Opinion
HHDCV176080961S
10-11-2018
TARA ST. GERMAIN v. ROCKINGHAM, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Budzik, J.
Defendant, Rockingham, LLC, objects to plaintiff’s, Tara St. Germain, demand for a trial de novo after issuance of a decision by a non-binding arbitrator pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549y. Rockingham objects to the demand for a trial de novo on the grounds that General Statutes § 52-549z limits such requests to "a party who did not fail to appear at the hearing." Rockingham asserts that because Ms. St. Germain did not appear personally at the arbitration hearing, but only appeared through her counsel, she is barred by § 52-549z from seeking a trial de novo. For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees with the defendant and therefore sustains Rockingham’s objection to Ms. St. Germain’s demand for a trial de novo.
FACTS
Ms. St. Germain filed suit on June 27, 2017, alleging that she slipped and fell on premises owned by the defendant and that Ms. St. Germain suffered injuries from her fall. See Compl. Ms. St. Germain alleges negligence on the part of Rockingham. Id. The case was eventually placed on the arbitration docket (over the plaintiff’s apparent objection [see Doc. 113.00] ) pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549n. An arbitration proceeding was held on August 10, 2018. See Arb. Decision. Both sides were represented by counsel at the arbitration. Id. In addition to its counsel, a representative of Rockingham attended the arbitration and testified. Id. Ms. St. Germain did not attend the arbitration. Reply, 1; Arb. Decision, 1. Ms. St. Germain’s counsel attended the arbitration and offered medical records and photographs in support of Ms. St. Germain’s claim. See Arb. Decision. On the basis of this evidence, the arbitrator concluded as follows: "[p]laintiff’s counsel suggested that there was a broken window in the staircase which allowed rain to get in and thus that the stairway was wet at the time that Plaintiff slipped. However, there was no actual evidence of this, either in the form of live testimony or even a statement given by Plaintiff. The photographs submitted are, by themselves, inconclusive as to any defective condition of the stairway. On the basis of the evidence submitted, the undersigned must conclude that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden ..." Id. The arbitrator filed his decision on August 28, 2018. The plaintiff filed her demand for a trial de novo on August 31, 2018, to which the defendant objected on September 5, 2018.
Plaintiff’s counsel states that "[t]here was some confusion which caused the absence of the Plaintiff, herself ..." but provides no further explanation for Ms. St. Germain’s absence. Reply, 1.
ANALYSIS
General Statutes § 52-549y states in relevant part that "[w]here a party fails to appear at the hearing, the arbitrator shall nonetheless proceed with the hearing and shall make a decision, as may be just and proper under the facts and circumstances of the action, which shall be entered as a judgment forthwith by the court." Section 52-549z(a) states: "[a] decision of the arbitrator shall become a judgment of the court if no appeal from the arbitrator’s decision by way of a demand for a trial de novo is filed ..." Section 52-549z(c) states: "[f]or the purpose of this section the word ‘decision’ shall include a decision and judgment rendered pursuant to subsection (a) of section 52-549y, provided the appeal is taken by a party who did not fail to appear at the hearing ..." (Emphasis added.)
Several courts have interpreted the language at issue in this matter- "a party who did not fail to appear at the hearing"- in the context of an objection to a demand for a trial de novo. See Griffith v. Johnson, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-13-6036742 (December 10, 2014, Bellis, J.) ; Mancusi v. Sondelski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-05-5001367-S (May 13, 2008, Lager, J.) ; Tartaris v. Laffin, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-98-0413272-S (February 2, 2000, Alander, J.) (26 Conn.L.Rptr. 436) Black v. Hamann, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-98-0412165-S (February 17, 1999, Silbert, J.). These courts have uniformly held that where a defendant appears at an arbitration only through counsel, and fails to appear in person, a demand for a trial de novo under § 52-549z is still permissible. The rationale for this rule is two-fold. First, because of the legislature’s use of the word "appear," courts have interpreted the legislature as referring to the concept of an attorney filing an appearance on behalf of a client. See e.g., Black v. Hamann, supra (stating that "the concept of ‘appearance’ in judicial proceedings has long been understood to imply personal appearance or appearance by counsel" [Emphasis in original.] ). Thus, these courts have interpreted the requirement in § 52-549z that a party "appear" to refer to an appearance by counsel only, not the individual bringing the suit. See Mancusi v. Sondelski, supra ; Griffith v. Johnson, supra ; Black v. Hamann, supra ; Tartis v. Laffin, supra .
