this case. The court is aware that in Mr. St. Germain's criminal cases, this court did grant Mr. St. Germain's application for public defender representation. In those cases he faces felony counts and possible incarceration and has a constitutional and statutory right to counsel; see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-297(f). The standard there is whether he has the financial ability to secure competent legal counsel. Id.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms . . . Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 487-88, 733 A.2d 835 (1999). "The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession." Southland Corporation v. Vernon, 1 Conn.App. 439, 443, 473 A.2d 318 (1984).
The court makes the following findings of fact: The court finds the testimony of Ms. Ross to be credible. Ms Ross is the fee simple owner of the subject premises, which is a residential dwelling and which she obtained from the defendant. Apparently, Ms. Ross and Mr. St. Germain had a personal relationship and cohabitated in the house from 1997 to 1999, but the relationship ended at some point, Ms. Ross left and Mr. St. Germain was allowed to remain but was supposed to make the mortgage payments. In 2005, the amount of the mortgage payment was $1,843.00. During the summer of 2005, without Ms. Ross' consent, and indeed, against her express wishes, Mr. St. Germain allowed people to move into the premises. At some point Mr. St. Germain stopped making the mortgage payments but never told Ms. Ross, but when she found out she was forced to bring the mortgage current. Then, prior to November 2005, Mr. St. Germain agreed to make payments to Ms Ross on a weekly basis for his current use of the premises and to repay the missed mortgage payments.
On November 19, 2005, Mr. St. Germain was arrested as a result of an altercation with someone on the property and a protective order was issued which forbid the defendant from entering the premises of 276 Washington Street, Norwich, Connecticut. This protective order is still in effect. See DN CR05-96539.
At the end of November 2005, Mr. St. Germain began a summary process action against Ms. Ross and the people that he had allowed to live in the premises without Ms. Ross' consent. As noted, this action was dismissed by Judge Schimelman because Mr. St. Germain had no right to bring it.
In December 2005, Ms. Ross made it clear that she did not want Mr. St. Germain occupying the premises by virtue of serving him with a notice to quit, claiming that he had failed to pay weekly rent. She also filed a summary process claim against him, but it was dismissed due to a defect.
Thereafter, Ms. Ross hired an attorney and began the present action by filing a valid notice to quit. The plaintiff's notice to quit notified Mr. St. Germain that he was to quit possession of 276 Washington Street because of 1) termination of lease by lapse of time, and 2) "You once had a right or privilege to occupy the premises but that right to occupy has terminated." The court finds from the evidence presented that the plaintiff has met her burden under either theory of the notice to quit. Therefore, judgment will enter on her behalf.
As noted, Mr. St. Germain has filed an "answer," "special defenses" and "counterclaims." While Mr. St. Germain has appeared pro se, that cannot excuse what the court finds to be meritless, frivolous and dilatory claims. "There are no special rules authorizing a lesser standard of compliance for pro se parties. Any litigant may choose to proceed without representation, but all are bound by the same standards." Basilicato v. Department of Public Utility Control, 197 Conn. 320, 324, 497 A.2d 48 (1985). "[T]he right to appear pro se, like the right of an attorney to appear for a client, is not absolute but subject to the condition that the rules of practice be followed. The right will be forfeited upon the repeated and wilful failure to follow the rules or the repeated filing of frivolous pleadings." Fairfield University v. Newton, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, Docket No. 93 0307005 (March 14, 1996, Levin, J.).
"The signing of any pleading, motion, objection or request shall constitute a certificate that the signer has read such document, that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 4-2(b). "Courts have an inherent power to disregard . . . pleadings which have been interposed for the purpose of thwarting the orderly progress of a case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tolland Bank v. Larson, 28 Conn.App. 332, 336, 610 A.2d 720 (1992).
Claims for money damages are not permitted in summary process cases. "[T]he nature of a summary process proceeding under the [Landlord and Tenant] Act is one for possession and any responsive pleading must be related to the issue of possession or occupancy. A counterclaim that seeks relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages is not permitted in a summary process action because prayers for monetary relief do not implicate the right to possession. Fellows v. Martin, 223 Conn. 152, 154, [ 611 A.2d 412] (1992) . . . Complaints and counterclaims seeking money damages are not permitted in summary process lawsuits, either tenant, against landlord or landlord against tenant. Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe, 131 Conn. 528, 531, [ 41 A.2d 109] (1945)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perrone Realty, LLC v. JP Enterprises of New Milford, LLC, Superior Court, Judicial District of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 1810093 (July 22, 2005, Shaban, J.) [ 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 696].