No court has considered § 52-549z on the facts presented here, where plaintiff’s counsel appears, but the plaintiff herself does not. See also Rodriguez v. Granada, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-15-6049393 (April 19, 2016, Arnold, J.) (holding that plaintiff cannot demand a trial de novo under § 52-549z where neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s attorney appear for arbitration).
Second, courts have noted that the purpose of § 52-549z is to reduce the back log of cases in superior court by encouraging the settlement of "smaller" cases short of a full jury trial. See Griffith v. Johnson, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-13-6036742 (stating that "[t]he purpose of § 52-549z ... was to reduce the judicial backlog in civil cases. See 24 S. Proc., Pt. 23, 1982 Sess., p. 7665. The hope was that some of the cases for lesser value would settle after arbitration, instead of continuing to wait for a jury trial. See 25 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1982 Sess., p. 3657-58"); Tartaris v. Laffin, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-98-0413272-S (stating that "[t]he purpose underlying the statute establishing the arbitration process is to reduce the backlog of civil cases awaiting jury trials by diverting cases of lesser value to arbitration in hope that some of the cases will settle as a result"); Caputo v. Blackie, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-97-0402197-S (September 10, 2000, Silbert, J.) ("[T]he arbitration program ... was designed to clear congestion in the Connecticut civil jury dockets"). Because a defendant bears no burden of proof and may not have meaningful evidence to offer if liability is undisputed, courts have reasoned that a defendant’s personal presence would serve little purpose. Therefore, courts have reasoned, the statute’s purpose of encouraging settlement is not offended by the defendant’s failure to attend the arbitration. In such cases, the parties are still able to present their evidence through counsel or in person (if they choose to attend), receive a neutral arbitrator’s assessment of the value of the case, and consider the advisability of settlement in light of that information. See Griffith v. Johnson, supra (stating that the "purpose of § 52-549z is fulfilled by an arbitration proceeding attended by the defendant through his counsel. Such a scenario affords both parties the opportunity to see what an impartial decision maker would do when presented with the claims of each party and to settle the case in accordance with the decision of the arbitrator. The presence of the defendant’s attorney at the arbitration hearing means that he will be aware of the basis of the arbitrator’s award, if any, and in a position to advise the defendant on whether the award should be accepted." [quoting Tartaris with approval] ).
Despite the uniformity of previous opinions in this area, the court nevertheless reaches a different conclusion for the following reasons.
The court is confronted with an issue of statutory interpretation. The question before the court is what did the legislature mean when it used the words "a party who did not fail to appear at the hearing." When confronted with an issue of statutory interpretation, the court’s first duty is to assess the plain meaning of the words of the statute. See General Statutes § 1-2z. "When construing a statute, we first look to its text, as directed by General Statutes § 1-2z, which provides: The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’ " Genesky v. East Lyme, 275 Conn. 246, 253-54, 881 A.2d 114 (2005).
Here, the court concludes that the plain meaning of the language in § 52-549z is subject to two reasonable interpretations depending on which words the court chooses to emphasize. The court certainly understands that the legislature’s use of the word "appear" can be reasonably interpreted to refer to the concept of an attorney appearing on behalf of a client, as other courts have held. Nevertheless, the court cannot ignore that an equally reasonable interpretation of § 52-549z could focus on the legislature’s use of the word "party." Under this interpretation, a court could conclude that the legislature intended no special meaning when it included the word "appear" in § 52-549z. Instead, the legislature intended to place an obligation of attendance on the party, not the lawyer, and evidenced that intent by using the word "party," not lawyer or counsel. Thus, under this reading, § 52-549z can be reasonably interpreted according to its plain text as meaning that a party who does not appear at, i.e., come to, the arbitration may not file a demand for a trial de novo. On the basis of this reasoning, the court finds that § 52-549z is ambiguous. See DaimlerChrysler Services North America, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 274 Conn. 196, 203, 875 A.2d 28 (2005) ("The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] )
When confronted with an ambiguous statute, the court is permitted to look beyond the words of a statute to the statute’s legislative history and the intent of the legislature in passing the statute. Wilton Meadows Ltd. Partnership v. Coratolo, 299 Conn. 819, 825, 14 A.3d 982 (2011) ("When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter ..." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ) Here, it is undisputed that the legislature’s intent in passing § 52-549z was to reduce the back log of smaller cases that the legislature perceived as clogging the courts. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mottolese, 261 Conn. 521, 529, 803 A.2d 311 (2002) ("The provision by the legislature for an alternative means of dispute resolution through the use of arbitrators to hear cases claimed for a jury trial was but a part of an effort to alleviate court congestion." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] )
Additionally, and importantly to the court’s analysis, it seems plain that in passing § 52-549z, the legislature intended § 52-549z to mean the same thing regardless of whether it was applied to a defendant or a plaintiff. There is certainly no indication in the statute itself that when the legislature wrote "a party who did not fail to appear at the hearing," the legislature intended different meanings depending on whether that language was being applied to a defendant versus a plaintiff. Thus, to the extent § 52-549z is referring only to the appearance of counsel, it must be true for both defendant’s and plaintiff’s counsel. In other words, if § 52-549z means the defendant does not have to attend in person, it must also mean that the plaintiff does not have to appear in person either. Interpreting § 52-549z in such a way as to allow both the plaintiff and the defendant to skip personal participation in the arbitration appears to this court to undermine the statute’s fundamental purpose of encouraging settlement of certain cases.
First, allowing both the plaintiff and the defendant to avoid personal participation in the arbitration plainly encourages both parties not to take the arbitration as a serious opportunity to assess their cases. Both parties could simply send their attorneys to present whatever half-hearted presentation they could manage without their clients’ presence, confident in their ability to seek a trial de novo. Cf. Caputo v. Blackie, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-97-0402197-S (holding that "[a] party and an attorney who make a sham out of an arbitration mandated by our statutes" are precluded from seeking a trial de novo ). That is hardly an opportunity for both parties to see what a neutral decision maker would do when presented with the claims of each party. Indeed, that is exactly what happened in this case as plaintiff’s counsel was hampered in presenting his case by the lack of testimony from Ms. St. Germaine. Neither Ms. St. Germaine nor Rockingham can meaningfully assess settlement options when the arbitrator’s decision is expressly based on a lack of evidence, and, moreover, a lack of evidence that will surely be cured at trial when Ms. St. Germaine does testify.
Second, the court notes the positive effect of a party’s personal participation in a proceeding on the possibility of settlement. It is far easier to over value one’s legal position from the comfort of home or office than when sitting in the courthouse. Our Practice Book recognizes this fact by requiring parties to personally attend pretrial proceedings and by providing judges with the authority to require insurance adjusters to attend pretrial proceedings in person. See Practice Book § 14-13 ("Parties and their attorneys shall attend the pretrial session ... [T]he judge or judge referee, in his or her discretion [may require] the attendance of the [insurance] adjuster at the pretrial"); see also Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 155 Conn. 609, 614, 236 A.2d 466 (1967) ("It is a proper exercise of the judicial office to suggest the expediency and practical value of adjusting differences and compromising and settling suits at law. The efficient administration of the courts is subserved by the ending of disputes without the delay and expense of a trial, and the philosophy or ideal of justice is served in the amicable solution of controversies. Our rules specifically provide for the procedure to be followed in pretrial sessions designed to encourage the settlement of cases").
Finally, the court also notes that it is frequently beneficial to settlement for the parties themselves to properly understand the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. Attorneys, who commonly represent clients on "small" personal injury cases on a daily basis, are generally well able to assess the settlement value of their cases. By contrast, parties are likely to have little or no experience in assessing the settlement value of lawsuits and are, understandably, more personally invested in their case, having actually sustained the injury or lived through the events at issue. Parties, far more than lawyers, would benefit from personally witnessing how their case might present to a neutral arbitrator.
Therefore, in construing the ambiguous language of § 52-549z, the court concludes that interpreting § 52-549z as requiring the personal presence of the parties at the arbitration, rather than simply the appearance of counsel, is both consistent with the statute’s plain language and better supports the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.
The defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s demand for a trial de novo is sustained. Judgment shall enter in accordance with the arbitrator’s decision filed August 28, 2018.