As noted, the court has reviewed Mr. St. Germain's answer, "special defenses" and "counterclaims" which were filed in this case. They are verbose, at times nonsensical and frivolous; and almost completely bereft of pertinent legal authority. It is not necessary for the court to deal with them in any detail except to note that they are improper for several basic reasons.
The court agrees with Ms. Ross' "Reply to Special Defenses" that Mr. St. Germain's "special defenses" are incomprehensible and fail to apprise the plaintiff of the factual basis of the alleged "defenses" and that filing a request to revise by Ms. Ross would have only generated more cost and delay to her case without any hope of receiving a more comprehensible revised pleading.
First, Mr. St. Germain's claims are no more than an attempt to reassert the summary process action that was dismissed by Judge Schimelman on December 21, 2006, because Mr. St. Germain had no right to bring it. Mr. St. Germain still does not have such a right. Moreover, with the exception of Ms. Ross, the claims pertain to parties who are not before the court. See attached transcript. This court has not heard or found anything in the voluminousrecord before it that would cast any doubt on Judge Schimelman's decision, or Judge Hurley's either.
Mr. St. Germain's request to join these alleged parties was denied by the court on May 17, 2006; see order of Foley, J.; and a "Motion to Reargue Motion for Joinder" was denied by the court, Foley, J., on June 7, 2006.
Second, as part of Mr. St. Germain's counterclaims, his claims for relief request a hearing in monetary damages for each and every counterclaim. As noted, such claims are improper and cannot stand. Fellows v. Martin, 223 Conn. 152, 154, (1992). Finally, the court is of the opinion that they were interposed for the purposes of delay and thus should be disregarded on that ground also.
Mr. St. Germain specifically states in his "special defenses" that the "counterclaim" "shall be considered included as made part hereto." Thus, he has additionally, and just as fatally infected his "answer" and "special defenses."
On January 5, 2007, Mr. St. Germain filed more "motions" in DN 14983 and DN 15286 entitled "Emergency Motions for Hearing."
This "motion" filed under DN 15286 and 14983 references the temporary injunction issued by Judge Hurley in KNL-CV06-4005044, the action which Judge Hurley dismissed on the merits on April 3, 2006. Mr. St. Germain did not file an application for waiver of fees to appeal until August 7, 2006, which was initially denied on October 10, 2006, by Gordon, J. On December 22, 2006, the court, Gordon, J., sua sponte, reversed its decision and waived the fees. Mr. St. Germain has since filed an appeal in that docket number.
The present motion is at best frivolous and vexatious and perhaps intentionally misleading. The court and court staff wasted considerable time on January 5th to unravel the true procedural facts contained therein. The motion was without merit and denied that day.
In addition, this court is aware through the clerk's office that Mr. St. Germain has made innumerable and unnecessary phone calls and visits to the clerk's office, further distracting the court staff and wasting judicial resources. This behavior was noted previously by Judge Foley; see Memorandum of Decision, dated January 19, 2006. Not only has this behavior not abated, but it may have increased.
This court further notes that should such filings continue, it would entertain a motion enjoining Mr. St. Germain from filing frivolous vexatious and harassing litigation.
"[T]he court has the inherent authority to enjoin vexatious litigation. 'It is well settled that equity may enjoin vexatious litigation . . . This power of equity exists independently of its power to prevent a multiplicity of actions. It is based on the fact that it is inequitable for a litigant to harass an opponent, not for the attainment of justice, but out of malice . . . To be vexatious, litigation must be prosecuted not only without probable cause but also with malice.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trinity United Methodist Church v. Cleaver, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 04 4000933 (October 20, 2006, Peck, J.), citing Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Pearson, 139 Conn. 186, 194, 91 A.2d 778 (1952); see also Adgers v. Keller, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 05 4004154 (February 21, 2006, Jones, J.) (where plaintiff was enjoined from filing new civil actions or writs of habeas corpus without prior court approval).
"[I]n determining whether or not to restrict a litigant's future access to the courts, [the court] should consider the following factors: (1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g, does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties. Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties." Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1099, 107 S.Ct. 1323, 94 L.Ed. 175 (1987).
"If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hong Mai v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2005).
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Ross is entitled to judgment of possession. Judgment shall enter accordingly.
As if more evidence of the vexatious and harassing nature of the litigation in this case was needed, on January 9, 2007, Mr. St. Germain filed yet another set of applications for waivers of fees for the apparent purposes of filing another Entry Detainer proceeding and a lockout complaint and application for temporary injunction, all pertaining to 276 Washington Street, Norwich, despite the fact that such claims have been dismissed on previous occasions.